Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

693.941/3–552: Telegram

No. 539
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

secret

Taipei, March 5, 1952—9 p.m.

1130. During call on Generalissimo, yesterday for purpose of presenting Emb’s new Counselor Jones,² we discussed Jap Treaty negotiations in some detail. Generalissimo emphasized importance to Chi of first numbered point mytel 1123 March 5.³ He hoped US wld continue support Chi Govt in its position as one of victorious allies.

Generalissimo thinks Japs will make grave error if they fail embrace this opportunity for reconciliation with Chi Govt. He regards tenor of Jap draft of bilat treaty as mistake from their own standpoint, adding that Japan’s only hope for continued freedom from Communist domination lies in liberation of Chi mainland from Communism. He naturally regards his govt as chosen instrument to accomplish such liberation. In attempting analyze Jap motivation Generalissimo expressed fear that they are toying with idea of third force among Chinese. I asked where they expected find such force. He did not answer directly but it may be assumed he had in mind elements which collaborated with Japs during war and which Chi here suspect have been negotiating with Amers more recently.

I sympathized with Generalissimo’s disappointment over progress of Chi-Jap talks to date but noted that three important steps had been taken:

1. Japs actually sent important treaty del to Taipei.

2. Japs agreed to “peace” treaty.

3. Japs apparently will treat with Govt of Repub of Chi as such and not as “local” Govt.

I remarked that one more step—admittedly long one—needs to be taken: Conclusion of treaty. I said we must not expect it to be entirely satisfactory to all concerned, but that if it materializes in form which contains nothing definitely unsatisfactory its actual conclusion wld in itself be most important accomplishment from Chi’s standpoint. I expressed appreciation of patience skill and hard work of FonMin and other responsible Chi officials in this connection.

In reply Generalissimo expressed hope of treaty’s early conclusion and repeated his desire for US support in persuading Japs to be reasonable.⁴

Rankin

1. Repeated to Tokyo.
2. Howard Palfrey Jones.
3. In this telegram Rankin reported on his conversation held on Mar. 5 with Minister Yeh. Rankin stated that Yen’s first point was that while the Chinese Government did not expect specific recognition in the bilateral treaty of its position as one of the victorious allies, or of its sovereignty over the mainland, it was not willing to sign a treaty which failed to imply the former, or which would give up the latter. (693.941/3–552)
4. In telegram 643 to Taipei, Mar. 7, the Department replied: “Dept appreciates ur taking opportunity afforded by Jones call to discuss Jap treaty negots with Gimo and believes you correctly pointed out importance of (a) progress which has been made and (b) fact that conclusion of Jap treaty, even one mtg only minimum Chi requirements, wld be advantageous to Chi. It is hoped your observations will encourage Gimo give Yeh full confidence and allow him wide latitude which necessary if treaty negots are to progress rapidly.” (693.941/3–652)