Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council Wednesday, April 8, 19531
eyes only
Present at the 139th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Director of Defense [Page 893] Mobilization; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.
[Here follows discussion on items: 1. “National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies”, 2. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, and 3. “United States Policies in the Far East”.]
4. Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 147; NSC 118/2; Memo for the NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Future Courses of Action in Connection With the Situation in Korea”, dated March 30, 1953; NIE-80; SE-4)2
Mr. Cutler then turned to the paper on Korea, and requested a discussion in the first place of page 44,3 which dealt with the problem of reimbursement of the United States by nations having forces in Korea, for logistic and other support afforded these forces by the United States.
After a brief discussion, General Bradley suggested that the best solution for the time being was to drag our feet and go on as we had been going, since it was still important to try to secure additional forces, and it would be little less than catastrophic if any nation withdrew its forces from Korea because of our insistence on reimbursement for U.S. services performed.
With respect to the alternative courses of action in Korea, Mr. Cutler suggested that it would be premature for the Council to make a choice now, in view of the new possibility that the Communists were really prepared to enter into an armistice in Korea. He suggested, however, that the Council should now hear from the Secretary of State the latest information on the new armistice proposals and the views of the State Department on them.
In the first place, said Secretary Dulles, he desired to emphasize a point which had not, in his opinion, been adequately covered in the present report on alternatives open to us in Korea. The fact of the matter was that the United States had inherited an armistice agreement which had been complete except for the one point of the disposal of prisoners of war. In view of the changed situation and the possible desire of the Communists for an armistice, it seemed to Secretary [Page 894] Dulles questionable whether we should feel bound now by the other provisions in the armistice to which we had agreed earlier. The particular point that disturbed him was that in effect this armistice would be perpetual unless one side or the other deliberately broke it or unless it was agreed by both sides to break it. This situation, if continued, would enable the Communists to sit it out indefinitely on the line which they now occupied, and refuse to go forward to any satisfactory political settlement in Korea.
Secretary Dulles stated his belief that it was now quite possible to secure a much more satisfactory settlement in Korea than a mere armistice at the 38th parallel, which would leave a divided Korea not economically viable nor politically acceptable to the South Koreans. He would himself have much preferred at the outset an armistice agreement which would have required in its wake a political settlement, in the absence of which the United States would have been permitted to call off the armistice.
The President inquired whether the United States did not now propose to look at the whole situation de novo. Was it now not perfectly possible to reopen all the agreed armistice provisions?
Secretary Dulles said that this would be very hard to do. Our allies were desperately anxious to see the fighting stopped. Nevertheless, he affirmed that we should certainly be able to secure a better armistice in view of our much greater power and the Soviet Union’s much greater weakness currently.
The President stated his belief that it would be impossible to call off the armistice now and to go to war again in Korea. The American people would never stand for such a move.
Nevertheless, replied Secretary Dulles, our current trading position is a great deal better, and he personally would like to be able to say to the Communists that unless we could divide Korea at the waist rather than at the 38th parallel, we would call off the armistice.
Certainly, thought Secretary Wilson, if we are going to undertake a long-range settlement of Korea, the South Koreans must be “dealt in”. So far they had been on the outside of plans to settle their future.
Secretary Humphrey inquired the nature of the ultimate settlement we desired in Korea.
The President explained this as a unified democratic Korea, and then inquired of General Bradley how it had happened that the armistice agreement had been worded in such a way as to carry the implication of permanence.
General Bradley was unable to answer, and the President then observed that the American negotiators should be instructed to state that in certain circumstances and on due notice the armistice could be ended.
[Page 895]Mr. Cutler suggested likewise that our people be instructed to state that we reserved our right to void the armistice if it turned out to be a fraud and led to no settlement.
While there was rather strong reaction in the Council against this suggestion, the President pointed out that in any case the Communists would void the armistice with impunity whenever they thought it convenient.
In that case, replied Secretary Dulles, in all likelihood global war would follow. What we really want, he continued, is a satisfactory settlement of the Korean problem, and we should be in a position to call off any armistice if it proves impossible to achieve such a permanent settlement. This must be done adroitly, however, in order not to offend our allies.
[Here follows a statement of action on item 3. “United States Policies in the Far East.”]
Action on Item 4:4
The National Security Council:
- a.
- Agreed that the United States should make clear, in some appropriate way, that, without revising provisions already agreed upon, the United States interprets the purpose of the armistice to be the achievement of a political settlement in Korea and that, if this purpose is not achieved within a reasonable time, the armistice may be voiced (voided).
- b.
- Agreed that the current practice regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea (see paragraphs 168–180 of NSC 147) should be continued for the time being.
- c.
- Deferred further action of the reference report on the subject (NSC 147) pending further study.
Note: The actions in a and b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.
[Here follows discussion of items: 5. “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China”, 6. “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Japan”, 7. “Basic National Security Policies and Programs in Relation to their Costs”, and 8. “Status of NSC Projects”.]
Deputy Executive Secretary
- This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on Apr. 16.↩
- For excerpts of NSC 147, see the Staff Study, p. 841; for NSC 118/2, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1382; the memorandum of Mar. 30 is not printed, but see footnote 2 p. 838; for NIE-80, Apr. 3, see p. 865; and for SE-41, Apr. 8, see supra.↩
- The reference was to NSC 147 and the page number reference referred to paragraph 168 of the Staff Study section of that paper. For text, see p. 850.↩
- The following paragraph and note constituted NSC Action No. 759; a record copy of this action is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.↩