Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/5–3152: Telegram

The Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)¹

top secret
priority

Munsan-Ni, May 12, 1952.

HNC 1236. Reference HNC 1234.² This message in 3 parts.

Part I It has become evident that the Communists will continue to use further meetings solely as a propaganda vehicle and that they have no intention of accepting the UNC proposal at least not for the immediate present. In effect, the Communists have laid down a challenge to the UNC to either back up its statements of finality regarding our package proposal, or compromise the POW issue. Today the Communists in effect challenged the UNC to terminate the conference unless we are willing to meet daily.

It may be that the Communists do not expect a concession by the UNC but are instead seeking to provoke the UNC into breaking off the conference, i.e. they are unwilling to meet our terms in order to get an armistice, but wish to put the onus for breaking off the talks on the UNC. We believe the issue must now be squarely faced. It appears to the delegation that the time for decisive action is here; that a determination must be arrived at to risk the onus of a possible breakoff of negotiations in a final effort to achieve an armistice. To continue along the present lines of action is to exhibit serious weakness at a time when a posture of strength is imperative. In view of the strong statements made by the President and other high officials of the United Nations that our present position is final, the delegation considers we should be authorized to announce unilaterally a suspension of the conferences until the Communists are ready to accept the UNC proposal of 28 April without substantive change. We would accompany this announcement with a statement that liaison officers would maintain contract [contact] during the period of suspension. We recognize that the Communists could utilize this action to support a charge that the UNC broke off negotiations. We also recognize that even were the Communists to break off negotiations themselves, they would charge the breakoff to the UNC.

If the Communists will ever accept an armistice on our terms, the action recommended will not cause them to break off negotiations. If they are determined not to accept our terms, no action by UNC short of capitulation to their position will gain an armistice. Further discussion of the remaining issues is futile, since all have been exhaustively and thoroughly discussed. The UNC Delegation cannot thwart the Communist intent to utilize the Plenary Session as a propaganda outlet so long as these sessions continue.

Part II. Two courses of action are open, (1) We can continue to meet daily at Communists’ insistence. This is an evidence of UNC weakness and follows Communist initiative and desires. (2) We can unilaterally suspend further meetings until the Communists are willing to accept our 28 April proposal without substantive change. We would, in this course of action, maintain contact through the liaison officers.

Part III The delegation unanimously recommends implementation of course (2) at the discretion of the Chief Delegate.³

1. Gen. Mark W. Clark assumed command of the following, effective 10 a.m. May 12: The Far East Command, the UN Command, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, and the governorship of the Ryukyu Islands. Clark transmitted this telegram from Joy to the JCS as C 68350, May 12, 1952, 6:40 p.m. A marginal notation on Clark’s telegram indicated that the Secretary of State saw the cable.
2. The telegram under reference, relayed by Clark to the JCS on May 12 as C 68349, contained the record of the plenary session of May 12 at Panmunjom, which was characterized by long and acrimonious propaganda statements and charges (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 78).
3. General Clark cabled the JCS the following by separate telegram: “I heartily concur in the views of the Delegation and strongly recommend that I be authorized to implement course of action (2) at my discretion.” This message was CX 68355, May 12, 1952 (795.00/5–3152). For Clark’s recollection of why he supported the delegation’s proposal, see his From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 104–105.