695A.0024/7–252: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State
18. Eyes only Armstrong–R. ReDeptel 992 June 23.1 Fol from Manhard: From info my disposal previous POW resistance to camp authorities Koje-do stemmed from (1) uncontrolled internal political agitation and unauthorized polit indoctrination, (2) misuse of inadequate force by camp command and (3) food bulk below non-combat standards of Commie forces.
Camp authorities usually took stand POWs internal discipline and control within compounds no concern of camp command unless personal safety UN personnel endangered or duties interfered with. Instead of carefully-supervised elections lower echelons camp admin appointed or confirmed POW trustees on basis self-styled anti-Communism in many compounds. Trustees assumed almost complete internal admin and judicial control, removed rivals by informing authorities of alleged Commie plots, which were investigated superficially, if at all. UNC–CI and E stepped in with “reorientation” program, using mostly self-appointed POW instructors who tried emphasize anti-Commie polit indoctrination often requiring POW participation by force. Camp command thus appeared [Page 370] in position actively supporting one polit faction against another. For POWs war was not over. Polit “civil war” continued with camp replete with kangaroo courts, polit murders, beatings, torture. Bitter tension mounted between POWs opposite polit poles while little educated, politically-inert majority fearfully followed orders strongest POW leadership. Conviction grew among POWs all factions camp authority ended at compound gates, POWs cld “negotiate” requests in return for cooperation with camp command.
By Jan 1952 reaction had begun in many anti-Commie Korea compounds, some of which pro-Commies took over, directed efforts to taking revenge on anti-Commies and sabotaging CI and E program. Commie POWs intransigence focussed increasingly on camp command as power behind anti-Commie trustees.
In past camp command has had difficulty enforcing discipline among US and ROK troops. Some trigger-happy men had not been adequately trained in Govt control techniques and equipped with non-lethal weapons. Stones, songs and insults have on occasion been silenced by bullets and bayonets. Authorized personal possessions POWs frequently confiscated by other POWs, ROK and US personnel.
Amount and type food ration subj constant complaint among practically all Chi POWs regardless of polit attitude, and presumably among many Korean POWs. Since original diet established, rice ration lowered in quality, two-thirds replaced by inferior grains often indigestible for many POWs and requiring more fuel to prepare. Stomach and digestive diseases long chronic among large numbers POWs.
One result repatriation polling placed intractable pro-Commie POW leaders in undisputed control many large compounds without internal control by UN. These leaders possibly feared being killed or punished whether or not they followed camp orders. In May widespread POW rumor, presumably fostered by Commies, alleged anti-repatriation POWs were being armed by UN and might be turned loose on pro-repatriation group. Pro-Commie leaders based requests concerning conditions of captivity and representation on Geneva Convention and assumed equal right to judge conformity of camp admin to Convention. Violent resistance to camp command May and June apparently local decision POW leaders. No concrete evidence available to show initiative, direction or timing by Commies outside camp.