Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief Far East (Clark)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, April 22, 1953—7:11 p.m.

JCS 937205. From: CSUSA for CINCUNC. JCS have directed me to dispatch the following reur C 62022:¹

1. There follows basic instructions for your guidance in conduct of armistice negotiations. It is the intent of this guidance to provide you with the general outline of the U.S. position on the basic issues. Within this framework you are accorded broad negotiating latitude in your effort to obtain an armistice. Questions should be referred to JCS for decision only when: (a) you consider it desirable or necessary to obtain governmental approval of a specific substantive position, or (b) indicated specifically within these instructions. We are prepared to handle any such matters expeditiously. Ambassador Murphy is to be available to assist you at your level in analyzing and assessing any political implications that may be involved in your action. State is issuing separate instructions to Murphy in consonance with those contained herein.²

2. The following are general considerations which should govern your conduct of the negotiations:

a. It is in the interests of the U.S. to obtain an acceptable armistice.

b. The U.S. stands firm on and will not compromise the principle of no forced repatriations.

c. While we have no assurance that the Chou En-lai–Kim Il-Sung proposal is advanced in good faith, our official attitude on this proposal or similar proposals will be to take them at face value until proved to the contrary.

d. The U.S. will not countenance prolonged and inconclusive negotiations; however, no specific time limit can be set at this time. Negotiations will not be unilaterally recessed by UNC without authority from JCS.

e. We believe 16 April Harrison letter has put us in favorable position of having taken initiative and that UNC Delegation should attempt to maintain this initiative.

f. As you recall early in the negotiation it appeared Communists were less concerned about disposition of Korean non-repatriates than of Chinese. It would, therefore, appear desirable that effort be made in early stage of negotiations to attempt to confine processing of non-repatriates under Chou En-lai proposal to Chinese non-repatriates, and to reach understanding with Communists to release Korean non-repatriates in Korea without further processing.

g. Any of the solutions to the POW question previously put forward by the UNC, or, if implemented as set forth below, the Chou En-laiKim Il-Sung proposal provide an acceptable framework on which to base a detailed POW agreement.

3. In order for Chou En-lai proposal to be acceptable to U.S. the following elements should be incorporated therein:³

a. The single question of the selection of a neutral state is one in which you are not given the same discretion as in the others. You are authorized and directed to press for Switzerland or Sweden in that order. We would prefer Switzerland and believe that in most respects it is the logical country to fill the role, and we see no reason why one of these two should not be accepted. If you fail in both you must ask for further instructions. Obviously neither the Soviet Union nor a Soviet satellite can be considered.

b. The neutral state will assume custody of the non-repatriates in Korea. The physical movement of non-repatriates to the neutral state should not be considered.

c. We consider that at least the following elements must be present in some form in any terms or reference for the “neutral state”.

(1) A specified time limit should be established during which non-repatriates would remain in custody of the “neutral state”. While 60 days considered reasonable and sufficient you are authorized to agree to a period up to 90 days, if necessary to obtain agreement.

(2) Conditions under which access to non-repatriates is granted should be such as to prevent abuse of the privilege and to assure that coercion and force are not employed against non-repatriates. Any such arrangements should be reciprocal.

(3) Arrangements should be made by the neutral state promptly to repatriate any of those originally classed as non-repatriates who during period of custody indicate to the neutral state desire for repatriation. The neutral state shall be the final authority as to whether or not an individual does in fact desire repatriation.

(4) At the termination of the period of custody set forth in sub-para (1) above, non-repatriates shall be free to proceed to an available destination of their choice in accordance with necessary and appropriate arrangements made by the neutral state. Terms of reference should not preclude Chinese from proceeding to Formosa or Koreans from remaining within the ROK.

4. As any neutral such as Switzerland will find it extremely difficult if not impossible to meet the manpower requirements indicated in ur C 61968⁴ as being required to take full custody in Korea of both Korean and Chinese non-repatriates it would, in addition to consideration mentioned para 2 f be desirable from practical point of view that processing non-repatriates be confined to Chinese, and/or provide that neutral state will exercise only technical custody.

5. In absence of practical alternative, action indicated para 2, ur C 61971,⁵ is approved. Suggest that discussion of military demarcation line be deferred until agreement on POWs is obtained unless in your view negotiation advantage could be obtained from such prior discussion. Similarly view here is that discussion of any other possible subjects should be deferred until agreement POW question reached.

1. Supra.
2. The instructions under reference were transmitted in telegram 2489, infra.

3. When these instructions were forwarded to Acting Secretary Smith in draft on Apr. 21, subparagraph 3 a read as follows:

   “Neither the USSR nor a Soviet satellite. nor India is acceptable as the ‘neutral state’. While we would prefer Switzerland and believe that in most respects it is the logical country to fill the role, we would also be willing to accept Sweden or Norway. We see no reason why one of these should not be acceptable and you are not authorized to agree to any other country. Agreement should first be reached on the neutral state. Once this is done the other questions outlined below should be capable of ready resolution.”

   According to a telegram from Smith to Dulles, who had left Washington on Apr. 21 for NATO meetings in Paris, the JCS took exception to the exclusion of India as an acceptable neutral state and the President was disposed to accept their recommendation because of his belief that the negotiations could not be allowed to fail if the selection narrowed to India. In a meeting with Eisenhower on the afternoon of Apr. 22; Smith convinced the President to accept the alternative language as presented in the source text which, although not ruling out India, did not state its acceptability. (Memorandum by Robertson to Smith, Apr. 21, 1953; 795.00/4–2153; and Tedul 4 to Paris, Apr. 22, 1953; 695A.0024/4–2253)

4. In this telegram, dated Apr. 17, 1953, Clark estimated that if the neutral state had to assume full custody of nonrepatriates, with the UNC responsible only for logistical support and medical services, about 6,000 neutral representatives would be necessary. If the UNC continued to supply full logistic, administrative, and security support, however, only 220 neutral state representatives would be required. (Matthews files, lot 52 D 413)
5. Dated Apr. 18, p. 915.