Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/9–2553: Telegram

No. 690
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Tokyo, September 25, 1953—11 a.m.

767. General Clark, Parsons and I met two hours yesterday afternoon with Okazaki, Kimura, and Masuhara, Vice Director National Security Agency, for discussion of Japan’s defense position. Only concrete result of meeting was agreement for meeting this morning of Masuhara, Parsons and representative of General Clark to go over details of present Japanese defense plan, outline of which was given us yesterday. Present plan similar to that of NSA reported in Embassy telegram 723 September 18.¹

Significant points developed during course of conversation were as follows:

1. Ability of Japanese to increase personnel of National Safety Forces limited by fact that conscription impossible without revision of Constitution and that present laws make no provision for creation of reserve system.

2. Revision of Constitution dependent upon education campaign bringing home to Japanese people facts of life in present world and necessity for adequate defense system. Kimura agreed with our contention that Japanese Government had so far been deficient in carrying out such educational program but claimed necessity was realized and government would take definite steps in this direction in future. He expressed opinion, in response to General Clark’s question, that it would probably take about three years to get Japanese public in proper frame of mind so that there would be reasonable chance of Constitutional revision being approved by national referendum as required in Constitution. Kimura claimed that premature attempt at revision ending in failure would set back progress several years. In meantime, government would have to depend on voluntary enlistments.

3. Prerequisite to strong defense structure and to conduct of educational campaign among people is, according to Kimura, merger to coalition of Japanese Conservative Parties. Kimura reverted to this point several times during conference. In response to my query, he stated he has reason to be optimistic at prospects of such merger and hoped it might eventuate in near future. He cautioned, however, that this was most delicate and that we should treat statements of his on this question as “top secret.”

4. Toward end of conference Kimura stressed point that quality rather than quantity was desirable element in National Safety Force and that this depended upon spiritual awakening of people and their realization of necessity of defending themselves against any form of direct or indirect Communist aggression. Kimura referred to activities of Sohyo, college professors and other intellectuals who are spreading anti-American and anti-rearmament propaganda throughout country with considerable effect. He said government was particularly concerned with activities of National Teachers Union, which has large funds at its disposal for use in this manner, and that Cabinet was now considering what action could be taken to limit activities of this union.

Detailed memorandum of conversation will be airpouched.² It is hoped result of today’s conference attended by Parsons will make possible forwarding of specific information as to Japan’s intentions.

In my opinion, yesterday’s meeting was most helpful, as for first time it put squarely up to Japanese American position concerning force goals as well as Japanese financial contribution to its own defense. General Clark made clear that in United States opinion ultimate ground force of around 300,000 men to be attained by annual increments of 50,000 was deemed essential. General Clark added that Japanese plans for sea and air defense forces appeared more nearly in line with US thinking. I stressed United States belief Japan’s economy would permit immediate expenditure of 3 1/2 percent of national income on defense, as contrasted to present 2 percent, and that this amount should gradually increase to maximum of 5 percent. It was made clear that even this amount was considerably less than that being spent by any other country receiving American military aid and that it would be difficult to persuade American Government and Congress that Japan was serious unless it made a contribution to its own defense of approximately this magnitude. Our statements were received in most friendly spirit by Japanese and I believe they will be passed along immediately to Yoshida in effort by Okazaki and Kimura to convince Yoshida that present Japanese thinking on rearmament problem is entirely inadequate.

Allison

1. In this telegram the Embassy transmitted the following summary of the NSA plan:

   “NSA 5–year force goals confidentially given Embassy by Foreign Office official. Goals are 210 thousand men, for ground force, 140,400 tons for navy, and 1418 planes for air force. NSF would be increased in FY 54 by 30,800 men and 10 thousand civilians (for clerical administrative positions thus releasing equivalent number for service with units). Total cost to Japan would be 956 billion yen, of which 118 billion would be FY 54 cost. US would be asked provide 5–year total of $1.5 billion of which $237.5 million would be provided in first year. US contribution would be military end items and some OSP.” (794.5/9–1853)

2. Not found in Department of State files.