Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/9—3052: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
priority

Tokyo, September 23, 1952—4:45 p.m.

CX 55641. 1. For your info, there fols herewith a statement which Gen Harrison will make to the Communists in the event the proposals contained in JCS 917910,² or as modified by my CX 55003,³ are approved. Part 1 is applicable regardless of whether changes suggested in CX 55003 approved. Part 2 is for use if statement fols JCS 917910 without amendment. Part 3 is to be substituted for part 2 if changes recmd by CX 55003 are approved.

Part 1. “I have an important statement to make.

“For many weeks the pris of war issue has blocked the achievement of an Armistice in Korea. On 1 July we suggested to you that a solution to the problem must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the rqmts of both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition.

“It must now be clear to you that one of the rqmts of our side which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation. Your objections to this principle have never been consistent. You yourselves applied this principle in disposing of many United Nations Command POWs you had captd. At one time you appeared to have agreed to our use of the principle when you supd us with an amnesty declaration to be read to the prisoners prior to the screening. As you know, we used your amnesty declaration and conducted the screening in such a manner as to encourage the max no of pers to return to your side. When the results of the screening were announced, and it became apparent to you that the Communist-inspired riots in POW camps on Koje-Do did not deter large nos of your former pers from renouncing Communism, you contended that the screening was not fairly conducted. When we offered to conduct a rescreening and let you observe the process, or have it conducted by impartial nations, you suddenly announced that you would not agree to any type of screening by anybody, anywhere, under any circumstances. It is apparent you have taken this stand because you are afraid to be confronted with the incontrovertible fact that large nos of your former pers violently oppose returning to your side.

“By your process of continually raising new excuses for delaying an Armistice you have finally arrived at the indefensible psn of refusing to have anything to do with the principle of no forced repatriation. You have therefore refused to meet the rqmts of our side in any degree and have substituted as your price for an Armistice a demand that we force these hapless pris to return to your side at the point of a bayonet.

“You have attempted to camouflage the unreasonableness of your stand by associating it with the Geneva Convention of 1949 and by trying to deceive the world into believing that you are concerned with the rights and welfare of indivs. You have used these confs as a forum for the most vicious type of propaganda. You do not hesitate to use lies, half truths, and distortions to further your ends.

“In contrast to what you would have the world believe, that you are the champions of the Geneva Convention, it is well to compare your actions with your words. From the beginning of these conferences you have obstinately and inhumanly refused to agree to the immediate exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded POWs. By your own admission you have converted from a POW status thousands of captured United Nations command pers and impressed them into your armed forces. You consistently place your POW camps near mil tgts so that you will be able to accuse us of bombing our own pers. You have refused to turn over the names of captured UNC pers to the ICRC, and you refuse to allow pers of that committee to visit your POW camps. You will not even agree to the humane action of allowing POWs in your custody to receive relief packages. Yet you are well aware that Geneva Convention expressly provides for each of these humanitarian objectives—objectives designed solely for the relief and well being of POWs held by both sides. This is your record, and it shows that while you talk loudly about the humane treatment of POWs you have not put any of this fine talk into practice.

“Another example of how inconsistent you have been in your insistence that the Chinese fighting in Korea are vols having no direct political connection with any sovereign government. You strongly support the right of these indivs to vol in the Korean venture, but now you adopt the inconsistent psn that these same indivs in the custody of the UNC have no right to transfer to the control of a power other than the one under which they were serving at the time of their capture.

“On the other hand, the UNC has made honest efforts to achieve an Armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the UNC del has attempted to find a solution to the POW question, I will restate the proposals which we have prevly offered and which you have summarily rejected.

“We proposed that joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without mil observers of both sides, be admitted to the POW camps of both sides to verify the fact that non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. As an alternative we proposed that all POWs of both sides be dlvrd in groups of aprop size to the demilitarized zone and given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the interview to be done by one or a combination of the folg:

• “(A). ICRC.
• “(B). Teams from impartial nations.
• “(C). Joint teams of mil observers.
• “(D). Red Cross representatives from each side.

“Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have allayed any legitimate fears you might have had that the POWs were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and would have produced an Armistice. Your summary rejection of these proposals is an indication that your so-called reasons are only excuses. It can be assumed only that you have ulterior motives for contg the war in Korea and that you are not conducting these negotiations with honesty or sincerity.”

Part 2. “I now present to you 3 additional alt proposals, any one of which will lead to an Armistice if you truly desire one. I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side can agree to an Armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior formal acceptance of an Armistice by both sides, with the disp on non-repatriates to be determined thereafter according to one of the folg procedures:

• “(1). As soon as the Armistice agreement goes into effect all POWs in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of POWs shall begin in accordance with the provisions of part 3 of the Armistice agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate POWs shall be fulfilled by having them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The POW shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of POWs, in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the ICRC, joint Red Cross teams, or joint mil teams. The POW shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any POW who at the time of ident states that he wishes to return to the side by which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so. Such former POW shall thereupon go into the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with trans from the demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such indiv, of course, shall not be detained as a POW but shall assume civ status, and, in accordance with article 52 of the Armistice Agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.
• “(2). All non-repatriates will be dlvrd to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from mil control of both sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without mil representation from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the folg:
  • “(A). ICRC.
  • “(B). Joint Red Cross teams.
  • “(C). Joint Mil teams.
• “(3). As soon as the Armistice becomes eff there will be an immediate exchange of the aprxly 12,000 UNCPOWs held by your side for the aprxly 83,000 of your former pers held by our side whom we can repatriate, with the issue of the remaining pers held by our side to be the subj of further negotiations.

“If you are prepared to enter immediately into an Armistice on the basis of any of the foregoing proposals, the UNC is prepd to agree that, upon signing of the Armistice, those persons who are not exchanged under the Armistice and who are not Koreans will be sent to any place or places outside of Korea which may be agreed upon by both sides and which are willing to accept them.

“We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the UNC can offer. Each of them will produce an Armistice. I urge that you give mature and careful consideration to our proposals. For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, and that we meet again here at 1100 hrs on blank. Our staff offs will be aval at any time to answer questions on any of our proposals.”

Part 3. “I now present you an alternate proposal which will lead to an Armistice if you truly desire one. I urge that you give it mature and careful consideration, for it contains the remaining avenue of approach on which our side can agree to an Armistice.

“As soon as the Armistice is signed and becomes eff all POWs who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capability permits, or as soon as poss thereafter, those POWs who have prevly expressed their objections to repatriation will be dlvrd in grps of aprop size to a mutually agreed-upon loc in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the mil control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, or screening, each indiv so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this mvmt and disp of non-repatriates accomplished under the obsn of one or a combination of the ICRC, Joint Teams of Mil Observers, or Red Cross representatives from both sides.

“In order that you may have time to study our proposal I now propose a recess for 10 days and that we meet again at 1100 hours on blank. Our staff offs will be aval at any time dur the recess to ans questions.”

1. Nagle, Matthews, Hickerson, and Johnson were handwritten on the source text; presumably they received copies of the telegram.
2. Dated Sept. 8, p. 499.
3. Dated Sept. 11, p. 506.