Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

320/11–2452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

secret
priority

New York, November 24, 1952—2:05 a.m.

Delga 245. Re Korea. Following is summary of proceedings at meeting of 21 co-sponsors held at USUN, 6:30 p.m., November 23, 1952.

Spender (Australia), Chairman, opened meeting with suggestion group attempt reach agreement on tactics, in light of exaggerated press reports re dissension within group.¹ He hoped keep meeting limited to discussion of principles rather than details. He noted new Menon draft resolution (see separate tel for revisions)² had moved perceptibly toward recognition of criticism of earlier draft. In order to counteract stories in press, Spender expressed hope press could be told after this meeting that general agreement had been reached.

Secretary agreed generally with Spender’s remarks. He said it was highly desirable that, if we could agree on attitude of group, we should give priority to Menon’s draft resolution and work on that. He agreed that Menon’s redraft was an improvement, especially as to appointment of umpire. However, he saw no improvement in para 17. First sentence that para referred to post-armistice political conference the disposition of POWs who had not returned home after 90 days. Remainder of para indicated there was no limitation of time upon this referral of power to dispose of POWs. Second sentence of para said in effect POWs were to remain under detention indefinitely with only their care and maintenance transferred to another, unspecified body.

Secretary emphasized US dislike of idea of reference this problem to political conf. There had been no agreement on it after months of discussion at Panmunjom; therefore it was not likely that political conf could reach agreement or make unanimous recommendation to govts which was only effective way of settling problem through political conf. US would much prefer not to refer matter to political conf at all. Secretary was in consultation with his government on this point. He did not wish to take adamant stand at this time. One thing, however, was clear: There must be some definite end point to power of control and disposition of POWs by political conf. This could be done in a variety of ways. It should be made clear that after a given period, POWs should be released to a civilian group, not connected with the Korean hostilities for care and resettlement. He would suggest UNKRA for this purpose, unless some other UN agency should be preferred. UNKRA had the staff and funds to carry out the job. It could not simply be turned over to “UN” under whose control POWs were after all at present. Secretary continued, he did not see why this should present any problem. He understood the importance of reaching agreement with Indians, but all we were doing here was to bring Menon’s speech (Doc A/C.1/2542, pouched separately to Dept).³ Secretary concluded by noting internal contradiction in para 5 of resolution where reference is made to Kim Il Sung letter. He suggested words “by the Repatriation Commission” be added at end of para 5 to make it absolutely clear that classification of POWs was not to be undertaken by Commies as proposed in Kim letter. He stated this might save weeks of argument at Panmunjom.

Spender then suggested that word “disposition” be substituted for “care and maintenance until end of their detention” in last sentence of para 17. He realized this would still leave open the question of specific agency to care for POWs, but felt that this would not be a practical problem since UN would set up such an agency. Secretary said he attached more importance than Spender to designation of specific UN agency.

Lloyd (UK) began his remarks by regretting press publicity. UKDel had never considered there was any difference of principle among us, but only difference on method. Lloyd stated that revised para 14 in Menon draft taken together with para 13, though not as clear as might be desired, met points laid out by Eden re umpire being chairman and having deciding vote in Repatriation Commission. Lloyd discussed what he singled out as three critical comments made by Secretary re para 17 of Menon draft.

First, re absence of any terminal date of jurisdiction of political conf. Lloyd said he thought this was a flaw in revised text.

Second, re failure to set up agency to act for UN in taking over POWs, Lloyd maintained present language of revised paragraph was important advance over earlier draft. He said 150 day period contained in para fixed a limit after which UN could ensure that moral pressure upon POWs would not continue endlessly. He agreed, however, that it was desirable that an agency should be specified.

Third, re Secretary’s point that POWs might be held indefinitely, Lloyd pointed to reference to recommendation for disposition of POWs in para 17 which he thought it was clear would be made by Repatriation Commission and which gave additional assurance through inclusion of idea of target date for termination of detention. Lloyd added that UK would be willing to accept Menon draft in present revised form as basis for agreement.

If resolution were to have best possible impact on Chinese, the less amendment there was by countries with forces in Korea, the better. It was important to retain Indian initiative and support for resolution; if Chinese refused to accept it while UN side did so, we would be in best possible psychological position. He hoped that group would not now reach fixed or final position. It would be a mistake to put forward amendments as a sine qua non. He suggested that the points we wished to have clarified should be developed in course of debate without ultimata, with effort to see if we could not obtain a further revised draft which did meet them. Above all, group should not be maneuvered into a rigid position.

Kyrou (Greece) expressed gratitude for Eden’s efforts with Menon, results of which were clear in revised draft. Kyrou suggested Menon should be asked entirely to omit reference to political conference in connection with disposition of POWs so that at end of 90 days they would be turned over to UNKRA or some other UN agency for care and maintenance. Spender replied that he thought that in Menon’s view any reference to UNKRA in resolution would prejudice its acceptability. Spender would himself have preferred no reference to political conf, but this did not involve so important a matter of principle as to insist over Menon’s objections.

Sarper (Turkey) pointed out para 17 provided for no way of ending the detention of POWs unwilling to return home. He thought it opened the door to endless difficulties with Commies. Secretary expressed strong support for points made by Kyrou and Sarper. He stressed importance of matter. He directed attention of group to waiting period involved. We had started with 90 days and had now reached almost a half year. We would be confronted with re-establishment of Commie airfields near battle lines, and would be discussing these matters at end of period in face of increased military pressures upon US. Secretary stated we prefer total waiting period of only 120 days and a specific decision re UN agency to be involved. He had the gravest difficulty in believing that tactics suggested by Lloyd were wise. If we should take a relaxed attitude in so vital a matter and later have to vote against this para of resolution, we would be charged with having misled people in GA as to what our attitude really was. Perhaps some group or person might try to work matter out with Menon.

At this point Spender remarked that group was in agreement on giving priority to Menon resolution. There was chorus of “noes” from far end of table. Secretary interjected that priority for Menon draft was conditioned on acceptance of necessary changes.

Romulo⁴ (Philippines) stated group was not in general agreement re priority. Sponsors must hold on to 21 power resolution until satisfied with provisions of Menon draft. Menon resolution at some points seemed based on assumption GA was neutral body holding even balance between UN and aggressors. He could not accept this approach.

Lloyd replied that 21 power resolution must certainly not be abandoned, but we could not tell whether Indian resolution would be acceptable until after we had debated it.

Wan⁵ (Thailand) stated that the question of priority could not be considered until agreement had been reached on principle, especially re para 17. Balluseck⁶ (Netherlands) stated that on the essential principle of no forced return, Indian resolution was actually clearer than 21 power draft and therefore group could give it priority. If group could agree on a definite text for para 17, he would favor such a course. Sarper replied that what Menon draft gave in para 3 re no forced return it took away in para 17 where release of prisoners not choosing to return was held up for at least 5 months and for an indefinite period thereafter. A satisfactory solution of this difficulty should be a main requirement for giving priority to the Menon resolution.

Hoppenot (France) agreed such changes would be desirable, but felt that they should be worked out in first comite and not made a condition for acceptance of the Menon resolution.

There was further discussion of para 17 of the Menon draft with Sourdis⁷ (Colombia), Aklilou⁸ (Ethiopia) and Carias (Honduras) supporting US general approach, Carias stressing his dissatisfaction with proposed composition of Repatriation Commission.

Kyrou then suggested it would be useful if Eden could talk with Menon re desired changes in para 17. He hoped that 21 sponsors would agree to introduce such amendments themselves if Menon were recalcitrant. He also supported the change suggested by the Secretary in para 5, and reverted to his proposal that para 17 contain no reference to political conf. Sarper thought last point desirable; Secretary thought it highly desirable.

Spender then suggested group agree that certain changes in para 17 be taken up with Menon. Martin (Canada) agreed, but stressed necessity that approach be in terms of points on which group would like clarification; otherwise, he foresaw unfortunate reaction in certain elements of public opinion.

Lloyd supported Martin’s point that it would be a mistake to condition question of priority on reaching of agreement with Menon re proper wording of para 17. He felt that this would be a tactical blunder. A better way would be to “generously” give priority to Menon resolution in committee and through discussion and discreet outside pressure achieve result group desired. On Secretary’s suggestion, Lloyd then stated three principles on which clarification should be sought from Menon.

First, political conference should not have jurisdiction over POWs for an indefinite period. Spender noted that question had been raised whether political conference should have such jurisdiction at all. Lloyd responded he would prefer political conference have nothing to do with matter, but to produce desired result with Menon he suggested a limited period of jurisdiction for political conference.

Second principle stated by Lloyd was that some UN body must be provided to deal with POWs not returning home. Lloyd suggested that perhaps a separate resolution put in at the right moment, not at present, could be used to make this determination.

Third principle expressed by Lloyd was that POWs could not be kept in custody for an indefinite period.

Secretary agreed that Lloyd has stated broad principles. He repeated explicit reservation of United States re having political conference involved in matter in any way, as well as importance of short time limit because of possibility of construction of airfields by aggressor. Re Lloyd’s second principle, Secretary considered it important that armistice agreement state either that a specific agency should be used or that UN should thereafter determine agency. On third principle, Secretary urged 120 day limit. Secretary warned against getting into prolonged negotiating with Menon. What we are doing, he said, is negotiating with ourselves, and in public. He hoped for another meeting of group very shortly. If Menon had not by then agreed, he hoped we ourselves would then move to put Menon resolution in shape.

Lloyd thought it would be a mistake to negotiate with Menon at this moment. He again remarked that best tactic was to give Menon resolution priority and carry on discussion with Menon over next few days. If we could mobilize large majority behind great neutral force represented by Menon, we would have strengthened our position very greatly. Referring to his upcoming speech, November 24, the Secretary assumed Lloyd would not object if Secretary pointed out our objections to Menon draft. Was that what Lloyd suggested we should do? Lloyd remarked he had often advised his own Foreign Minister re public statements, but it was first time he had ever been put in this position. He thought the Secretary should take line we were prepared to consider any useful means of dealing with problems before us, should welcome Menon resolution, should state there were still some matters requiring clarification, but should not get involved in precise wording of individual paragraphs. He suggested that at later stage, when First Committee was discussing specific resolutions, Secretary might intervene again to suggest alternative language of specific paragraphs.

Spender then attempted to draw the meeting to a close, stressing importance of group showing no division as it left meeting. It was agreed Spender would draft a communiqué for press indicating need for further clarification of Menon draft resolution and agreement on basic problems involved. Before adjournment it was agreed that if Entezam moved for priority of consideration for Menon draft at November 24 meeting of Committee 1, group would seek to prevent vote thereon. Spender said he would call group meeting on short notice before Committee 1 was convened if Secretary’s speech was likely to be prejudiced by any move in committee re priority of voting.

Acheson

1. See New York Times, Nov. 23, 1952.
2. Reference was to telegram Delga 246 which is Tab A to a memorandum from Bruce to the President, infra.
3. Not printed.
4. Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Ambassador to the United States and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.
5. Prince Wan Waithayakon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Permanent Representative at the United Nations, and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.
6. D. J. von Balluseck, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands at the United Nations.
7. Evaristo Sourdis, Chairman of the Colombian Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.
8. Ato Abte-wold Aklilou, Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.