795.00/2–252: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
C 64383. 1. During their recent visit, Gen Hull and Mr. Johnson, in exploratory discussion, proposed the possibility of developing a plan for the release of those POWs now in UNC custody who violently oppose repatriation; this plan to be implemented on JCS order and only in the event the Communists irrevocably refuse to agree to voluntary repatriation with or without UNC concessions on other points.
2. After serious and deliberate consideration of the many factors involved, my strong convictions are:
- a.
- The UNC delegation has never deviated in its efforts to attain the paramount objective set forth by you of seeking adequate safeguards to insure the safe and speedy return of UNC prisoners in enemy hands. (DA 99024).1 Other objectives, such as return of civilians and even voluntary repatriation have been considered secondary and to be obtained only if the primary objective is not jeopardized. In my opinion this should continue to be our course.
- b.
- The opinion of all here is that the possibility of obtaining Communist agreement on voluntary repatriation is doubtful whereas adherence [Page 67] to our present planned procedure offers the only possible chance of success.
- c.
- The adoption of any subterfuge designed to avoid the violence of forced repatriation will nullify and discredit our efforts and the prestige which we have gained thus far, may destroy any chance of securing the safe return of those prisoners reported by the Communists and would materially increase the difficulties of reaching agreement on an armistice.
- d.
- Further we must never leave ourselves open to the accusation of treachery and deceit which have consistently characterized Communist dealings.
3. Therefore, I recommend the following course of action:
- a.
- Adhere to our present planned procedure of negotiations, reducing areas of disagreement as quickly as possible to those of voluntary repatriation and airfields.
- b.
- Go to plenary session and submit a package agreement involving both principles.
- c.
- Negotiations can then take the following courses:
- (1)
- We can agree to both Communist positions. I oppose this.
- (2)
- We could trade airfield restrictions for agreement on voluntary repatriation. I would accept this but there is no slightest indication that this will occur.
- (3)
- The Communists could accept both our positions. There is no slightest indication that this will occur.
- d.
- It therefore appears highly probable that the Communist position on voluntary repatriation will become clear beyond any reasonable doubt, and that this position will be irrevocable rejection. At that time UNC delegation must announce the UNC decision, namely, we will or will not agree to forced repatriation and we will be prepared to break negotiations rather than concede on this forced repatriation issue.
4. In summation I am deeply and firmly opposed to any plan of premature release of POWs which can result in retaliation against our prisoners and which constitutes a breach of faith of the principles which have guided us throughout the negotiations. After months of discussion the armistice negotiations have reached a state of crisis which will inevitably restrict our freedom of decision in future discussions. Our course of action must be set with a clear objective in mind. I therefore strongly urge that I be given my final position on the POW question now, thus allowing me to press for my final objective with vigor and without deviation.
5. In this connection, removal of the current issue concerning USSR is likewise a requisite. See my CX 64342.2