611.95A241/12–354
No. 426
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Secretary of State
Memorandum of Conversation With Krishna Menon1
Mr. Menon came to see me at his request, which I had received through Arthur Dean. He said that he wondered whether he could be useful in connection with the prisoner-of-war matter. He pointed out that while the Repatriation Commission2 had been dissolved, India had been chairman of that Commission. He also said he was leaving on Thursday to see Nehru and would talk to him about the matter. He expressed the opinion that the repatriation could only be worked out as part of a comprehensive settlement with the Chinese Communists. I said in my opinion this was totally impossible; the United States was not going to deal in any way with Communist [Page 986] China so long as they were acting in an uncivilized way. I felt that the conviction and imprisonment of these prisoners of war was a blot which, unless they removed it quickly, would set back the clock very seriously and endanger the whole position in Asia. I explained the position of the President and myself as being that we hoped that the United Nations represented an effort to put justice onto a collective basis and to make it unnecessary for individual nations to take the law in their own hands and use their own means to secure redress and inflict punishment. If, however, the members of the United Nations did not feel any concern or responsibility in this matter, then after a reasonable opportunity had been offered, the United States would have to take its own measures to seek relief.
Mr. Menon said that he understood these people were spies. I read the substance of the statement given me by Mr. Cowles3 describing the flight and the forcing down of the plane by the MIGs south of the Yalu River. Mr. Menon suggested they might have done their spying afterwards. I said this was ridiculous—the plane had been forced down, some of the crew had apparently been killed and the others had immediately been taken prisoner so that they had nothing to spy on except prison walls.
Mr. Menon said that he felt that action taken by us as against China would have repercussions which might lead to general war. I said this would be too bad and for others to decide; but while we wanted peace, we were not pacifists to a point where we could allow our rights to be trampled upon without any reaction. I said that the armed services had a particular sense of responsibility to look out for their fellows in uniform and that the uniform was respected in wartime even as against enemies and that this imprisonment of the uniformed members of the armed services for wholly fictitious grounds was something that no nation could accept without reaction. He asked what action might be taken. I said that there was no decision, but that a blockade had been talked about. Mr. Menon said he understood there was already a blockade of China so that a naval and air blockade would not really add anything. I said that if he felt that if a naval and air blockade was not a strong enough measure, perhaps we could think of something stronger. He said he did not really mean that.
In conclusion, Mr. Menon said that while the Repatriation Commission had technically been dissolved, he nevertheless felt that since India had provided the chairman for the Commission, it might be in order for us to communicate officially with the Indian [Page 987] Government in relation to this matter. He said that if we were embarrassed to communicate with India directly, we could do so through the United Kingdom.
I said that the United States was not primarily a petitioner here; that we felt an issue was involved which ought to arouse other nations on their own initiative to use influence to get the prisoners released; that the President and I strongly hoped they would do so, and this seemed to us to be as much in their own interest as in our interest; and if they did not feel disposed to do anything about the matter, then we would have to accept that fact. Mr. Menon asked whether we thought of doing anything in the United Nations. I said I thought the United Nations certainly had a strong responsibility in the matter particularly since these men were serving the United Nations Command. Mr. Menon said he doubted whether any good would come out of United Nations action.
- The conversation took place at the Waldorf Hotel in New York, where Secretary Dulles was staying.↩
- The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, set up at the time of the Korean armistice.↩
- Deputy Legal Adviser Willard B. Cowles; the document under reference has not been found in Department of State files.↩