795.00/2–2552
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
Subject:
- POW Question in Korean Armistice Negotiations
Participants:
- The President
- Mr. Foster, Under [Deputy] Secretary of Defense
- General Hull, Department of Defense
- Mr. Matthews—G
- Mr. Johnson—FE
General Hull briefly summarized for the President the results of the visit of himself and Mr. Johnson to Japan and Korea with regard to the foregoing question.1 The President was informed that it was the view of General Ridgway, in which General Hull and Mr. Johnson concurred, that in the absence of Communist agreement to voluntary repatriation there was no feasible method of handling the problem of prisoners of war held by the UNC who violently object to repatriation to the Communists except by an overt screening of all POWs. It was General Ridgway’s view that this could and should be accomplished within the daylight hours of a single day and that the Communists should thereupon be immediately informed of this and our willingness to enter into an all-for-all exchange upon the basis of accordingly revised lists of POWs. The President indicated his acceptance of this view. The President was informed that General Ridgway did not now require or expect additional instructions and that he would proceed to carry out his present instructions to reduce the outstanding questions to the airfield and POW questions, whereupon he would propose to concede the UNC position on airfields if the Communists would concede their position on voluntary repatriation. If, as anticipated the Communists refuse to accept this proposal, General Ridgway will report to Washington and request instructions on the basis of unilateral screening of POWs by the UNC. In the meanwhile, General Ridgway’s command will continue [Page 59] detailed planning for promptly carrying out such screening at such time as directed. It was pointed out to the President that the implementation of such a plan would constitute an irrevocable decision on this question, and the President expressed his understanding. General Hull also informed the President that it was the conclusion of General Ridgway’s headquarters that the Communists hold a considerable number of American POWs over and above the 3198 figure they have reported to the UNC. While the number of such Americans is conjectural, there is fairly firm information with regard to 562 such prisoners. It is the preliminary estimate of General Ridgway’s headquarters that approximately 5000 North Korean POWs and 11,500 CCF POWs could be expected violently to resist repatriation to the Communists. It was also the view of General Ridgway’s headquarters and General Hull and Mr. Johnson that, qualitatively as well as possibly quantitatively, the problem of CCF POWs and possible Communist reactions thereto was much more difficult than that of Korean POWs. General Hull informed the President that it was General Ridgway’s opinion that the Communist military position is now stronger than at the beginning of the armistice negotiations, that the Communists are well dug in in depth, and that any military decision in Korea would require an additional corps of three divisions and greatly increased casualties. General Hull also stated that General Ridgway was of the opinion that while an all out Communist air attack would initially result in considerable losses to the 8th Army, such air attacks would not be able to destroy the 8th Army, which would be able quickly to adjust itself to such a situation.
In reply to a question by Mr. Matthews, General Hull said that General Ridgway no longer feels that the Communists are in such urgent military need of an armistice, that they will agree to one on the basis of unlimited concessions to our requirements.