Office of the Historian

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

top secret
priority
Tokyo, April 18, 1953—2:08 p.m.

CX 61976. Refs: A. C 61949, 16 Apr. 1953.2 B DIP 464, 15 Apr [Page 918] 1953.3 C. DIP 465, 15 Apr 1953.4 D. DIP 467, 16 Apr 1953.5 This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

a.
The President’s msg6 should be extremely helpful in easing the tension in connection with the psn taken by the ROK Govt with respect to overall armistice negotiations.
b.
I recm no consideration be given a bilateral scty pact at this time. Such a pact, at least at this time, appears in dir conflict with my primary mission under JOEWP.
c.
I do not concur having ROK Govt liaison representative on armis negots staff since these negots are purely mil. No other govt is represented by a political liaison off. It should be left to ROK Govt to communicate its views and policies through diplomatic channels. It is known that the ROK Mil Del reflects the ROK Govt psn during discussions within the delegation and staff in all planning confs. Admission of political ROK liaison off is apt to seriously hamper progress of armis negots.
d.
The possibility that Rhee may make independent use of ROK forces raises again the ques of obtaining an agreement with the Republic of Korea which would provide for UNC control of ROK forces during the post-armistice period. The objections raised in JCS 902158 of 28 (27) Feb 19527 still appear valid and this may not be the optimum time to seek such an agreement. However, curr UNC authority over ROK forces was granted by Rhee personally, and exists only “during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities”. In my view “the present state of hostilities” will not legally end with the execution of an armis but Rhee may interpret his agreement differently.
e.
Any questions as to the unification issue, the nature and duration of future rehabilitation assistance, ROK participation in political negots after an armis, establishment of time limits for such political discussions, etc., appear to be aprop for resolution at govtl level.

Part 2.

a.
On 16 April ROK National Assy passed resolution to send 6 representatives to observe actual exchange of prisoners at Pan Mun Jom and Munsan-Ni. I have agreed to permit 6 ROK representatives at MunsanNi to observe exchange of PWs but have denied their rqst to observe actual exchange of prisoners at Pan Mun Jom due to limited area and restrictions placed on entering. These acceptable arrangements were [Page 919] made on 16 April in conf between Gen McGarr with Amb Briggs present and Fgn Minister Pyun, upon instructions from me.
b.
It was also agreed in accordance with Pyun’s rqst that final ques concerning repatriation would be made in the presence of ROK representatives to successive groups of 25 prisoners each. Anyone declaring self as non-repatriate to be segregated immed from pro-Communist prisoners and given protection.
c.
Info received from KCOMZ indicated the initial processing of first group of PWs completed on 16 April in accordance with para b above. 3 ROK representatives present and satisfied with proceedings. No defection in PWs.
  1. This telegram was sent separately to General Herren and Ambassador Briggs for their information.↩
  2. Not printed; this telegram was substantively the same as telegram 1218 from Pusan, Apr. 14, p. 906.↩
  3. The reference was to telegram 1225 from Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 910.↩
  4. The reference was to telegram 1226 from Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 913.↩
  5. The reference was to telegram 1231 from Pusan, Apr. 16, in which the Embassy reported on arrangements with the ROK vis-à-vis the exchange of sick and wounded. The telegram is accurately summarized in CX 61976. (695A.0024/4–1653)↩
  6. This message was transmitted in telegram 653 to Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 912.↩
  7. Ante, p. 69.↩