Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

operational immediate

Tokyo, September 28, 1952—4:43 p.m.

Z 23092. For info, CINCUNC (Adv) msg HNU 11–333.

• “1. Delegations reconvened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows.

• “2. UNC: I have an important statement to make.

  “For many weeks the prisoner of war issue has blocked the achievement of an Armistice in Korea. On 1 July we suggested to you that a solution to the problem must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the requirements of both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition.

  “It must now be clear to you that one of the requirements of our side which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation.

  “Within this humanitarian principle the United Nations Command has made honest efforts to achieve an Armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the United Nations Command delegation has attempted to find a solution to the prisoner of war question, I will restate the proposals which we have previously offered and which you have summarily rejected.

  “We have previously proposed that joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without military observers of both sides, be admittted to the prisoner of war camps of both sides to verify the fact that non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. As an alternative we proposed that all the prisoners of war of both sides be delivered in groups of appropriate size to the demilitarized zone and given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the interview to be done by one or a combination of the following:

  • “A. International Committee of the Red Cross.
  • “B. Teams from impartial nations.
  • “C. Joint teams of military observers.
  • “D. Red Cross representatives from each side.

  “Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have allayed any legitimate fears you might have had that the prisoners of war were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and would have produced an Armistice.

  “I now present to you three additional alternate proposals, any one of which will lead to an Armistice if you truly desire one. I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side can agree to an Armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior formal acceptance of an Armistice by both sides, with the disposition of prisoners of war to be determined thereafter according to the one of the following procedures. (At General Nam Il’s request, General Harrison repeated the last statement beginning with “I now present.)

  • “A. As soon as the Armistice Agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall begin in accordance with the provisions of article three of the Armistice Agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate prisoners of war shall be fulfilled by having them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The prisoner of war shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of prisoners of war in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams. The prisoner of war shall there upon be considered as fully repatriated for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any prisoner of war who at time of identification states that he wishes to return to the side by which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so. Such former prisoner of war shall there upon go into the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with transportation from the demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual, of course, shall not be detained as a prisoner of war but shall assume civilian status, and, in accordance with paragraph 52 of the Armistice Agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.
  • “B. As soon as the Armistice Agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. All prisoners objecting to repatriation will be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the following:
    • “(1) International Committee of the Red Cross.
    • “(2) Joint Red Gross teams.
    • “(3) Joint military teams.
  • “C. As soon as the Armistice is signed and becomes effective all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capability permits, or as soon as possible thereafter, those prisoners of war who have previously expressed their objections to repatriation will be delivered in groups of appropriate size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the military control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this movement and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the observation of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross representatives from both sides.

  “We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the United Nations Command can offer. Each of them will produce an Armistice. I urge that you give mature and careful consideration to our proposals. For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, and that we meet again here at 1100 hours on 8 October. Our Staff Officers will be available at any time to answer questions on any of our proposals.”

• “3. Communists: ‘Your statement has been carefully noted. Now I propose to recess until 2 o’clock in the afternoon.’
• “4. UNC: ‘We agree.’
• “5. Meeting recessed at 1128 hours.
• “6. Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours.

• “7. Communists: ‘I have a statement to make.

  “‘In line with our sincerity to make consistent efforts to achieve an Armistice in Korea on a fair and reasonable basis, we have carefully studied your statement of this morning and the 3 alternate proposals put forth by your side in that statement.

  “‘I cannot but point out that we cannot find anything in any one of your 3 different proposals which in substance meets the reasonable requirements of both sides. You have only used different forms and ways to decorate the unreasonable demand upon which your side has persistently insisted.

  “‘It must be pointed out that the present issue between both sides on the question of repatriation of war prisoners is definitely not to be covered up by any tricks of playing with forms and ways. No matter under what name it is disguised, the proposition of retaining war prisoners is not to be tolerated.

  “‘The question of repatriation of war prisoners must be settled in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention and the agreed paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Draft Armistice Agreement. Our principle of repatriating war prisoners home to lead a peaceful life is in full accord with the Geneva Convention and paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Draft Armistice Agreement.

  “‘In contrast to your side which has never made any substantive concession on the question of repatriation of war prisoners, our side in seeking a fair and reasonable Armistice has made a series of major efforts on the question of repatriation of war prisoners. On 18 July we presented a proposal which carries out concretely the principles of repatriating war prisoners to lead a peaceful life. I have repeated many times that our proposal of 18 July is itself a solution which in substance meets the reasonable requirements of both sides and now I repeat again it is our proposal of 18 July alone which in a reasonable degree meets the requirements of both sides.

  “‘In the interests of an Armistice in Korea, I once again propose to your side to reconsider your basic stand. In accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention and the agreed paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Draft Armistice Agreement, war prisoners must be repatriated home to lead a peaceful life. This is absolutely fair and reasonable.

  “‘The Korean peoples Army and the Chinese peoples volunteers firmly maintain this absolutely fair and reasonable principle. In order that your side may reconsider your basic stand, I agree to your proposal to recess for 10 days.’

• “8. UNC: ‘My statement today was made only after the most careful study by the United Nations Command. We urge that you give mature and careful consideration to what we said.

  “‘We will expect your considered response at the meeting on 8 October.’

• “9. Communists: ‘In my statement I clearly showed you our stand. I urge you that during the recess you seriously reconsider your stand. We agree to recess for 10 days.’
• “10. Meeting recessed at 1415 hours. No comments. Signed Harrison.”