Office of the Historian

793.00/12–1454

No. 445
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1

top secret
[Washington,] December 14, 1954.

Subject:

  • Operation “Oracle”

Reference:

  • Report of Tripartite Working Group on Operation “Oracle”, dated December 13 [11].2

Under its terms of reference, the Tripartite Working Group dealt only with problems of timing and procedures, given the assumption that the three Governments would decide to launch Operation “Oracle”.

Undoubtedly cogent arguments exist for launching operation “Oracle” promptly. The situation has changed since the “Oracle” operation was first formulated. The Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China has been signed, and the issue of the 11 airmen has come to a head in the United Nations. However these new developments probably do not greatly affect the desirability of operation “Oracle” from our standpoint. They have made the British somewhat more skeptical of operation “Oracle” because the British do not want to proceed unless they think there is a good chance of Communist concurrence. We do not attach the same importance to Communist concurrence and therefore have less reason for dropping operation “Oracle” merely because of the increased tension. The threat of a large scale assault against one or more of the off-shore islands is as great as, or greater than ever, although it may not be imminent. Chinese Communist capabilities, especially in the air, are growing. The Communists may be emboldened by the fact that our Mutual Defense Treaty does not include the offshore islands within the treaty area. There should be some deterrent effect in the mere introduction of the New Zealand resolution in the Security Council. The moral and psychological position of the Communist bloc would be impaired by passage of the resolution, as by a Soviet veto of it. A blow would be struck at the ambition [Page 1034] of the Chinese Communists to obtain a seat in the UN. A moderate and cooperative stand by the Chinese Nationalists would enhance the prestige of that government and improve its UN status. If an attack on the islands should occur, our prospects of obtaining united action against the attackers would be better with this resolution than without it.

However there are also some adverse considerations which need to be weighed against the foregoing arguments before a final decision is made:

1.
The inevitable discussion and dissection in the Security Council of our exchange of notes with the Chinese Government of Dec. 10. The face saving effect of the carefully drafted language of the notes would be destroyed and some of the classified aspects of the Treaty negotiations possibly revealed to the Communist side. The British would probably show too much zeal in stressing their interpretation of the notes.
2.
The British almost certainly expect the question of the unresolved juridical status of Formosa to be injected into the debate. This would be embarrassing for the Chinese Government and undesirable from our standpoint. It seems possible that the British may hope to claim for themselves, and possibly for other signatories of the Peace Treaty with Japan, the right to a substantial voice in determining the ultimate disposition of Formosa. Any new shadow on the claim of the Chinese Government to sovereignty over Formosa would be prejudicial to our position in the Far East at this time.
3.
The general broadening of the Security Council debate on China issues, which is now considered inevitable by the British and New Zealand representatives if “Oracle” is launched, would be unhelpful to us and not fully in keeping with the tenor of our assurances to the Chinese.
4.
The possible presence of Chinese Communist representatives at the UN in the course of the debate could be made to serve Communist ends. The Chinese Communists may contemptuously spurn the invitation. But if they should decide to accept there is reason to believe that they would not repeat the mistakes they made when General Wu3 antagonized everyone in the course of his appearance before the UN four years ago. They might exhibit something less than total defiance this time, and their very presence at the UN would tend to condition the UN to the idea of Chinese Communist participation in UN matters, even though of course they would not be there as members. Their presence there might be made an opening wedge for renewed demands for a UN seat for Communist China.
5.
The British and New Zealanders undoubtedly hope to make this exercise a prelude to an indefinite freeze of the present situation, which would consolidate and sanction the hold of the Chinese Communists on the Mainland, further, the “Two Chinas” concept, and formally extinguish Chinese Nationalist ambitions to free the [Page 1035] Mainland, by branding any attempt by them to dislodge or harry the Chinese Communists as a breach of international peace and security, and violative of the UN Charter.

  1. A handwritten notation on the source text by O’Connor indicates that it was seen by the Secretary.↩
  2. Not printed, but see the memorandum from Wainhouse and McConaughy to Dulles, Document 441.↩
  3. Gen. Wu Hsiu-chuan, leader of the special delegation from the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations in November and December 1950.↩