Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, September 2, 1952—4 p.m.

Draft Statement Proposing Korean Armistice on Basis of Agreed Items (See tele, to Moscow 206, August 27, 1952)²

Mr. Matthews: We have read the messages from Clark³ and Murphy⁴ and we think that perhaps in the light of their views we should not pursue the idea of a presidential statement at this time.

General Bradley: Most of our people thought that it would show weakness at this time.

Mr. Matthews: That certainly wasn’t the intention. I am not sure that Clark understood this was merely to provide a face-saving device for the Communists, but as a result of his views we have been giving consideration to avoiding a presidential statement. We have been considering throwing something like this into the Panmunjom negotiations. It was not our thought at any time to weaken on the principle of non-forcible repatriation. We would, of course, not give that up in any later negotiations on prisoners. We have also looked at Clark’s long cable in which he sets forth several proposals that might be made. (Cable No. C 54499 from Tokyo.)⁵

Mr. Nitze: I had some difficulty following Clark’s reasoning. The main point he seemed to be making was that if the Commies came back with a counter-proposal offering only part of our prisoners for part of theirs which we hold, we would have difficulty with it. I don’t think we would have difficulty turning down something that would not give us back all our prisoners.

General Collins: I think his basic objection was that prior to passing to the political field we should do everything we can at Panmunjom.

Mr. Nitze: We would be inclined to go along with that idea.

General Bradley: What would happen if they accept our proposal? We would still have 45,000 or so prisoners who would stay with us. Do we go back and fight if the negotiations fail?

Mr. Matthews: No, you would have an armistice, but you would be stuck with the prisoners.

General Bradley: Wouldn’t you have to go back and fight?

Mr. Nitze: Not if you signed up on this basis. One of the armistice terms is that it will stay in effect until superseded.

Mr. Allison: If they want an armistice you are all right. If they want an armistice they can forget about these additional prisoners later.

General Bradley: We have always been afraid of a cease fire before you get an armistice.

Mr. Nitze: You would have an armistice here on all of the agreed terms; that includes the provision that it will continue in force.

General Collins: Clark points out that they would build up their air fields, but they could do that under any of these arrangements.

Mr. Allison: Yes.

General Bradley: Well, this just gives them one more excuse for breaking the armistice.

Mr. Nitze: We agree to that but there are a lot of other things they could use as a pretext for breaking the armistice if they wanted to.

General Collins: You feel now that it would not be a good idea to propose this?

Mr. Matthews: That’s right. We are against a presidential statement, but we are inclined to favor at least putting up to Clark the idea of proposing this at Panmunjom.

Mr. Allison: If it were put up at Panmunjom we would take off the first paragraph about Izvestiya.

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

General Collins: Clark has now come in with five proposals. This might be fitted in as a sixth method.

General Bradley: We haven’t finished studying Clark’s message. Personally, I rather like the idea of giving them something and then saying no more talk until they have something to say. I don’t like some of the five specific proposals too much.

The first is something that Bill Fechteler has been talking about for months.

The second is difficult; you would just turn them loose and lose control of them.

The third is difficult because these other people don’t have guards so you couldn’t turn them over to their control.

In the fourth, the word that struck me was the word “decides”. Suppose there is a stalemate. Of course, he puts a time limit on it.

These five proposals require careful study. Maybe this thing that you suggested should be included as a sixth.

Mr. Matthews: May I ask about the paragraph in which Clark says that after five days you would recess unilaterally and the military aspects of the matter would in effect be completed. Do you have any idea what he visualizes after that?

General Bradley: I assume that he means that unless they come back with a proposal there wouldn’t be an armistice. The last sentence is unclear to me too.

General Collins: I took it, it would be removed entirely to the political plane—through our Ambassador in Moscow or some other place, but there would be no further military efforts to secure an armistice.

Mr. Matthews: Then he doesn’t contemplate further military steps?

General Collins: Not unless he gets additional forces. I don’t see what more the military could do about an armistice.

Mr. Nitze: Then we would really be in a box. You have a UN meeting coming up and then the things Clark worries about could really happen.

General Collins: I don’t see why. I assume any diplomatic efforts would include a demand for the return of our POWs. But we have tried everything.

Admiral Fechteler: He says he thinks the military will have exhausted the possibilities after making these proposals.

General Collins: Paul, you say we will be in a box. We haven’t gotten anywhere for two years.

Mr. Matthews: Well, I take it Clark doesn’t mean there is some magic by which to get an armistice.

General Bradley: No, I think we ought to study his message further.

Mr. Matthews: Yes, I think we should.

Mr. Nitze: If you were to make this proposal we have suggested, it would be better to do it not in conjunction with the other five Clark suggests.

General Collins: Yes, I think it should be separate.

Mr. Matthews: Could we send you a rewording of the proposal?

General Bradley: I suggest the people who have been working on this try to come up with a draft.

General Collins: I think Clark is trying to put up a lot of proposals to show how far we are prepared to go and then if they reject all of them we will have a basis for breaking off.

Mr. Matthews: Have you seen any other reports to indicate our military pressure on North Korea is creating a panic.

General Collins: I haven’t personally seen any.

General Bradley: I have just seen indications they are being hurt, but nothing to indicate panic.

General Collins: One thing that struck me while I was in Korea was how little of the front is held by North Koreans. At least 75 percent of the front is held by the Chinese.

General Bradley: When I was there a year ago the North Koreans were full of vinegar. I suspect they have gotten tired of it and have just quit.

Mr. Matthews: It looks like the Chou En-lai talks will end soon.

General Collins: One thing we have talked about was Kennan’s idea of finding some way to throw a monkey wrench in. If we could get agreement on Clark’s suggestions, maybe they could be thrown in. We would have to act fast.

Mr. Matthews: We have no idea what will come out of the meetings in Moscow, but Korea has probably played a part.

General Bradley: On the subject of Clark’s proposals, what chance do we have of getting a group of countries to do some of these things for us, starting out with the worst one, the fifth, where the Indians would take over the remaining prisoners, and coming up to the others?

General Collins: We have approached some of these nations on other things and they have shown great reluctance.

Mr. Matthews: They don’t like to do these things, but you remember they agreed to serve on the inspection teams.

General Bradley: Is there any chance of doing anything along the lines of Kennan’s suggestion of throwing something between the Russians and the Chinese?

Mr. Nitze: Frankly, I think all of Clark’s proposals will be turned down, and there will be no disagreement over them between the Chinese and the Soviets.

Mr. Allison: I agree.

General Collins: What about this other proposal you have suggested?

Mr. Allison: I think it is the only thing that has any chance of being accepted. It may not be good from that point of view, but at least they don’t have to accept the principle of non-repatriation.

General Vandenberg: Suppose they turn down all of Clark’s proposals. Wouldn’t that mean they don’t want an armistice, and wouldn’t it be good for us to know that?

Mr. Allison: I think if they turn down this other one you would know better.

Mr. Matthews: Do you mean we know whether there was a split between the Soviets and the Chinese?

General Vandenberg: No. I just meant the sooner we know whether they want an armistice the better. There has been no real thought as to what we should do if this thing is going on indefinitely. You have to have a new tack sometime.

Mr. Matthews: That was one aspect of it we wanted to talk about. We wanted to know whether you had any idea what you would want to do if the talks broke off. If we knew that, it would be easier to know whether the negotiations should be broken off.

Mr. Nitze: I thought we had been through that in connection with Southeast Asia.

General Vandenberg: I don’t think so. The American people feel differently about Korea where their troops are fighting.

Mr. Nitze: Is there more drastic action you would advise taking?

Mr. Matthews: Is there something you would do this year?

General Vandenberg: No, but you would prepare for it.

General Bradley: I think we should limit ourselves to what we would recommend from the military point of view. You might, on that basis, say it is better to stay 15 years. The public might demand something different.

General Vandenberg: My point is that the people and we here are still hoping for an armistice.

Mr. Matthews: But the difficulty is that if you don’t know what you are going to do, and you break off the negotiations, you may get pressure for something you don’t want to do.

General Bradley: I think we have said a long time ago that we were trying to win this by a limited war in Korea. We wanted to give it a fair try.

Mr. Nitze: I think we have always worried about what we would do to meet a new situation. The question is how you can get a bigger build-up there. It is hard to do in the election campaign.

General Bradley: We can’t do it now. You will have to let it ride.

General Collins: This question also affects the 1954 budget we are working on now.

General Vandenberg: The people in Michigan and Ohio and out there across the country where I have been are red-headed about this. They want something done. The people here in Washington don’t realize that. It is going to affect the elections.

General Bradley: The people have been sold on the MacArthur line that attacking Manchuria will bring the Commies around. We know that may not happen.

General Vandenberg: Well, the lid will blow off.

General Bradley: Then, Doc, is it your idea that the proposal you were suggesting should not be added to Clark’s five proposals and that it has a better chance than his?

General Collins: You mean you’d try this one first?

Mr. Nitze: Yes, I would.

General Collins: That would throw out Clark’s five proposals. General Bradley: No, it would postpone them.

General Collins: You said you thought this proposal of yours was the only one with a chance of acceptance. In paragraph 3 on page 5 of Clark’s message isn’t that also a proposal that would save face for them?

Mr. Allison: If you read back to the message that paragraph refers to you would find other conditions that would be specified.

General Collins: No, I think this is a separate thing.

Mr. Allison: Yes, I guess that is right. The conditions don’t apply here.

General Collins: This proposal seems to me to offer as much chance of acceptance as the one we have been talking about. The other four all require them to agree ahead of time to free determination by individuals.

General Bradley: The proposal number 4 does not differ much from the one you suggested the President make. It turns the matter over to impartial nations instead of having us negotiate it. But suppose those nations did go along with the idea of forced repatriation.

Mr. Nitze: Part of my concern, and we haven’t studied this message fully, is the use of the word “non-repatriation”.

General Collins: I think you are right about that. It is a difficult thing. I thought you might say the remaining prisoners.

General Bradley: You could say those whose disposition is in dispute. What do you do if the impartial nations decide in favor of returning the prisoners?

Mr. Nitze: That worries us because you would be giving the decision on the principle of no forcible repatriation to others.

Mr. Matthews: In our proposal we would keep control of the matter.

General Collins: I think we’ll have to study these.

General Bradley: Yes, we ought to study them along with your proposal. I don’t think we could put the present one up after Clark’s proposals are made.

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

Trials of POWs

General Bradley: Do you want to discuss the other thing we had up last Friday?

Mr. Matthews: You mean the trials in the prison camps?

General Bradley: Yes. The deputies⁶ passed on it Friday and I believe State has not concurred. Admiral Dennison said the President had seen one message on this and didn’t like it.

Mr. Matthews: When you told me that I stopped studying it.

General Bradley: I don’t think this is a good time for the trials. You start hanging them and you give propaganda to the Commies.

Admiral Fechteler: This proposal would give them fair trials.

General Vandenberg: We are shooting the troublemakers now.

General Collins: The difficulty is that the people who get shot now aren’t the ones who are really responsible.

General Bradley: He ought to dig out the ones responsible.

Should we defer consideration on this, or take it to the President and get it turned down, or what should we do?

Mr. Matthews: Aren’t they doing pretty well in the camp?

General Collins: They are taking direct action now. Of course, this proposal is also for past offenses and any new ones. He wants to know whether he can start with the new ones and then pick up the old ones. The President doesn’t think it is a good time to do this. The Commies will probably cook up charges against General Dean or someone else.

General Bradley: Does everyone agree that we should suspend action?

General Vandenberg: I think we should tell him to go ahead as he is now.

Release of South Korean POWs

General Bradley: Do you also want to discuss the release of the 16,000 South Korean prisoners?

Mr. Nitze: Mr. Kennan said in his wire⁷ that we shouldn’t do anything on that if we were going to make a proposal.

General Vandenberg: We’ll always be in the same boat if we keep postponing it. Can I put in a plea that if this other proposal isn’t made we go ahead and clean this matter up.

Mr. Nitze: Is there anything he can be doing for the preparation of their release?

Mr. Matthews: I gather there is not.

Mr. Allison: Is there anything we can be doing with the allies?

General Bradley: Shouldn’t we send an interim reply to Clark.

General Cabell: He has one already.

Mr. Allison: There is one legal question we could work on; that is, how you work out this release under the Geneva Convention.

General Collins: Anything you can do to clear the decks would be fine.

[Here follows a brief discussion of NATO matters.]

1. A note on the title page read: “State draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the JCS, Generals Bradley, Collins, Vandenberg, and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed a five-man Department of State contingent and General Ruffner represented the Department of Defense. In all, 16 persons attended. With the exception of an extremely brief discussion at the conclusion of the meeting about NATO operations, the discussion concerned Korea.

2. Ante, p. 463.
3. Clark’s message was telegram C 54495 to JCS, Sept. 1, p. 467.
4. Murphy’s message was telegram 777 from Tokyo, Sept. 1, p. 466.
5. Dated Sept. 1, p. 470.
6. Operations Deputies, JCS.
7. The reference was to telegram 385 from Moscow, Aug. 28, p. 464.