794A.5 MSP/11–254
No. 442
Memorandum by the Director of the
Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)
Subject:
- Remarks on Embassy Taipei Despatch No. 218, November 2, 1954—”MAAG Activity Report for Month of September, 1954”1
The most recent regular monthly “MAAG Activity Report” received in CA, for September 1954 (as attached),2 has a number of [Page 1025] items of interest which are passed on herewith for your information and upon which we offer a few comments.
1. The Report (in September) stated that MAAG had proposed that the elimination of ineffectives from the Nationalist armed forces be given top priority, that FOA had approved a pilot project in this field, but that there was little likelihood of real progress soon. The Government of the Republic of China (GRC) had named a committee to study the matter further.
CA Comment
Since this report was written, contrary to the above prediction, considerable progress has been made in preparing for the elimination of ineffectives. Recent telegrams from Taipei, amplified by personal consultation with Mr. Brent, Chief of the FOA mission in Formosa, disclose that firm plans have already been laid to remove about 73,000 ineffectives from the GRC armed forces, of which 16,300 will be removed by April 1955, and to replace them with young able-bodied Formosan recruits. Plans call for the cost of this program (including the mustering out and provision of jobs for the ineffectives as well as the equipping of new recruits) to be defrayed during FY 1955 with a portion of the $100 million fund earmarked for China aid by the Senate Appropriations Committee headed by Senator Bridges. It is estimated that this program will require U.S. aid for a total of four years, of which the first two years will be the most costly.
The elimination of ineffectives and their replacement with Formosan recruits is obviously significant as a means of removing dead wood from the GRC forces and of coming to grips with the problem of over-aging, and it will mark the first large-scale induction of Formosans into the regular armed forces. No insurmountable difficulties seem to be anticipated.
2. Looking back on developments following the commencement of the Chinese Communist artillery offensive against the Chinmens (Quemoy) on September 3, the Report states that “MAAG Formosa became heavily involved in an ‘operational advisory’ capacity to the GRC forces. In addition, activities of the Formosa Liaison Center (Task Force 74) greatly increased. The Formosa Liaison Center functions with the same personnel and facilities as are allocated MAAG Formosa and has been established by CINCPAC in order to coordinate operations of GRC forces and U.S. forces in the area Charged with the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.”
CA Comment
This confirms what we suspected at the time, that the dividing line between advice and operational participation becomes thinner and probably exceedingly difficult to maintain in time of actual [Page 1026] hostilities. Also of interest is the above description of the Formosa Liaison Center (TF 74), which confirms our understanding that General Chase wears two brass hats: one as Chief of MAAG, the other as Commander of Task Force 74.
3. In another section, the Report states that “One hundred and seventy-seven students commenced the initial four-week Political Officers Staff Orientation Course. Purpose of the course is to familiarize political officers with U.S. staff procedures and tactical doctrine.”
CA Comment
This apparently marks the inauguration of a new course for (Chiang Ching-kuo’s) political officers, the idea being to teach them something about military affairs so that they will be less inclined to cause their indoctrination and surveillance activities to interfere with military activities. We understand that the course was planned earlier this year by the MAAG advisor to the Political Department. The course represents an outgrowth of the MAAG decision to change from its former policy of opposing the Political Department to one of trying to work with the Political Department and in the process bend it to the MAAG will.
4. The Report contains the usual number of encouraging and discouraging evaluations of the MAAG training program. Here are representative samples of each:
- a.
- The Air Section of MAAG predicts the imminent shutdown of cadet flying on November 1 because of the small number of planes in commission. It comments that this results from “a deliberate effort on our part to force the Chinese units into doing their own work. We believe that if they were ever to become self-sufficient, the (cadet) program should show it. We have had doubts on this all along, and since the cadet program could be allowed to fall on its face, ran this experiment. It has proven conclusively that the Chinese logistics system cannot be set free of U.S. supervision for a long time to come.”
- b.
- Elsewhere, however, in evaluating Chinese Air Force operations in the Chinmen area, the Air Section of MAAG states that “the aggressiveness of the combat pilots was admirable. Ground crews improved the turn around time required for combat loading of aircraft. The entire operation became better day by day, and the experience gained will be invaluable in our next major effort.”
Note
The Report from which the above excerpts are taken is written by MAAG. Embassy Taipei merely transmits the Report under cover of a Despatch.