795.00/4–153
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
Subject:
- Korean Armistice Negotiations
Participants:
- Mr. Tomlinson—British Embassy
- U. Alexis Johnson—State Department
Mr. Tomlinson called today with an instruction from the Foreign Office to the effect that Mr. Eden agreed that the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war should be “the first item on the agenda” and that resumption of armistice negotiations “a second order of business.” However, the instruction went on to state that Mr. Eden did not think “that we should at this stage insist rigidly on a conclusion of the exchange before resumption of the main negotiations. We should retain flexibility so as to exploit developments to our best advantage.”
I told Mr. Tomlinson that I thought General Clark’s letter1 made it clear that we consider Communist performance on the exchange of sick and wounded as an important test of Communist good faith and that it was, of course, not yet possible to reach any decision as to the exact timing on entering into broader negotiations.
[Page 832]The instruction went on to the effect that on the assumption (yet to be proved) that progress towards an armistice is possible, there will be difficulties over the selection of a neutral power, and that thought should now be given to this. The UK would not consider any member of the Communist bloc acceptable for this purpose, but that it seemed to the UK that India is “obviously the most suitable although she may not relish the responsibility.” Eden stated that if the State Department agreed to “taking soundings now in New Delhi” with a view to making sure that India will “volunteer.” [sic]
I told Mr. Tomlinson that on the assumption that the “neutral” was to take custody of prisoners within Korea, which it seemed to us to be the only really practical plan, it was our preliminary feeling that some country such as Switzerland or Sweden would be much preferable to India. In reply to his query I stated that we were, of course, not dismissing the possibility of India but that we would not be happy over such a choice as India, as India all too often seemed to consider it necessary to be “more neutral” towards the Chinese Communists than towards the UN. I said that it was our preliminary thinking that the burden should be placed on the Communist of amplifying and detailing what is now a bare skeleton of a proposal rather than our attempting to develop it for them. I, therefore, feel that any approach to India at this time would not be desirable. Tomlinson said that he would report this to the Foreign Office. I went on to state that we would authorize Clark to have the Liaison Officers at Panmunjom at their first or an early meeting with the Communist on the subject of exchange of sick and wounded make reference to the Chou En-lai message to the President of UNGA and to state that UNC would be glad to receive a detailed statement from the Communist on suggestions on the implementation of the proposal in order that it could be under study by the UNC while the exchange of sick and wounded was being discussed and carried out. I said that the Liaison Officers would simply make this offer to receive such a statement and carefully avoid entering into any discussion of the proposal. Mr. Tomlinson said that this seemed to him to be a most excellent approach.
I told Mr. Tomlinson that I assumed that the UK was in full agreement with us that discussions should be carried on only at Panmunjom and kept out of the UN. He said that while he had no instruction on the subject, he hoped this was the case.