695A.0024/7–1752
Draft Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
Solution to Prisoners-of-War Question Along Lines of Chou En-Lai’s “Alternative B”
Assuming that the Panikkar report of his conversation with Chou En-lai is generally accurate, and that the Communists will in time be prepared to agree to a solution of the prisoners-of-war question along the lines of “alternative B”, we will face the following problems:
1. Forum for reaching agreement.
Should the question be pursued at Panmunjom or elsewhere? We have now two additional channels in differing stages of development (India and Zinchenko). There is also the possibility that the Communists might move towards this position at Panmunjom; they have now in effect offered us “alternative A”, and they may go on to “alternative B” at a later stage, or we might seek to direct them there. If the Communists [Page 392] indicate a preference for some other channel there is no objection to using such other acceptable channel. At the same time we should instruct General Harrison to explore whether the Communists are prepared to deal with this alternative at Panmunjom. (Actually, the plan of action which General Clark has recently proposed is in its general outlines not unlike “alternative B”.)
2. Text of the proposed agreement.
There are attached a copy of “alternative B” as well as a version of “alternative B”, in a form as close as possible to the Communist position and acceptable to us.
The text leaves open the character of the commission to hear the expression of views by prisoners-of-war. It would be desirable in the first instance to seek to get Communist agreement to having a truly impartial body determine the wishes of the prisoners-of-war. It might be difficult for them to refuse a body consisting for example of India, Indonesia and perhaps an Arab State. From our point of view such a body would be satisfactory for the narrow purpose of accepting custody of prisoners-of-war for interrogation and for determining their attitude towards repatriation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which the Communists have suggested would include the Poles and the Czechs, an arrangement which offers opportunity for “sabotage”, might result in divided determinations as to what is the wish of a particular prisoner-of-war, and may lead to complete breakdown of the procedure.
We should therefore suggest an impartial commission rather than the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Nevertheless, if the Communists insist, we should agree to using the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for this purpose. We would do so on the assumption that if the Communists really want this to work, it will; if they don’t the entire procedure would break down at an early stage, but, as indicated below, this would not necessarily leave us in a disadvantageous position. Further, since our basic concern is for those who would truly resist repatriation, these would in any interview make their refusal to return clear, emphatic and unequivocal and it would be difficult for the Communists to insist that the person does wish to be repatriated.
In regard to place of interview, it is important that if any of our own prisoners-of-war are said not to wish to return, they should be interviewed not in some prison camp, but rather in neutral territory and neutral custody. While there would be practical problems in making similar arrangements for the large numbers of prisoners-of-war we hold, it can be worked out, as indicated below. Panmunjom which is the exchange point under paragraph 55 of the agreement, and which “alternative B” apparently contemplates, appears the most practicable site for the interviewing. (Some other point in the neutral zone would do also.)
[Page 393]3. Incorporation in armistice agreement.
It would be preferable to have acceptable language along the lines of the attached formula inserted in the text of the armistice agreement. If the Communists prefer however it would be acceptable to us to leave the draft armistice agreement much as it is (including the present paragraph 51), provided that there is a written understanding along the lines of the above formula. This understanding could be described as a “gloss” in paragraph 51. While the lists contemplated by paragraph 51 would include the names of the persons opposing repatriation, both sides will be held to have fulfilled paragraph 51 if they offer repatriation to all persons listed, deliver those willing to go to the other side, and deliver those refusing repatriation to the Commission for interviewing in accordance with the agreed formula.
4. How this program could be implemented.
We would envisage implementation of the program in the following steps:
- a)
As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect the exchange of prisoners-of-war would begin on the basis of Article III of the draft armistice agreement and the above formula. We should, of course, seek to get as many of our 12,000 back as possible, while delivering 83,000 to the Communists, before the interviewing of the non-repatriates begins. Under paragraph 54 of the agreement, these exchanges would have to be completed within two months, but presumably it could be done more quickly if the Communists were willing. The interviewing of many thousands would take longer but the two month period could be considered modified to this extent.
The Communists however will probably refuse to return all of our prisoners-of-war before the interviewing of non-repatriates begins, but may insist on phasing the two processes. (They could always say that a number of our POWs refuse repatriation and must be interviewed.) We could live with such an arrangement if we are persuaded that the Communists will abide by their agreement.
- b)
- When the interviewing is to begin, we would bring a small group—perhaps 50—to the demilitarized zone and give them into the custody of the guards provided by the impartial commission. (In order to make the job manageable the Commission might set up a number of teams, each including representatives of all the Commission’s members, as well as Red Cross personnel, to interview simultaneously and speed the process.) The Commission would proceed, in individual interviews, to inquire whether the prisoner-of-war wishes to be repatriated (in a sense, “alternative B” gets us back into “voluntary repatriation” instead of “non-forcible repatriation”, but that is inherent in “alternative B”; in fact, of course, the persons submitting to interview would be those who have already persuaded us that they would forcibly resist repatriation.) Those who change their minds and want to go home will be repatriated by the Commission. Those who continue to assert that they do not desire repatriation would be released by the Commission. They would go back to our side, but no longer be in prisoner-of-war status. Provision would be made under Red Cross supervision for their continued [Page 394] care in quasi-refugee status until they are settled in available destinations of their own choice.
- c)
- So long as the procedure works, individuals are given an impartial hearing and are disposed of in accordance with their true wishes, we would continue the procedure by bringing up small groups and handing them over to the custody of the Commission. (As the early groups of non-repatriates return to our custody, those still to be interviewed will be less fearful and more cooperative.) If at any time it becomes clear that the Communists are not living up to their agreement, we would discontinue sending groups to the neutral zone and the procedure might break down. We would then claim a violation of the agreement, to be determined by the Mixed Armistice Commission or by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; if the dispute can be settled through that machinery the process would continue.
It is important to ensure that if the Communists refuse to live up to the letter and spirit of the above formula, our position is not prejudiced. If by that time we will have regained all or virtually all the UNC prisoners-of-war, the break down would not damage our position, since we will have an armistice and our prisoners-of-war back. If, however, the breakdown comes at a stage when the Communists have not yet returned substantial numbers of our own prisoners-of-war, we may find ourselves with an armistice in effect, and only limited means for putting pressure on the Communists to return our remaining prisoners-of-war. It does not appear possible that we could resume military pressure as a way of getting the Communists to live up to the armistice agreement in this respect.
In the circumstances it seems that to some extent we must rely on the Communists living up to an agreement along the lines indicated. We will have machinery for trying to settle existing disagreements, and the pressures of world opinion. Also, of course, we would continue to have large numbers of Communist prisoners-of-war (whom we would be returning in phase with the return of our prisoners-of-war to us), as a bargaining counter.