Office of the Historian

Matthews files, lot 53 D 417: Telegram

The Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate
Tokyo, April 11, 1953—9:38 p.m.

CX 61879. Ref: A. Z 36244 (HNU 4–13).1 B. C 61854 (HNC 1617).2 C. CX 61752.3 D. JCS 935741 (NOTAL).4

1.
I feel strongly that we are in no psn to refuse to resume full del meetings sooner or later, and preferably sooner, with or without rec additional details from the Communists as to their plan for resolving the PW deadlock. Sensing here is that Communists probably want armistice. In view of Communist ltr contained in ref B, and comments made by their liaison group in ref A, I do not consider that I can arbitrarily reject their rqst to discuss resumption of plenary sessions since they have, to some degree, met the demands presented to them in my ltr of 19 Oct 52, which required either acpt of the UNC proposals or submission [Page 904] in writing of a constr counter-proposal. This, in my opinion, they have done. At the same time I cannot now acpt their proposal presented in ref A to reconvene plenary sessions since they have not sup a “detailed statement of suggestions for the implementation of the proposal for settling the entire ques of repatriating PW” as set forth in para 1b, ref C, and guidance in para 5 of ref D.
2.
Accordingly, I plan to instr my liaison group to meet with the Communist liaison group to discuss the basis for reopening plenary sessions. This has the fol advantages:
a.
We do not place ourselves in the psn of the one who refuses to meet.
b.
We do not rush into a plenary session.
c.
It may give us time to observe manner in which Communists implement exchange of sick and injured PW.
d.
Does not maneuver us into a psn of demanding more info by ltr and being refused, a psn from which we would have to retreat.
e.
At the same time it may prov us with some idea of how the Communists intend Chou En-lai proposal will be implemented. Since we undoubtedly will be forced to agree to meeting in plenary session later, it will be to our advantage to resolve, or at least ident, issues insofar as possible.
3.
Rqst your comments and rcmd ASAP.5 As soon as rec, reply to Nam Il will be prep.
  1. This telegram, dated Apr. 11, 1953, transmitted to the JCS the record of the meeting of the Senior Liaison Group on Apr. 11, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)↩
  2. This telegram, dated Apr. 10, 1953, transmitted to the Department of the Army a letter received from the Communists on Apr. 9, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413). For a text of this letter, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 575–576.↩
  3. Not printed, but see footnote 4 p. 901.↩
  4. Dated Apr. 3, p. 863.↩
  5. For the JCS comments, see infra.↩