695.0029/5–2752
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)1
Subject:
- Korean Armistice Negotiations.
Participants:
- Mr. Tomlinson, UK Embassy
- Mr. Johnson, FE
- Mr. Henkin, UNP
Mr. Tomlinson called to inform me, with some embarrassment, that contrary to his assurances of yesterday that the Indian-UK formula2 would not be transmitted to Peiping for some time, New Delhi had jumped ahead and had in fact instructed its Ambassador to transmit it to the Communists. According to the telegram which London received from New Delhi, Nehru had Panikkar transmit the formula as suggested, i.e., as the kind of proposal which Nehru is prepared to make to the UK and to ask the UK to discuss with the U.S. Panikkar has reported that the initial reaction of the Communists “warrants some hope.” The matter is to be discussed again by Panikkar on June 1st. The UK will keep us fully informed.
The UK Foreign Office further suggested that if the Communists in fact prove receptive to the formula, there were several possibilities for following it up: a.) The same channel, i.e., India, might be used to reach agreement with the Communists on behalf of all the UN participating nations. Introducing this new channel might prove a desirable new factor leading to more easy agreement; of course it would be important to give Panikkar very specific and limited instructions, b.) In the alternative, the UNC might make this suggestion at Panmunjom.
In regard to the timing of the making of the proposal, the UK Foreign Office thought that the offer should not be made until the possibility of a pre-armistice screening had been exhausted, but should be made as soon after that as possible.
I told Mr. Tomlinson that I did not understand the meaning in this context of their last point about pre-armistice screening; Mr. Tomlinson admitted that he did not either. This led to re-examination of the formula, which I indicated I had understood to comtemplate screening after an armistice. It was because I construed the formula to be entirely within our present proposal (including post-armistice screening) that I had stated that the formula might prove an adroit and useful way of getting the Communists to accept our present position. In the light of Mr. Tomlinson’s suggestion that he construed the formula to contemplate pre-armistice screening, I suggested that we would appreciate having the Foreign Office give its view as to the respects, if any, in which the formula differs substantially from the present UNC proposal.
I then expressed my unhappiness and concern over the fact that the formula had been transmitted to Peiping before the U.S. had had a full opportunity to make suggestions. Any suggestions which might be made now would be sharply scrutinized by the Communists and might be perverted by them for propaganda purposes. We still considered the [Page 251] suggestions which we had made yesterday, and which Mr. Acheson may be taking up with Mr. Eden at this time, to be important. While I made no firm suggestions as to how to undo the damage, I expressed the view that the suggestions might well be communicated to Peiping and that it would be easier if they were made at an appropriate opportunity by the Indians rather than later by the UK, or still later by the U.S.
Mr. Tomlinson reported that a telegram from Mr. Eden states that he agrees that it would be desirable to make the offer of pre-armistice screening to the Communists and that he hoped it could be done. I informed Mr. Tomlinson that we were still considering very actively and on a very high level the suggestion that we offer the Communists prearmistice screening. I hope to have some definite reaction for him in a few days.
Mr. Tomlinson also informed me that apparently Mr. Eden did not share Selwyn Lloyd’s concern (expressed to me the day before) over the fact that the 70,000 figure was based in part on an estimate of the views of PWs whom it was not possible to screen.
I gave Mr. Tomlinson the latest figures on the distribution of PWs in various camps and compounds as of May 26th. I also agreed to give him the material for a reply to a parliamentary question on the use of Chinese Nationalist personnel in indoctrination of PWs before the April screening.