Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795B.5/2–2453

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State¹

New York, February 24, 1953.

Dear Foster: On September 12, 1950, the Secretary of Defense (in a letter classified Secret²) wrote to the Secretary of State that the acceptance of foreign troops for service in Korea would have to be contingent upon their providing their own financing and supplies.

On September 30, 1950 (in a letter classified Secret³) he wrote to the Secretary of State again: “…that the Department of Defense attaches great importance to preserving this principle of reimbursement”, adding that: “it would appear undesirable to establish any general principle that U.S. military supplies, services or equipment will be donated without creating any obligation on the part of their recipients.

On September 27, 1952, the Secretary of Defense (in a letter classified Secret⁴) wrote to the Secretary of State: “The Korean operation is now more than two years old and any further offer of forces that might be forthcoming would not be made in the atmosphere of urgency that prevailed in 1950 and early 1951”. (Underlining is mine.)⁵

I would like to interpolate at this point that one of the same criticisms levelled at the previous Administration in 1952 was that it had indeed lost a sense of urgency about Korea.

The letter of September 27, 1952 continues: “Under present conditions there is no compelling reason for postponing discussions of financial considerations, and a failure on the part of the U.S. to be more specific concerning reimbursement for logistic support could be expected to be misunderstood.”

Underlying all this verbiage is the clear inference that foreign troops for Korea will not be accepted unless the nation furnishing the manpower is also able to furnish the financial and logistic support. This may not always be spelled out with unequivocal clearness, but it is implied so clearly that it is the view of our position held by many foreign officials.

I had thought that it was generally agreed among Americans that the U.S., not having inexhaustible manpower resources, would be performing an act of statesmanship to provide military material to those countries which in turn would furnish their young manpower in a common cause. I had thought that the calling into service of young foreign soldiers who would help our young people bear the burden of the battle was not a price which could be calculated in dollars.

This attitude on the part of the Defense Department has greatly damaged the U.N., because criticism is directed at the United Nations on the grounds that the member nations have not produced manpower for Korea in proportion to population. The facts cited above indicate that one of the reasons for this is not that the member nations are slackers, but that the attitude of the Defense Department imposes logistic and financial obligations which they cannot meet. The attitude of the Defense Department not being known to the American public, the United Nations is blamed.

One of the major arguments made by General Eisenhower in 1952 and which received overwhelming public acclaim was that every practicable step should be taken so that our young men would not have to bear such an overwhelmingly large portion of the load of combat.

It is apparent that the Defense Department’s policy, as cited here, as it has been in effect during the previous Administration, stands squarely in the way of obtaining the largest possible amount of young foreign manpower to help us in the struggle. I hope, therefore, that the Defense Department will change this policy so that all militarily effective young men will be welcomed whether they come from countries which can afford to finance them or not.

I hope that the “atmosphere of urgency” which the previous Administration thought had decreased will be revived in this instance.

I am giving a memorandum on this subject to Bobby Cutler at the White House.⁶

Sincerely yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Ambassador

1. According to a note attached to the source text, Dulles asked O’Connor to discuss with Hickerson the advisability of raising the reimbursement question with the Department of Defense. This issue was treated in NSC 147 of Apr. 2 and discussed at the NSC meeting on Apr. 8. For a text of the relevant sections of the NSC paper, see paragraphs 179 and 180, pp. 853 and 857; for a report of the NSC meeting, see p. 892. According to another attached note, Lodge was to be reminded that if he quoted from classified material, he must classify his letters.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 649.
3. For text, see ibid., p. 666.
4. Not printed. (795B.5/9–2752)
5. Printed here as italics.
6. Lodge sent Cutler an identical letter on Feb. 23. Included with this letter was the following postscript in Lodge’s writing: “I fear this is another case of ‘ritualistic’ military thinking! If you can be the instrument of Providence which develops foreign manpower to help our boys, future generations will arise and call you blessed!” (Eisenhower Library, White House Office records, “Project ‘Clean Up’ “)