Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson records

Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters (Cutler) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

[Washington,] March 21, 1953.

This morning I discussed with the President the attached memorandum of a talk I had with Senator Flanders¹ on March nineteenth.

The President was interested in what Senator Flanders had to say. He asked me to pass Senator Flanders’ ideas to Emmet Hughes, who as you know is working on some speech material for him. He went on to extemporize as to whether it might not be best to extend the neutral zone idea throughout the whole world. Then he talked generally about building United Nations strength in order to deliver a massive blow and reach the waist of Korea—perhaps adding two American divisions (one Army and one Marine), building up to twenty ROK divisions, and getting a British brigade from Suez when that situation is settled.

He then asked me to request you to study what it would cost to conduct a successful campaign in Korea which would:

(1) Do the maximum damage to the Chinese forces, and

(2) Reach and hold firmly the waist line.

He wanted specifically to know whether this could be done without bombing the enemy’s Manchurian airfields. He indicated that the use of atomic weapons in such a campaign should depend on military judgment as to the advantage of their use on military targets.

It is my understanding that in the NSC Planning Board’s current study of Far Eastern policy papers, including a paper on Korea, the Planning Board will receive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff information along the very line requested by the President.² We now anticipate receiving this information by March twenty-fifth. It is our plan to present the Far Eastern policy papers, including Korea, at the April eighth Council Meeting. Therefore, I should think it would be sufficient if you make sure with General Bradley that the points which the President wishes covered will indeed be covered in the work now being brought to a conclusion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Robert Cutler

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters (Cutler)

top secret

[Washington,] March 19, 1953.

Senator Flanders asked me to come to his office this afternoon and he talked to me for half an hour on his ideas about the Korean War.

Flanders has continuously believed and now believes:

(1) the U.S. cannot safely continue an indefinite military stalemate in Korea.

(2) the American people want to see the Korean War brought to a victorious end, even at a cost.

(3) the American people elected the Eisenhower Administration to do something about corruption, Korea, and taxes.

(4) the American people expect the Eisenhower Administration to take the initiative.

Flanders was most cordial and friendly. He has made many speeches on this subject. His last speech was in the Senate on March 6, 1953. He believes that the U.S. should take the initiative in making a peace offer either

(a) as a basis for obtaining a peace settlement from Communist China, or

(b) as necessary condition precedent to taking intensified military action in Korea, looking towards a victory by force.

Flanders believes that the main points of the U.S. proposal for settling the conflict by a peace (note—not a truce) should be:

(1) offer to Communist China a neutral zone along the Yalu River, to be inspected and administered by a commission made up wholly of Asiatic neutrals; and broadcast this to the Communist troops.

(2) offer to rebuild in usable form housing, transportation, and industries in North and South Korea.

(3) offer to hold free elections under UN auspices in the reunited country.

As Flanders says: “here is a project which is based on the well-being of people rather than the aggrandizement of power.”

Flanders says he presented these views early last fall to the President and to Dulles and they both thought very well of them. Later, Dulles advised him that the plan would involve getting too many people to agree. He now has undertaken to mention it to me because he feels he is right and wants to advance his idea again.

Incidentally, he said that when he brought the idea up to President Truman and Secretary Acheson last year, their only reply was that the Russians don’t understand anything but military force.

Robert Cutler

P.S. Flanders feels that the difficult issue (repatriation of prisoners) which the Communists have used to stymie truce negotiations might have a better chance to get settled in a new and different setting—peace instead of truce.

1. Senator Ralph E. Flanders of Vermont.
2. The references were to NSC 147 and an attached estimate, dated Mar. 27, prepared by the JCS. For NSC 147, Apr. 2, see p. 838; the estimate is not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series)