Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series

Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

top secret
NSC 147

Washington, April 2, 1953.

Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea

References:

A.

NSC 118/2¹

B.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Future Courses of Action in Connection With the Situation in Korea”, dated March 30, 1953²

C.

NIE-80³

D.

SE-41⁴

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of the estimate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by Reference B,⁵ is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on April 8.⁶ A Financial Appendix, which will cost the alternative courses of action, will be circulated separately for Council information.⁷

This report does not take into consideration the March 30 radio declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities proposing resumption of armistice negotiations, or subsequent developments, since evaluation is not yet available.

The problem of reimbursement for U.S. logistical support of UN forces participating in the war in Korea, to which reference was made in the footnote on page 7 of NSC 144/1 on Latin America,⁸ is discussed in paragraphs 168–180 of the enclosed report.

The NSC Planning Board⁹ recommends that the Council determine the course of action the U.S. should pursue in Korea, and that it direct the Planning Board to prepare a report, based upon this determination, on U.S. objectives and courses of action in Korea to supersede NSC 118/2.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be restricted on an absolute need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

[Enclosure]

Report by the NSC Planning Board

NSC 147

Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea¹⁰

Excluding resort to global war, or complete withdrawal from Korea, or yielding to the communist position on prisoners of war in the armistiee negotiations, there appear to be two major alternative courses of action open to the United States in Korea. The first alternative maintains the current restrictions on military operations, the second removes these restrictions. Under each major alternative there are analyzed three possible specific courses of action, listed below in order of increasing severity.

Alternative I: Maintain Current Restrictions on Military Operations Against Manchuria and Communist China

Course A—Continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea.

Course B—Increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the United States.

Course C—Continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line, followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Alternative II: Remove Current Restrictions on Military Operations Against Manchuria and Communist China

Course D—Extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and, if required, increase ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.

Course E—Undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist, and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course F—Undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean war on the basis of a unified, non-communist Korea.

[Enclosure]

NSC Staff Study

Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea¹¹

general considerations

Current Policy with Respect to Korea

1. Current national policy with respect to Korea is contained in NSC 118/2, approved December 20, 1951. [Here follows a five-paragraph summary of NSC 118/2.]

6. Although a satisfactory armistice has, of course, not been achieved, no determination has been made that armistice negotiations have failed or have been deliberately delayed; hence the courses of action provided for these contingencies—comprising stepped up military operations and increased political and economic pressures against Communist China—have not been put into effect.

Need for Review of Current Policy

7. The lapse of time (more than 15 months) since the approval of NSC 118/2, the history of the armistice negotiations, and the increase in Communist military capabilities in Korea all clearly indicate the need for a review of United States courses of action in Korea. Other considerations which make such a review inoperative include the improvement in the capabilities of ROK forces, some loss in the effectiveness of U.S. forces resulting from rotation and stalemate, the death of Stalin and transfer of power to Malenkov, further study of sea-borne commerce with Communist China, developments in atomic weapons, developments in the attitudes of our allies and in American public opinion, and the change in national administration in the United States.

Armistice Negotiations

8. Negotiations for an armistice were undertaken in June, 1951 and agreement has been reached on all major points except the question of non-forcible repatriation. A draft incorporating the agreed provisions of the armistice consisting of some 63 articles has been preliminarily approved by both sides. There is attached hereto (Appendix A)¹² a summary of the agreed provisions.

9. Discussions of the prisoner of war question were undertaken in December, 1951 and continued until October, 1952. It clearly demonstrated that under present conditions further search for a formula, agreeable to the Communists and ourselves, for the disposition of those Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command opposed to repatriation is hopeless. The Communist rejection of the Indian resolution in the General Assembly, which was supported by virtually all non-Soviet bloc UN members, indicated that the Communists have been willing to face the maximum of free world political pressure rather than recede from their position on the prisoner of war issue. Whatever the Communist basic attitude towards an armistice may be, the ability of the Communists to supply and reinforce their troop strength in Korea has unquestionably reinforced their unwillingness to concede in the POW question what is possibly to them an important matter of principle and prestige striking at the roots of their system. They may well consider that agreement to any form of non-forcible repatriation so admits to the right of individual self-determination as to endanger maintenance of their concept of relations between the individual and the state. It also directly involves the question of mass defections from their armed forces in any future conflict, a matter upon which they are undoubtedly very sensitive. It is a problem in which the ideological conflict between the free and Soviet worlds is finding a focus.

10. It is out of the question for the United States to consider any abandonment of the principle of non-forcible repatriation. This position has been strongly and publicly set forth in categorical terms by this Government and has received the overwhelming support of virtually every non-Soviet bloc member of the United Nations. As set forth in the preceding paragraph, it has implications for the struggle between the free and the Soviet worlds far transcending the importance of the individuals involved. Apart from problems that would arise from the spectacle of United States forces using force against very large numbers of prisoners violently resisting return to the Communists, any abandonment of principle in this regard would in the present context constitute appeasement of the most serious sort. As the prisoners have now been screened and thus declared their attitude towards the Communists, to return those opposing repatriation would be the grossest betrayal of trust and would undoubtedly subject them to most severe reprisals. It might well also lead the Soviets to the conclusion that our desire for an armistice was so strong that they could up their price in other regards and we would find ourselves facing increasing demands from the Soviets as the cost of an armistice.

11. The course of the armistice negotiations, up to reaching the POW question, in general, indicated a tough bargaining attitude on the part of the Communists and no great sense of urgency to obtain an armistice, but could not be interpreted as an entire unwillingness to enter into an armistice. Except for the POW question, during the course of the negotiation the Communists often receded substantially from their original positions to accept the basic substantive positions of the UNC. With respect to the POW question the course of the negotiations at Panmunjom made it appear possible that agreement would have been reached if the number of POW’s, particularly Chinese, resisting repatriation had not been as large as turned out to be the case when screening was undertaken.

12. It is thus impossible to arrive at any categorical conclusion as to whether the armistice negotiations have clearly failed or have been deliberately delayed by the Communists because of Communist opposition to an armistice per se. This may be the case, in which event the POW issue is being used only as a pretext to avoid entering into an armistice, and if this issue were resolved another pretext would be found. On the other hand as mentioned above the POW issue may represent to them such a fundamental question as to overbalance the present cost to them of not having an armistice.

13. The agreement of all the UN nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of the joint “greater sanctions” declaration mentioned in paragraph 2-a-(5) of NSC 118/2 has been obtained. This statement is to the effect that if the Communists break an armistice in Korea and the aggression in Korea is renewed, the consequences would be so great that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea. The full text of this statement and procedures for its immediate issuance following an armistice have been agreed to.

14. Whatever the Communist attitude toward an armistice has been or now is, it is clear that their ability to increase their military capabilities in Korea lessens any willingness on their part to make concessions to obtain an armistice. At the same time this increased Communist military capability makes more difficult the choice of alternative courses of action by the United States. Their increased capabilities are now reflected in the fact that the United Nations Command is confronted with enemy forces, with good morale, numerically superior in strength, with adequate logistic support, and disposed in extremely well organized defensive positions in depth. A growing air potential including jet light bombers adds to these capabilities.

Relation of Korea to Over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives

[Here follows a paraphrase of the introduction of the Estimate portion of SE-41; for its text, see page 887.]

Current Restrictions on Military Operations

19. The current mission of UN military forces in Korea is to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea. In furtherance of this mission, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) will, consistent with the security of UN forces, inflict maximum losses on North Korean and Chinese Communist forces operating “within the geographical boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto”. At present the following restrictions apply to UN operations:

a. Air and naval operations are confined to geographical boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto.

b. Ground operations are authorized in support of the above mission to insure the safety of the UN Command and to continue to harass the enemy. Authority includes conduct of guerrilla operations and limited amphibious-airborne operations in enemy rear areas.

c. Operational Restrictions:

(1) Except with approval of higher authority in Washington, UN forces will not cross Manchuria or USSR border of Korea.

(2) Air and offensive naval surface operations should not be conducted within 12 miles to seaward of the coasts of Manchuria or of the USSR on the Asiatic mainland.

(3) Aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory, including coastal waters, is authorized up to the Yalu River on the West Coast, but short of the Korean-Soviet international boundary on the East Coast.

(4) Only the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has authority to order or authorize preventive U.S. action against concentrations on the Chinese mainland.

(5) Employment of atomic weapons is authorized “only in the event our forces in that area would otherwise be faced with a military disaster”, and upon approval of the President.

(6) Chinese National forces will not be used.

(7) Naval blockade will not be imposed against China.

d. Chemical, biological and radiological weapons will not be used by the United States except in retaliation (NSC 62, approved February 17, 1950).¹³

e. When authorized by the President, restrictions can be removed (unilaterally and on short notice as required) against attack of Chinese Communist air force bases whenever enemy air activity seriously jeopardizes the security of UN forces in the Korean area. Standing instructions to CINCUNC cover conditions where the Communists might launch massive air attacks against UN forces.

f. Specific approval from higher authority in Washington is necessary before the Yalu River power dams can be bombed.

g. In addition, CINCUNC has issued certain restrictions concerning flying over the Panmunjom truce area.

possible alternatives

Statement of Alternative Courses of Action

[Here follows the verbatim text of the Report by the NSC Planning Board, printed above.]

Use of Atomic Weapons

21. Each of the suggested courses of action (except Course A) permits but does not require employment of atomic weapons. In each case (except Course A) the use or non-use of such weapons is left open for future determination. This determination should be made only after a thorough study of the military, psychological and political implications of the use of atomic weapons has been completed, and considered by the National Security Council. A tentative statement of some of the military and political advantages and disadvantages of using atomic weapons follows.

22. Military Advantages:

a. Would considerably augment capabilities of U.S.-UN forces and somewhat offset the implications of developing a conventional capability to produce equivalent military effects outside Korea.

b. Would result in curtailment of Communist Chinese capability of continuing present hostilities, of threatening U.S.-UN security in Korea and Japan, or of initiating aggression elsewhere.

c. Might serve to increase the deterrent effect of our atomic capabilities on the USSR, as pertains to both global and limited war.

d. Threats to our military position in Korea could be eliminated more effectively, quickly and cheaply than by use of conventional weapons.

23. Military Disadvantages:

a. Unless the use of atomic weapons results in a decisive military victory, the deterrent effect might be reduced.

b. Any profitable strategic use requires extension of hostilities outside of Korea.

c. A precedent would be established, and UN forces and installations are, in general, better targets for atomic weapons than those of the enemy; for example, the ports of Inchon and Pusan, UN airfields and concentrations for amphibious operations.

d. Use of substantial numbers will reduce the U.S. stockpile and global atomic capabilities.

24. Political Advantages: There would be political advantages in the use of atomic weapons:

a. If their use in Korea alone was effective in achieving a military victory and thereby a political settlement in Korea, without encountering such enemy reaction as would lead to a spread of hostilities to Communist China.

b. If their use in Korea and against Communist China was effective in achieving a military victory in Korea and sufficient military results against Communist China to bring about a political settlement in Korea and a general political settlement with Communist China, without encountering such enemy reaction as would lead to a spread of hostilities to the USSR.

c. If their use in Korea or against Communist China was clearly required in order to avoid a U.S.-UN military disaster in Korea.

25. Political Disadvantages: There would be political disadvantages in the use of atomic weapons:

a. If other free world nations believe that

(i.) the net effectiveness of the use of atomic weapons in Korea would be insufficient for the achievement of our military objectives there.

(ii.) the net effectiveness of the use of atomic weapons in Korea and against Communist China would be insufficient to achieve decisive military results.

(iii.) such military results as could be achieved by the use of atomic weapons either in Korea or against Communist China would be insufficient to achieve our political objectives in Korea or a general settlement with Communist China.

(iv.) the use of atomic weapons in Korea would involve the West in general hostilities with Communist China or the use of atomic weapons against Communist China would involve the West in hostilities with the USSR.

(v.) the use of atomic weapons would lead to enemy retaliation in kind against vulnerable U.S.-UN targets.

(vi.) the use of atomic weapons is not required to avert military disaster and if they believe, particularly in the light of current Communist peace offers, that our military and political objectives in Korea can be achieved without their use.

b. If such action were taken without consultation with other free world governments and without the concurrence in advance of our major allies.

c. If merely raising the question of the use of atomic weapons in Korea or against Communist China resulted in a dissipation of the support we now have from other free nations for terms of a Korean settlement acceptable to us.

26. Estimated Communist Reaction: We believe that if atomic weapons were employed by U.S./UN forces in any of the above alternative courses of action, the Communists would recognize the employment of these weapons as indicative of Western determination to carry the Korean war to a successful conclusion. We are unable to estimate whether this recognition would by itself lead the Communists to make the concessions necessary to reach an armistice. We believe that the Communist reaction would be in large part determined by the extent of damage inflicted.

Industrial Mobilization Implications

27. All the courses of action considered in this paper—even the first course, which contemplates the increase of ROK forces to 20 Army divisions and one Marine Brigade to 20—will require added U.S. support in weapons and military equipment. And to implement the progressive increases in force involved in each successive course suggested, the material contribution of the U.S. will become correspondingly larger. Although it is not possible to measure accurately the effect on our military deliveries to NATO countries or other areas or the changes which will have to be made in our industrial mobilization program, certain consequences in an ascending curve directly related to the degree of step-up applied in Korea can be predicted. In the discussion below of the requirements and consequences of each of the alternative courses, there are pointed out the major implications of the course on our production and supply programs. In varying degrees, some or all of the following effects can be anticipated:

a. Extension of the date by which material commitments to our NATO allies will be met. (Course A would require delay of at least a year in the delivery of certain MDAP items.)

b. Cancellation or deferral of present plans for stretch-out and shutdown of military production lines, or, alternatively reducing the reserves further below minimum safety levels.

c. Need for acceleration of military production schedules.

d. Provision of additional production lines to meet increased requirements for military end-items, particularly ammunition and bombs.

e. Increase in requirements for materials, components and machine tools needed for the production of military end-items and, as the impact of the growing military demand reaches certain proportions, extension of allocations and controls to additional items and, at some point, reinstatement of full-scale Controlled Materials Plan (CMP).

f. Acceleration of stockpile programs and development of new sources of supply to compensate for increased current consumption.

g. To meet the increased threat of general war, acceleration of mobilization base progams to increase the degree of readiness for conversion to all-out wartime production.

h. Speed-up of readiness measures for all civil defense programs, as well as related programs like the continuity of government, continuity of production, and military defense measures (radar, port security, guided missiles and jet fighter programs).

U.S. Public Opinion

28. In this connection, it should also be noted that public opinion in the United States continues to show great concern over the Korean war. Recent surveys indicate that the American people want to end the war, but only on honorable terms. Sentiment for vigorous action to achieve a settlement is widespread, but there is no strong demand for any particular course of action. If the President were to initiate a vigorous course of action, there is a strong probability of predominant public support, particularly since surveys indicate great public confidence that the President will take the best possible steps to end the conflict. On the other hand, the stability of predominant editorial attitudes over the past two years offers a strong basis in public sentiment for continuation of a cautious policy. If the President were to conclude that more forceful action at this time is unwise, his exposition of that situation would be likely to receive predominant public acceptance.

Foreign Attitudes Toward Korean Conflict

29. In general, the support or opposition of foreign governments and foreign public opinion concerning the Alternatives I or II in Korea will depend almost entirely on whether the United Nations forces in Korea or the Communist forces take the initiative in changing the present military situation. Our principal allies and the majority opinion in the UN would favor only Course A or Alternative I out of the six courses of action proposed in this Staff Study. They might reluctantly be persuaded to accept Courses B and C, but would strongly oppose Courses D through F if initiated by the United States. On the other hand, the ROK Government will increasingly oppose Course A and in general favor Courses B through F, particularly Course E or Course F. A U.S. decision to undertake Courses D through F would severely strain and possibly break the Western alliance and would certainly alienate pro U.S. feeling in most of Free Asia. However, if the Communists launch a large-scale ground offensive in Korea or coordinated and large-scale air attacks, the reaction of our principal allies and the majority of UN members regarding Alternative II would be quite different.

30. Korean Attitudes: The Government of the Republic of Korea, in particular President Rhee, has been vociferous in denouncing the entire concept of entering into an armistice short of conditions that would expel the Communists from, and establish control of the ROK over, all of Korea. It can be expected that the ROK will continue to make unification by any available means a primary national objective, and the ROK may try to obstruct the execution of any armistice agreement, especially by hindering the operations of the Neutral Supervisory Commission in ROK territory. There is a danger President Rhee might instruct ROK armed forces to break any armistice. The ROK and President Rhee in particular have a marked antipathy towards and fear of Japan which is often expressed in terms akin to their attitude towards the Communists and relations between the two countries continue to be very strained. Moreover, the ROK Government does not command much respect among our principal allies or in Free Asia.

31. United Kingdom: In general, the Government of the United Kingdom has supported U.S. policy in the Korean conflict, has taken an especially active interest therein, and as time has passed has been willing to take an increasingly “stiff” attitude toward the Soviet bloc in regard thereto. However, the United Kingdom is gravely concerned that no action be taken which would: (1) markedly increase the risk of extended war with China or global conflict, (2) commit the United States or the United Nations to a course of action which will further divert United States and other military resources from Europe, and (3) seriously increase the risk of a Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong.

32. Canada, Australia and New Zealand: The attitudes of these countries towards Korea are motivated in varying degrees by much of the same concerns as those of the United Kingdom regarding extension of hostilities beyond Korea.

33. France: While sharing much the same concerns as the United Kingdom, French attitudes are modified by considerations of the possible relation between the Korean conflict and Chinese Communist support of or direct intervention in Indochina.

34. Japan: While there is some recognition in Japan of the importance of the conflict in Korea to the security of Japan, Japan’s attitudes are conditioned by such conflicting sentiments on the one hand as “neutralist” sentiment of much of the population, fear of a global conflict, a widespread desire not to become involved in another war or in the Korean conflict, misapprehension over assumed United States intentions to use Japanese forces abroad, and, on the other hand, by the substantial economic benefits arising from United Nations Command expenditures in Japan for the Korean conflict and the satisfaction of seeing the United States take the leadership in the Far East.

35. Other Asian: Except for Nationalist China, the Philippines and Thailand, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, there is a tendency in much of the rest of Asia (and the Arab world) to regard the Korean conflict as a manifestation of a world power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union from which the Arab-Asian world must remain aloof. All of these countries have thus far supported the United States stand on the principle of non-forcible repatriation but would regard with varying degrees of alarm and dismay any enlargement of the hostilities.

36. While the foregoing is a correct estimate of present attitudes, there is no question but that a substantial UN military success in Korea would deflate the present Communist Chinese military prestige and influence in Asia, and enhance the position of the United States in Asia.

Use of Chinese National Forces

37. None of the above courses of action contemplates the use of Chinese National forces in Korea. The use of such forces to further U.S. strategic objectives in the Far East is covered in detail in NSC 146 (now under consideration by the National Security Council)¹⁴ and will not be considered in this paper.

Guerrilla Operations, Sabotage and Subversion

38. Under each of these courses of action it is contemplated that guerrilla operations, sabotage, and subversion would be continued and intensified to the extent practicable.

[Here follows more detailed discussion of courses of action A through F under the following subheadings: “Timing (Military)”, “Logistic and Mobilization Implications”, “Military Advantages”, “Political Advantages”, “Military Disadvantages”, “Political Disadvantages”, “Estimated Communist Reaction”.]

additional forces from other united nations members and the problem of reimbursement for logistic support

Background of Problem

168. As soon as the forces of other United Nations countries joined in the action in Korea the problem arose of supplying them with food, ammunition and other equipment. It would not have been practical for each country to set up its own lines of supply, and in any event only the United States, and to a lesser extent the British, were in a position initially to furnish supplies to forces in Korea, and even the British were, to some extent, dependent on United States logistic support.

169. The United States armed services furnished supplies to the services of other countries against memorandum receipt. For example, the Navy furnished fuel oil to other vessels in order that they could remain on station in Korean waters rather than make lengthy voyages to home ports.

170. It was soon apparent, in view of the volume of support furnished by the United States and the possibility that repayment might not be readily made, that there should be intergovernmental agreements concerning this support. After interdepartmental consideration a memorandum¹⁵ (dated September 1, 1950) was prepared by the Department of Defense and approved by the President. Under this directive the military departments are authorized to provide to foreign forces, capable of effective participation in the Korean operations, necessary logistic support and supplies which the foreign governments themselves could not provide, and to maintain accounts of the costs involved, which would serve as a basis for reimbursement. The directive provides that “…¹⁶ the military departments of the United States will make available necessary supplies or services on a basis of immediate reimbursement in U.S. dollars. To the extent that the foreign Government cannot make prompt reimbursement in U.S. dollars, the U.S. Government and the foreign Government will negotiate the terms of settlement.” A procedure was established under this directive whereby the recognition of an obligation to reimburse the United States would constitute sufficient assurance to permit the initial furnishing of logistic support, with negotiation of the terms of reimbursement to follow.

171. The September 1, 1950 directive was identified at the time as an interim policy designed to meet an emergency situation. In the succeeding two and one-half years twenty countries, in addition to the United States and the Republic of Korea have provided forces for the United Nations in Korea. The combined contribution of these twenty countries is small. In November 1951 nations, other than the United States and the Republic of Korea, were furnishing approximately 7 percent of the United Nations ground forces and naval forces in Korea and less than 2 percent of the air forces. All of these forces were offered during the first months of the Korean action and the proportion furnished by those nations probably has not increased.

Present Status

[Here follows data on the status of United Nations participation in Korea other than by the United States.]

173. Of these countries, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and South Africa have signed agreements with the United States under which they have agreed to pay, and are paying currently for logistic support furnished to them by the United States. Canada and Denmark are currently paying for support received but have not signed a formal agreement. The Government of India has indicated that it is unwilling to make payment to the United States for supplies furnished to the Field Ambulance Unit operated by Indian personnel. The Indian Government has taken the position that the United States should look for reimbursement to the United Nations. It should also be noted that the United States has also in effect assumed responsibility for certain supplies furnished to the Indian contingent by the United Kingdom. India took the same position with regard to such supplies and after discussions with the British, the United States has agreed that supplies furnished by the British to the Indian group may be deducted from the obligation of the United Kingdom to the United States. President Truman approved these arrangements. The other countries participating are not making regular payments.

174. Through December 31, 1952 the United States had advanced approximately $200 million worth of logistic support to United Nations forces (exclusive of the Republic of Korea) in the Korean action. Approximately $40 million has been received in payment. Logistic support is currently being furnished to these countries at a rate of approximately $7 million per month. The estimated status of the accounts as of December 31, 1952 is shown in the following tabulation.

Estimated Status of Logistical Support Obligations: December 31, 1952

(In millions of dollars)

Country	Amount Advanced	Paid	Balance unpaid
Making regular payments:
Under formal agreements:
Netherlands	4.2	2.7	1.5
Norway	.5	.2	.3
Sweden	1.6	1.0	.6
South Africa	11.3	9.3	2.0
Without formal agreements:
Canada	30.4	28.6	1.8
Denmark	.1	.1	*
Subtotal	48.1	41.9	6.2
Not making regular payments:‡
Australia	5.7	.1	5.6
Belgium-Luxembourg	1.6	*	1.6
Colombia	7.1	0.0	7.1
Ethiopia†	8.1	0.0	8.1
France	7.5	*	7.5
Greece†	7.8	0.0	7.8
Italy	.1	*	.1
New Zealand	1.9	*	1.9
Philippines	38.6	0.0	38.6
Thailand	11.1	0.0	11.1
Turkey†	25.9	0.0	25.9
United Kingdom	43.4	.3	43.1
Subtotal	158.8	.4	158.4
Grand Total§	206.9	42.3	164.6

Possibility of Additional Forces

175. The table below records the status as of February 5, 1953 of certain offers of assistance other than those which have been accepted and are in action.

Country	Offer	Status
Belgium	Air Transport	Available
Bolivia	30 Officers	Acceptance deferred
China	3 Infantry Divisions & 20 C–47s	Acceptance deferred
Costa Rica	Volunteers	Acceptance deferred
Denmark	Motorship Bella Dan	Acceptance deferred
El Salvador	Volunteers if US will train and equip
Greece	Additional Unit of Land Forces	Pending
Panama	Contingent Volunteers; Bases for Training.	Acceptance deferred
	Farmhands to Supply Troops	Pending

176. In addition to the foregoing, it is understood that the Governments of Thailand and the Philippines would be prepared to increase their contribution to the level of a regimental combat team provided that they could be relieved of the financial burden of providing logistic support. The regimental combat team is the smallest size unit which can make an effective contribution from a military point of view. As a general order of magnitude it costs about $15 million to provide original equipment for a regimental combat team and another $15 million to maintain it a year under combat conditions. Maintenance cost is reduced approximately 25 percent if not in combat.

177. A change in the United States policy would enhance the prospect of receiving assistance or augmented assistance from other countries, although no other specific possibility can be cited.

178. On the other hand, it is possible that if the United States policy is not changed the Government of Colombia might withdraw its battalion which has been in action in Korea.

Possible Methods of Meeting Reimbursement Problem

179. The procedure instituted in September 1950 with regard to reimbursement to the United States for logistic support was regarded at the time as an interim emergency procedure. As shown above, some countries have signed agreements, as contemplated in the Department of Defense memorandum, and are currently making payments in dollars for support furnished them by the United States. On the other hand, no specific arrangements have been made by certain other countries and the basis of the ultimate settlement of their accounts remains uncertain. In the case of Colombia, this uncertainty is jeopardizing the continued participation of the Colombian battalion. The question of requesting appropriate legislation from the Congress was considered in 1950 but not acted upon and reliance was placed instead upon the powers of the President.

Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 147)

Course of Action	Objective	Timing	Build-up	Casualties	Costs (in $ billion)	Enemy Reaction	Allies’ Views	Military Appraisal
A. Continue indefinately current level of military operations and build-up ROK’s.	Limited redeployment of U.S. forces.	Already initiated re-deployment of 4 US divisions by July 54.	20 ROK Army divisions and 1 ROK Marine brigade.	Current rate indefinitely.	54—1.5 to 1.7 55—2.1 to 2.3	Continue build-up and probably increase pressure. No Armistice concessions.	ROK opposition, most others would favor.	Least maldeployment, lowest casualty rate and minimum risk. Indnatedrain and maldeployment.
B. Step up ground operations.	More cost to enemy in hope of acceptable Armistice.	Initiated in 6 mos. with full impact by July 54.	20 ROK divisions 2 US divisions and Air and Navy lift.	UN- US-	54—2.2 to 2.4 55—3.8 to 4.0	Strong local reaction. Little risk of expanded war. Armistice possibilities unknown.	Reluctant agreement except certain Asian natives would oppose.	Higher enemy attrition and lessened offensive ability. No assured victory with undue cost. Risk of air attack. Increased maldeployment and casualties.
C. Step up ground operations, then major offensive to waist.	Maximum destruction of enemy and favorable settlement.	Initiated in 6 mos. Offensive 3 mos. later, and new line at waist in 3 more mos.	20 ROK divisions 3 US divisions and lift. 2 attack carriers. 2 bomb and 4⅓ fighter wings.	UN- US-	54—3.0 to 3.3 55—4.0 to 4.4	Strong local reaction. If unable to halt UN, probably seek Armistice, might expand war.	Allies would oppose, sharp Asian opposition.	If successful, maximum enemy casualties and matériel losses. High UN/US casualties with serious risk of air attack. Less defensible lines. War plans adversely affected.
D. Air attack and naval blockade against China and, if necessary, increase ground operations.	Make so costly to enemy that favorable settlement achieved.	Air attacks at once. Blockade in 2–4 weeks.	20 ROK divisions. Naval up to 2 carrier groups. 2 bomb and 4⅓ fighter wings.	UN- US-	54—2.4 to 3 55—3.2 to 3.5	Probable Armistice concessions prior to initiation. Then maximum resistance, including increased Soviet participation and Chinese air attacks on UN forces and bases in Far East. If unable to counter, would sacrifice interests in Korea for end of hostilities might commit Soviet forces, but leave to UN/US question of casus belli.	Strong opposition, except ROK and Chinese Nationalists, unless Communists start large scale operations.	If successful, military victory without high casualties. If not, other courses still open. Less risk of general war. War plans adversely affected. General offensive may still be required.
E. Offensive to waist plus naval blockade and air and naval attacks against China.	Maximum possible destruction of enemy consistent with line at waist, to achieve favorable settlement.	Same as B, C or D if extension of these courses. If original, initiate in 9–12 mos.	20 ROK divisions 3 US divisions naval same as D plus lift, air same as D plus 1 bomb wing and 1 recon. wing plus lift.	UN- US-	54—3.2 55—4.2	Same as D.	Same as D.	If successful, defeat of enemy. Waist line ultimately more defensible by ROK’s but temporarily weaker than present line. If not successful, drive to Yalu (F) may be required. War plans adversely affected. High casualties.
F. Large-scale offensive plus naval blockade and air and naval attacks against China.	Defeat and destruction enemy and unified non-communist Korea.	Same as E.	Same as E plus 2 US divisions from Japan, replaced by 4–6 Japanese divisions.	UN- US-	54—4.2 55—5.1	Same as D.	Same as D.	If successful, destruction of major enemy forces in Korea and Chinese Communist ability for early renewal of aggression, strengthen security of Japan and permit redeployment of most US forces. Maximum adverse effect on war plans. Highest casualties. Weakened defense of Japan during operations.

180. If the United States wishes to deviate from the policy of securing cash payment in dollars for logistic support in order to maintain or increase the forces of other countries in the field, the cost of the grant aid for logistic support might be charged either to appropriations for the Department of Defense or to the Mutual Security Program. If existing authority is not adequate for this purpose, it would, of course, be necessary to obtain enabling legislation.

1. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1382.
2. This memorandum, not printed, transmitted the JCS estimate of Mar. 27 to the NSC which referred it to the Planning Board. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351)
3. Dated Apr. 3, p. 865.
4. Dated Apr. 8, p. 886.
5. The estimate prepared by the JCS was attached to the source text, but is not printed here.
6. For a report of the discussion at this meeting as it related to Korea, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.
7. A chart summarizing this paper and giving an estimate in billions for the years 1954 and 1955 was attached to the source text; it was the financial appendix under reference and is printed on pp. 854–856.
8. The reference was to the footnote in paragraph 18d, of NSC 144/1, Mar. 18, 1953; for text, see vol. iv, p. 6.
9. In March 1953, the National Security Council’s Senior Staff, hitherto the principal NSC unit for the formulation and transmission of policy recommendations to the Council, was reorganized as the NSC Planning Board. The Board retained the basic functions of the Senior Staff, but its personnel underwent certain changes. It was chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and its membership was comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. For additional information on the organizational structure of the NSC, see the compilation on national security policy in volume II.
10. The following marginal note appeared on the source text presumably for the benefit of Dulles: “It is suggested that you read the material outlined in red.” The next seven paragraphs were outlined in red.
11. At this point the following note appeared in the source text: “This staff study does not take into consideration the March 30 radio declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities proposing resumption of armistice negotiations, or subsequent developments, since evaluation is not yet available.”
12. This appendix was not attached to the source text and is not printed.
13. In this NSC paper President Truman approved the JCS recommendation that in the event of war, the United States would use gas only in retaliation against its use by an enemy on the decision of the President. This was an interim decision, subject to reconsideration after technical studies were undertaken. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351)
14. NSC 146 was not approved and it is not printed (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351). NSC 146/2, entitled “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government” and dated Nov. 6, 1953, was approved. For the text and relevant documentation, see volume xiv.
15. Not printed. (795B.5/9–150)
16. Ellipsis in the source text.
17. Less than $50,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
18. The amounts shown as paid for countries “not making regular payments” represent small sums paid to the U.S. Navy. [Footnote in the source text.]
19. Less than $50,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
20. No draft agreement or statement of account presented. [Footnote in the source text.]
21. Less than $50,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
22. No draft agreement or statement of account presented. [Footnote in the source text.]
23. Less than $50,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
24. Less than $50,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
25. No draft agreement or statement of account presented. [Footnote in the source text.]
26. The Republic of Korea is not shown on this list. [Footnote in the source text.]