JCS files, CS 091 Korea (15 Sep 52)
Memorandum for the Record, Prepared by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
Subject:
- Meeting with the President on Korean situation.
The President asked the Secretaries of the three Military Departments, the Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Secretary and myself to meet with him this afternoon at 3:30 to discuss the status of the Korean truce negotiations, the possibilities of an armistice, certain means of increasing military pressure in Korea and other related matters. The subjects were related to the recent exchange of messages1 with General Clark on the subject of the proposal to leave certain parts of the prisoner-of-war question for settlement after the armistice and to have the President make a public statement including an offer somewhat along the lines attributed to President Aleman of Mexico. (The original suggestion along these lines was made by Hallinan, nominee for President of the Progressive Party, and the Daily Worker.)
Those who attended the meeting were as follows: Messrs. Lovett, Foster, Kimball, Bendetsen, Gilpatric; General Vandenberg, Admiral Fechteler, General Hull, Admirals Libby and Dennison.
The President stated that he wanted to discuss the prospects of an armistice, get the views of those present as to the likelihood of getting one, and get any expression of opinion on what might happen to public opinion if and when an armistice were obtained. His question was framed in the general area of the exchange of views with General Clark in Tokyo and the proposals advanced by State for a modification of the “Package deal” we have previously made.
[Page 513]Lovett outlined briefly to the President the discussion between State and Defense which had narrowed their differences of opinion to two points:
- First, State felt that we should offer to exchange 83,000 prisoners we hold for 12,000 of ours they hold, leaving the approximately 15,000 Chinese Commie prisoners to be independently re-screened after this armistice was signed.
- Second, State recommended a statement by the President making such a proposal.
Lovett stated that it was the unanimous feeling of the three Secretaries, the three Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy and himself that the suggestion made by State was unwise and they unanimously supported the position taken by General Clark. Lovett added that he felt particularly strongly that the President should not, in any event, make such a proposal. He felt that we would get nowhere by making such an offer, that it would be considered a sign of weakness, that it would un-do much of the advantage currently being gained by increased military pressure, and that no considerations of fairness would move the Communist negotiators since their judgment was influenced solely by force.
The President discussed various aspects of the situation regarding various forms of military pressure with General Vandenberg, and inquired about the possibilities of a naval blockade and received from Admiral Fechteler a report on the large amount of shipping going into China with the major proportion under British flag. He discussed matters pertaining to the Army with General Hull, with particular reference to the training and increased use of South Korean manpower. He was told by General Hull that trained South Korean troops were coming out at the rate of 600 to 700 a day, and that properly led, they made very good soldiers, as was shown in the recent fighting.
It was pointed out to the President that any sign of weakness on our part and any evidence of willingness to negotiate indefinitely merely convinced the Commies that we would make further concessions and in so doing remove even further the possibility of arriving at an agreed armistice. The matter of the use of Chinese troops on Formosa was discussed, as was the virtually inevitable demand to “bring the boys back home” if by chance an armistice were obtained. Admiral Libby confirmed that in his seven months experience in the negotiations it was amply proven that we were trying to negotiate with people who merely had the quality of talking animals and that equitable compromises or concessions were not to be expected.
The President said that he agreed with the positions of the military and civilian advisers in the Department of Defense; that he saw no real prospect of getting an armistice other than to persist in our present course of action and increase the military pressure in so far as possible; that he would not make any such proposal as advised and that we [Page 514] should do our best to see if additional military effort would force the Commies to accept the reasonable proposals heretofore made to them.
Admiral Fechteler called the President’s attention to the fact that General Harrison was now operating under instructions which required him, when proposing a recess, to likewise propose a subsequent meeting. He pointed out that this had the effect of leaving in the Commies’ mind the distinct impression that our side was then going to come up with some further concessions at the subsequent meeting. He stated that General Clark had asked that General Harrison be given authority to lay the proposals outlined in Clark’s most recent dispatch on the table and then to get up and walk out with no suggestion for a subsequent meeting other than to say that when they had something to offer they would notify him through liaison officers that they desired another meeting, and that they had something substantive to offer.
Following Admiral Fechteler’s statement as outlined above, Admiral Libby confirmed the soundness of his conclusions. Both Admirals Fechteler and Libby urged that Harrison, through Clark, be given the authority to walk out under the conditions outlined above. The President agreed thereto.
The President authorized the dispatch of the message2 agreed on between State, JCS, and SecDef in connection with the release of certain South Korean POW’s pressed into North Korean service.