Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret

Toyko, July 11, 1952—7:04 p.m.¹

C 51780. Ref: A. JCS 912998;² B JCS 911932;³ C. CX 51489;⁴ D. JCS 910484.⁵

1. I concur that Communists proposal may be alternative a as reptd in ref B. The Communists freq interpretation of Para 52, draft armistice agreement, made in recent plenary sessions to the effect that POWs be permitted to rtn home and lead a peaceful life in accordance with the agreement may be an indication that they are approaching alternative b as set forth in ref B. This may be their way of attempting to secure our agreement to the gen principle that all POWs desire to go home.

2. In arriving at my decision to inform the Communists at an early date of the new figure to be repatriated, as set forth in Part 1, ref C, I considered the folg factors favored early release of this info:

a. The Communists have indicated specific nbr of Chinese Communist Force POWs which must be on the list to be repatriated. They have indicated a desire to discuss nbrs. It was my opinion that we should let the Communists know the extent of the differences existing between us and proceed to develop their solution, if any, as to the disposition of Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates.

b. I am of the firm opinion that the press knows the close aprx figure of all pers we can repatriate in accordance with our principle of no forced repatriation. There is the constant danger that this new figure may be prematurely exposed.

c. I consider the withholding of the new firm figure from the Communists as grounds on which the Communists and our allies might justifiably accuse us of failure to negotiate in good faith. Ref D indicated that public and allied spt for our psn in negotiations might be weakening. I do not know the evaluation of this spt at this time.

d. The Communists in recent days have shown a desire to negotiate. I consider that informing them of the new figure of pers to be repatriated and, at the same time or shortly thereafter asking them for their solution to this remaining difference, might aid in contg the Communists present attitude towards negotiations. Since entering Exec Session the Communists have avoided making false charges pertaining to our actions in Korea.

e. The manner in which opinions must be exchanged to effect any progress towards the solution stated in ref B, indicates that dev of this solution and its effect on negotiations will be slow and uncertain. Recent progress, if any, is unknown to me.

f. Presentation of the figure represents the continuation of effort to obtain an armistice agreement based on the present wording of Paras 51 and 52 of such agreement. I feel that in view of the aprx nature of the prev figure given to them that we are in many ways obligated to inform them of the new figure recently determined. Failure to do so gives them uncertain grounds on which to evaluate their psn.

g. Presentation of the new figure at this time even though accompanied by a firm statement to the contrary might be construed by the Communists, particularly for purposes of propaganda to their own people, as indicating a concession on our part. This might put the Communists in a psn whereby they could justify to their own pers the acceptance of our figure or any subsequent proposal.

h. The new figures have little bearing on other courses of action being considered.

3. Views of the UNC Delegation sptg early release to the Communists of the new figure of POWs to be repatriated are quoted in part below:

a. “The longer we sit on the 83,000 figure the more explosive it becomes. It is not disclosure by the UN press which is to be feared, but disclosure by the Communists themselves. It is very possible that the Communists have a fairly accurate idea of the present nbr to be repatriated to their control. They have efficient intel, and our re-segregation of POWs has undoubtedly assisted them in evaluating the nbrs earmarked for rtn to their control. There is always the possibility that the Communists on their own initiative might announce that they have good evidence that for some time the UNC has attempted to hide the fact that appreciably more than the original round nbr of 70,000 persons have indicated willingness to rtn to Communist control. We would be forced to admit the truth of the accusation. The Communists could charge us with apparent intent to withhold the true figures and to falsify the results of screening for our own nefarious purposes. The impact of such an atk on our spt both at home and abroad is obvious. This possibility has been a matter of concern to the UNC Delegation for some time.

b. The Communists have come to the meetings since 1 July with the probable expectation that we have something new to offer; they probably expect us to furnish the final results of screening, since we implied as early as April, when we gave them the 70,000 round figure, that the precise total would be furnd when we had had suf time to obtain it. The exec sessions would give them the opportunity to digest in private the new totals, since the news would still be bad from their point of view. In order to bring something to the meeting they made their present proposal. They must have been reasonably certain we would reject it, and we have done so, but they probably also expected that we would counter with our proposal. It is illogical that we should now reject their proposal as unacceptable and yet not be able to lay on the table what we would accept. This is a particularly awkward sit in view of the fact that we are prepd, and are actually morally obligated, to inform them that our terms are now more fav than before. If we refuse to reveal the 83,000 figure we imply that our stand is still on 70,000, which it is not.

c. The enemy has made his proposal very clear, and I have no basis for further exploration of the meaning of his words. If I cont to explore, it is a definite indication of weakness and indecision on our part. I must take a firm stand on either 70,000 or 83,000. For the reasons stated above, it should be on 83,000.”

4. I considered that the advantages, as set forth in para 2 above, for early release of the new firm figure of those POWs who can be repatriated in accordance with our psn far outweighed the possible disadvantages. I have no recent info on the progress being made along the lines indicated in ref B. Unless extremely good progress is being made along such lines, I still consider that we should inform the Communists of the new firm figure at the earliest possible date. I consider that we must make every effort to at least retain the present spt of the public and our allies for our psn. Delay in presenting the new figure affords them opportunity to charge us with failure to negotiate in good faith. If the Communists should raise the point of our failure to inform them of the new firm figure, I have no doubt that some of our allies would immediately make charges along the lines indicated.

5. Prior to informing you of my intentions to authorize the UNC Delegation to present to the Communists a round nbr of persons to be repatriated, I carefully considered any possible advantages which might accrue to us were we to withhold this info. I realized that if we were able to combine a new proposal with the info as to the new figure to be repatriated, the new proposal might be more palatable to the Communists. I realized the Communists might interpret the new figure as a weakening of our present firm psn and expect further concessions on our part; this might delay the presentation of any new solution they may be considering. However, in presenting the new figure I intend to emphasize the fact that this new figure represents our best effort to reach an agreement on the armistice in accordance with the provisions of para 51; that this represents no concession and is an accurate figure which was heretofore not available.

6. Unless positive action towards the solution indicated in ref B can be taken in 2 or 3 days I, for reasons expressed above, strongly recommend I be authorized to inform the Communists of the round nbr of persons to be repatriated as outlined in part 1 of ref C, stressing that this is no recession from our present psn.

1. Because of the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this telegram, sent at 7:04 p.m. Tokyo time July 11, was received in Washington the morning of the same day. The reply was sent in telegram JCS 913383 to Clark, July 11, 1952, at 5:47 p.m. EST, infra.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 3 to the memorandum of the State-JCS discussion, p. 386.
3. Dated June 23, p. 347.
4. Dated July 7, p. 380.
5. Dated June 5, p. 310.