Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)1
Subject:
- Korean Armistice Developments.
Participants:
- Secretary Dulles
- Dr. You Chan Yang, Ambassador, Embassy of Korea
- Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Counselor, Embassy of Korea
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
On instructions from President Rhee, Ambassador Yang came in to see the Secretary at 5:00 o’clock today. He said that in general President Rhee is worried over the tactics of the Communists with regard to the armistice negotiations in Korea and their so-called “peace offensive”. President Rhee feels that “the leopard never changes his spots”, and that the Communist tactics should be viewed with great caution, since they are intended to disrupt and befuddle the free nations. According to the Ambassador, while President Rhee is glad that the United States views these recent developments with a certain skepticism, he is particularly concerned over the effect that the armistice negotiations may have on the future of Korea.
The Ambassador then asked for the Secretary’s opinion on the following five points that President Rhee believes must be fulfilled to safeguard the security of the Republic of Korea if there were an armistice: (1) all of Korea must be reunited; (2) all Chinese Communists forces must be removed from Korean territory; (3) the North Korean forces must be disarmed; (4) any third party must be prevented from providing arms to the Communists in Korea; and (5) the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea must be made clear and it must have a voice in international discussions regarding the future of Korea.
The Secretary replied that we, of course, were generally in accord with his fifth point, and that the first four are desirable objectives which we all support. On point one, he noted how the United States for several years had taken the initiative in the United Nations in promoting [Page 898] the establishment of an independent and unified Korea. He said, however, that he was not clear as to all the implications that there might be in President Rhee’s five points, particularly the second, third and fourth. He told the Ambassador that we are not obligated to use force to unify Korea or drive out the enemy, for we do not believe in using war as an instrument of foreign policy. There might be more effective ways to accomplish them than by the use of force, since there would appear to be a better chance for establishing peace in Korea than was possible two years ago. He mentioned the internal difficulties that are taking place within the Soviet Union and the probable Soviet desire to eliminate a continuing military threat to their bases in Port Arthur, Dairen and Vladivostok and to the industrial complex in Manchuria. He informed the Ambassador that, knowing the general attitude of President Rhee, he had already discussed this matter with President Eisenhower before this meeting, and that he could say that there would be no relaxation on the part of the United States to continue building the unity of the free world and in promoting our overall objectives in Korea. He asked the Ambassador if he would clarify some of the implications of the five points.
However, the Ambassador turned to the question of a mutual security pact between the United States and Korea. He said that, if there is to be an armistice, such a pact would greatly relieve the fears and anxieties of his people, who are constantly afraid that the United States and the United Nations will desert them. He asked the Secretary what opinion the United States Government had of this matter.
The Secretary replied that he had previously discussed this with officials of the Korean Government, particularly Foreign Minister Pyun when he was in New York,2 and had pointed out the difficulties involved. He undertook to explain carefully to the Ambassador that a principal difficulty for the United States is the question of what is the territory of the Republic of Korea, since the Pacific security treaties are to be brought into effect when the territory of a signatory is attacked. As the Republic of Korea claims all of Korea as its territory, a mutual security treaty now might obligate the United States to use force to drive the enemy entirely out of Korea, and that we cannot undertake to do. On the other hand, if such a treaty covered only the present territory south of the battleline, it might give legal effect to the current division of Korea, which we do not wish to ratify. The dilemma for the United States in both the case of Korea and of China is that it is hard to give formal guarantees to governments which claim territory they do not control and which desire treaties with the United States that [Page 899] might obligate it to go to apply force against the Communists in both areas. The Secretary also noted that Congress might not approve such pacts now.
Thus, the question regarding President Rhee’s interest in a pact with the United States is whether or not this should be considered today or later, when the situation in Korea is stabilized. It would be better from the United States point of view to give consideration to such a pact after the political conference has worked out a peaceful settlement for Korea.
Ambassador Yang replied that he still thought a mutual security pact should be developed with the Republic of Korea as such. He apparently did not feel that the territorial question was insurmountable, although he may not have fully understood the problem. He suggested that, if a line were to be drawn along the “waist” of Korea, the area to the south could be considered the territory of the Republic of Korea for purposes of a pact. Pointing out again that one of the prime reasons for the insecurity of the Korean people was their worry over possible abandonment by the United States and the United Nations, he suggested that a statement by the United States Government that it would never desert the Korean people would be most helpful.
The Secretary replied that, of course, we had absolutely no intention of deserting the Korean people and that it is generally wise to make one’s intentions clear in advance. If that had been done before June 1950, there might not have been any invasion. The problem of an advance commitment is the time and the place to make it clear. With a truncated Korea and hostilities still going on, it would be most difficult now to make a formal commitment for there must be a territorial settlement before any such guarantee could be clear. Furthermore, a military declaration by the United States now might unfavorably prejudice the attitude of the Communists against the political conference, where we hoped it would be possible to obtain their agreement to a definite settlement of peace in Korea.
The Secretary asked the Ambassador if it would help the position of his government if President Eisenhower could make a statement in the near future to the effect that the United States would not desert Korea. He replied that this would be “wonderful”. The Secretary said that he would discuss such a possibility with President Eisenhower.
The Ambassador asked to see the President next week. The Secretary replied that he would try to arrange it after his return to Washington.3
Before leaving, Ambassador Yang said that the Korean Government was extremely concerned over the lack of adequate rations for the [Page 900] Korean armed forces. He asked that the United States Government do all it could to improve this situation. The Secretary told him that the matter was under serious consideration by appropriate authorities and that we would look into it.
- According to notes attached to the source text, this memorandum was cleared by Robertson and then submitted to the Secretary of State, who desired changes in it. The changes were made and are reflected in the memorandum as printed. The source text did not indicate the changes Dulles suggested.↩
- A partial account of this meeting can be found in a memorandum of conversation by O’Connor, dated Mar. 10, not printed. (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199)↩
- From Apr. 10–16, Dulles vacationed at Duck Island in Lake Ontario. (Princeton University, Dulles papers, Dulles Appointment Book)↩