State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
Indian Resolution on Korean Armistice
Mr. Matthews explained that he had talked the day before with the Secretary in New York, and that the Secretary was having considerable difficulty with the U.K. and a number of other countries who were anxious to support something similar to the Indian resolution. Mr. Matthews said the Secretary had asked that we go over the Indian resolution and see what changes would have to be made in it to make it acceptable. Mr. Matthews also said that the Secretary has spoken very strongly against any such resolution, but felt that he must be in a position to know what the minimum was we could accept in case we found ourselves in a position in which we could not avoid wide support for something along these lines.
General Bradley said he understood the problem as outlined by Mr. Matthews and that he thought we should go through the resolution to see what changes had to be made.
General Hull: What would the political effects be of turning down the Indian resolution as opposed to seeking to amend it?
Mr. Hickerson: It is difficult to say exactly what would happen. Many of these countries are worried about what the new administration will do in Korea. Some of them think the Indian idea might bring about an armistice. Others don’t believe it will be accepted but think it would put us in a good position if it were rejected.
Mr. Matthews: Suppose we insist on our own resolution. What support would we get?
Mr. Hickerson: It would probably pass. There would be lots of abstentions. However, you could probably make the British and Canadians support it.
Mr. Matthews: Menon is going to introduce some resolution on Monday. He says he is under instructions to put something in.
General Bradley: That’s why I think we must see what is wrong with his present draft and change it.
General Hull: If we can find modifications that will permit us to support it, I guess that is best.
[Page 635]Mr. Johnson: I gather that what we are trying to do today is find out what we have to do in order to live with it. That was the basis on which we revised it last night.
General Bradley: Yes, I think that is it, and if we don’t get the changes we think are necessary, then we would have to oppose it.
Mr. Bohlen: I think in effect we are deciding that if we can get the right modifications we would support it.
General Hull: I agree.
Mr. Matthews: We are agreeing to work out a paper for the Secretary which we could live with if he decides we have to follow this tactic.
General Bradley: Yes, I think we are trying to see what we can live with. It is up to him to decide whether to go along with something like this. I notice from the telegrams that Doc sent over to me this morning that the Secretary and Gross have taken a very firm view that we oppose Menon’s resolution.
Shall we go over the resolution paragraph by paragraph?
Mr. Matthews: Yes, unless you want to go to the last paragraph first. It is the crucial one.
Mr. Johnson: I think we might take up the last paragraph.
(General Bradley then read some suggested language proposed by Mr. Johnson.)
Mr. Johnson: This is just some language I put down to raise the problem.
General Hull: Will the Repatriation Commission that is called for be able to make these arrangements with other countries to take the remaining prisoners as a practical matter?
Mr. Hickerson: It will certainly be difficult. As far as the grammar is concerned you have to say the Commission shall send these people to countries willing to take them.
General Hull: Then the Commission would make the arrangements with these other countries.
General Bradley: They won’t be up against any more problems than we are as long as Formosa is not excluded.
Mr. Nitze: On the basis of this suggested language you can’t guarantee that the possible destinations include Formosa. That would be up to the Commission.
General Bradley: It is clear that the Repatriation Commission would be responsible to the General Assembly in carrying out its duties?
Mr. Johnson: As we conceive it, the Commission would call on us and others to furnish guards and logistic support.
Admiral Duncan: Who the Commission is responsible to is important because this provides the machinery by which the Commission would do its business.
[Page 636](The meeting then took up the Indian resolution and the draft amendments thereto, paragraph by paragraph, and agreed to changes that would be considered necessary if we were to accept such a resolution.)
Admiral Duncan: This resolution should address itself solely to the way of settling the POW issue. It is addressed to the North Koreans and Chinese, and it should not include all these provisions for the mechanism.
Mr. Hickerson: This resolution really means that you would set up a new screening mechanism.
General Bradley: I think that is what it boils down to.
Mr. Hickerson: I think the Indians might buy it if it contains some provision for the disposal of these POWs other than to Formosa.
Mr. Nitze: Suppose you provided that if no disposition can be agreed upon, the prisoners would be returned to those who now have custody.
Mr. Matthews: I think that might make it more difficult for the Indians.
Colonel Matthews: Under this proposal the Communists have at least two members on the Commission. Under Mr. Nitze’s suggestion they would lose all voice.
Mr. Hickerson: What we must have is an alternative to the POWs staying forever in the custody of the Commission.
General Hull: Do the Indians go along with the idea of no forcible repatriation?
Mr. Johnson: Yes, technically.
Admiral Duncan: I think the Secretary should reject the Indian proposal and discuss the way this matter should be approached by the General Assembly to find a basis for settling the issue.
Mr. Bohlen: The difficulty is not just with the Indians. I think there are others who would say this does attempt to give a means of settlement of the POW problem so you can get ahead with the armistice.
Admiral Duncan: What we ought to have is a paper that addresses itself to the problem of settling the issue. This resolution is too broad. It ought to tell the Commission to do certain specific things and give them guidance. You can’t get away from the fact that the armistice agreement is supposed to be a military matter.
General Hull: That is why I asked at the beginning how important it was to try to make this resolution something we can take.
Mr. Matthews: Our job is to try to make this resolution one that we can live with if it becomes necessary to offer something to avoid losing our allies in a debate.
Mr. Bohlen: If you had two resolutions—the Twenty-one Nation resolution and the Indian—we could abstain on the Indian and if the Communists accepted, we could take another look at it. If they refused, we would not be stuck with anything.
[Page 637]Mr. Matthews: That is a possible tactic, but I think we have to leave that with the Secretary in New York.
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A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
Chairman of the JCS General Bradley and Vice Chiefs General Hull and Admiral Duncan attended for the JCS. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Admiral H. Page Smith and General Ruffner represented the Department of Defense. The entire discussion was concerned with Korea.
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