795.00/4–2453
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Subject:
- Future Security of Republic of Korea.
Participants:
- Dr. You Chan Yang, Ambassador, Republic of Korea
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Ambassador Yang came in to see me at 2:45 today by appointment. On handing me the attached Aide-Mémoire from his Government, he stated that President Rhee and the Korean people were extremely concerned over press reports that the United States was prepared to let Chinese Communist forces remain in Korea. He said that he wished again to express the strong opposition of his people to any such thing because it would mean in their view the death of Korea.
Since his opening remarks seemed so out of key with the recent efforts of the highest United States authorities to understand Korean anxieties, I felt called upon to speak frankly and firmly to the Ambassador. I first told him that there was nothing much for me to add, since President Eisenhower himself had communicated a personal message direct to President Rhee by letter and by instructions to Ambassador Briggs and since the Secretary of State had recently discussed this whole matter at length with the Ambassador.2 I emphasized the great importance to Korea of the President’s and the Secretary’s interest and efforts to understand and be helpful in so far as they could. I also tried to impress upon Ambassador Yang that in my short time in the Department I had found nothing but complete sympathy for Korea’s future security and a desire to do everything feasible to ensure it. I again assured him that we fully understood their position regarding Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the deep preoccupation of all Koreans over their future security.
Apparently the Ambassador was not familiar with the President’s messages to President Rhee, for Dr. Yang remarked that such communications merely expressed friendly sentiments in general terms, while the people of Korea wanted to hear some concrete assurances. I replied that President Rhee’s letter to President Eisenhower and the latter’s reply were couched in anything but general and friendly sentiments. On [Page 934] the contrary, they expressed the record in clear and unmistakable terms.
I told the Ambassador that the United States Government was disturbed and shocked by the incident that took place before the American Embassy in Pusan on April 23.3 This did not seem to us to be the evidence of cooperation that was so necessary at this vital time between our two peoples. I suggested that we would greatly appreciate the best possible sort of relationship between our two Governments right now, and not the kind illustrated by that incident.
I then pointed out that we are facing an issue of the greatest complexity all over the world. The American people fully realize that the ROK and the United States face a common foe. We can never forget for a minute that Communism exists around the whole perimeter of the world, and that if it breaks out in Indochina or Korea it can break out in the rest of the world. That is what we have to consider constantly. Therefore, the President and the Secretary of State have undertaken a most difficult and even dangerous task of testing Soviet intentions and finding ways to settle the basic problem confronting the ROK, the United States and the rest of the free world. Until the basic problem is settled, many others, however important they may seem will remain unsolved.
As Ambassador Yang returned again to his statement that Chinese Communist forces can not be left under any circumstances in Korea, I replied that the solution of the basic problem is not touched by moving the line of military contact with the enemy in Korea. The basic threat remains in the USSR and Communist China, whether the line is at the Yalu, at the “waist” or where it is at present. He indicated agreement, but still maintained that the Koreans would face a most difficult situation if any Chinese forces are left in Korea, which seemed to be the probability. As evidence, he cited the recent, well-known article in the New York Times regarding the division of Korea at the “waist”. I told him in no uncertain terms that there was absolutely nothing to that story and that he should ignore it.
Ambassador Yang then asked me what kind of settlement we were proposing to make with the Communists at Panmunjom, and whether we would agree if the Communists proposed a settlement on the basis of the present battle line, by which they would retain control in North Korea and we would maintain our position in South Korea. I replied that this question was of such complexity that I could not possibly attempt to speculate what proposals the Communists might make or how [Page 935] we might respond. Ambassador Yang remarked that apparently the United States and the United Nations had no plans or policies, while he and his President knew exactly what plans the Communists would have for the future of Korea. I told him that what I had said did not mean that at all, but only that I was not in a position to elaborate on a hypothetical situation.
The Ambassador then said that, while the United Nations had repelled the aggression in Korea, it was supposed to restore conditions of stability throughout Korea. However, he pointed out that the United Nations had not come through on a number of its policies with respect to Korea. He claimed, for example, that the United Nations embargo on Communist China was not working and that a large volume of strategic commodities were still flowing into Communist China, particularly from United Kingdom sources. Mr. Young and I both told him in some detail that he was completely misinformed on this subject. I also repeated to him the statement of Secretary Dulles that war is not an instrument of our foreign policy nor of the United Nations.
Ambassador Yang stated that the demonstration before the Embassy was tragic and that he, too, agreed that there must be complete cooperation between both Governments. He assured me that we could count on the full cooperation of his Government. I replied that I was most glad to have this assurance and that he must know how deeply concerned we are for Korea’s security. However, I pointed out again that decisions on Korea are not unilateral ones for the United States to make alone, but involve the whole United Nations.
With that, the conversation ended abruptly. The Ambassador changed the subject.
- This memorandum was drafted by Young.↩
- Robertson’s references were to the letter of Apr. 23, the message contained in telegram 653 to Pusan, Apr. 15, and the discussion between Dulles and Yang reported in memorandum of conversation, Apr. 8, pp. 929, 912, and 897, respectively.↩
- The reference was to an officially inspired demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Pusan where a group of marchers attempted to break into the Embassy and were stopped when a U.S. Marine guard fired a shot in the air. The demonstrators included a Korean Police band and 50 members of the Korean National Assembly. (Memorandum by Young to Robertson, Apr. 24, 1953; 795.00/4–2453)↩