Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 82

Draft Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief Far East (Ridgway)¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 12, 1952.

1. Careful consideration has been given here to methods whereby impasse in negotiations reported by ur HNC 1033² may be broken. View here is that future tactics in armistice negotiations should:

a. Make unmistakably clear to Commies what are in fact our minimum positions and disabuse them of any misconceptions concerning possible success of continuation their present tactics in bringing about modifications in our minimum positions.

b. Bring to a conclusion further apparently fruitless discussions between delegations at Panmunjom while not modifying our consistent posture of continued willingness to negotiate and making Commies bear entire onus for any breaking off of negotiations.

c. Require the Commies shortly clearly to show whether they are willing enter into armistice upon basis already agreed points and our minimum positions on remaining points.

d. If Commies break off negotiations have break come about in context several unresolved issues on all which Commie position is one of intransigence rather than single issue which may result in strong pressures on US to compromise principles on such an issue whatever it may be.

e. While bringing maximum pressures on Commies to agree to armistice on basis our minimum terms and not compromising any our basic principles, carry out foregoing so as to reduce prestige factors militating against Commie acceptance our positions.

2. View here is that foregoing objectives can best be obtained by the following procedure:

a. Discussion remaining three basic issues (Soviet Union as member neutral inspection organization, airfields, and forcible repatriation POWs) be moved to plenary sessions full delegations, with primary emphasis placed on POW question.

b. Discussions in plenary be carried on only so long as is required for you to complete plans for implementation of directive to identify and remove from POW status those POWs held by UNC who you consider would be so fearful of their lives if returned to Commie control that they may be expected violently to resist repatriation along lines set forth JCS 902159.³

c. When you are prepared to implement plan for POWs held by UNC accordance foregoing paragraph, request a meeting between yourself and two opposing commanders.

d. If and when proposal for foregoing meeting is accepted implement the plans for POWs envisioned in paragraph b, timing the implementation thereof and the date of the meeting so that you will be able at that meeting to make announcement to Commies along lines set forth paragraph 2, JCS 902159. (In the meantime the highest possible degree of security would be maintained concerning the action being taken re POWs.)

e. At meeting envisioned by foregoing paragraph c you would:

(1) Make announcement to Commies re POWs along lines paragraph 2, JCS 902159.

(2) Indicate desire and willingness immediately to discuss and settle airfields and Soviet Union as neutral inspector issues in such a manner as to make it entirely clear that your position on both of these questions as well as on POW question are completely interrelated and that Commies as well as public opinion cannot interpret action as any willingness to concede on one without Commies acceptance of others. Your position on airfields would be to concur in the elimination from the armistice agreement of any mention of airfield reconstruction or rehabilitation. Your position on the Soviet Union would be along lines set forth paragraph 2, JCS 902160.⁴ Positions on both issues would be presented as UNC concessions in interest prompt attainment armistice.

(3) Express willingness forthwith to sign armistice on foregoing basis, and expectation that two opposing commanders as parties principal will be able and willing to do the same.

(4) If, as is likely, opposing commanders demur and request time for consideration, your position would be that of complete willingness again to meet with them at such time as they are prepared to accept your proposals. In the meanwhile, any requests for meetings of delegations would be countered with expression of your willingness to meet with opposing commanders when they are prepared accept your proposals.

3. Your position in meeting envisioned in paragraph 2e would be given the maximum possible support by simultaneous high level US Govt statements and diplomatic action.

4. Request your comments soonest.

1. This draft was prepared in the Department of State by Johnson and sent to Matthews, Bohlen, Nitze, and Hickerson for suggestions. It was then considered at the State-JCS meeting of Mar. 12, 1952; for the text of a memorandum of discussion at the meeting, see supra.
2. Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.
3. Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
4. Dated Feb. 27, p. 71.