793.00/11–1954
No. 396
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
Subject:
- Mutual Defense Treaty—7th Meeting
Participants:
- Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
- Ambassador Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Dr. Tan, Minister Chinese Embassy
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA
Dr. Yeh referred to the Chinese version of the proposed exchange of notes dated November 18 reading as follows:
“The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the Republic of China and the United States of America signed on ——— at ——— and other territory. It possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said Treaty and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI without mutual understanding.
The Government of the Republic of China declares its firm intention to defend all territory now under its control. It is, however, mutually understood that while the question of the joint defense of the offshore islands now under its control and other territory which may hereafter come under its control, is subject to further [Page 905] agreement between the Parties in accordance with Article VI of the said Treaty, the Government of the United States of America will provide full logistic support for the effective defense of the said offshore islands.”
He asked what the reaction of Mr. Robertson was.
Mr. Robertson said he did not think the Chinese proposal met the requirements.
Dr. Yeh pointed out that the treaty only covered Formosa and the Pescadores. The offshore islands were the responsibility of the Chinese Government. It was imperative that the right of the Chinese Government to defend the off-shore islands be made clear, since the U.S. Government assumed no obligation as to those islands. The exclusion of the off-shore islands from the treaty means that the treaty falls short of expectations. It was realized that this could not be helped. A restriction on the Chinese right to deploy forces for the defense of the off-shore islands might indicate that the Chinese were prepared eventually to give up the off-shore islands. In view of the inherent right of self defense possessed by the Chinese Government, he felt that the U.S. Government would take a reasonable view of the needs which were reflected in the last paragraph of the Chinese draft. The U.S. is a powerful country while Nationalist China is a weak country. This creates a delicate situation. The view of the stronger party is inclined to prevail over that of the weaker party.
He felt that as long as the present leadership is in office in both countries, there would be no reason to worry about the interpretation of “joint agreement”. But the situation might change and the possibility of a sympathetic mutual understanding might be less in the future when President Eisenhower and Generalissimo Chiang were no longer in office. As of now there is good working understanding with General Chase, who would agree to the transfer of necessary troops to defend, say, the Tachens. But the successor to General Chase might take a different view. The Foreign Minister must be able to defend the treaty before the Legislative Yuan. The Chinese position would be much stronger if the reference to the removal of forces from the treaty area could be deleted. He admitted there was a remote possibility of a misunderstanding over the distribution of forces between Formosa and the off-shore islands. He said he had racked his brain in search of a satisfactory formula. The Generalissimo personally had wired his hope that Secretary Dulles would reconsider. The reference to “full logistic support” for the defense of the off-shore islands might be considered unnecessary in this exchange of notes, but it would help psychologically in Formosa.
[Page 906]Mr. Robertson said that the request for a U.S. commitment “for full logistic support” created unnecessary new difficulties. He doubted if the Senate would approve this language in a formal exchange of notes relating to a treaty. He doubted if the President would wish to make that commitment. He agreed that the Chinese Government was entitled to logistic support for the off-shore islands, but to incorporate the assurances in an exchange of notes was not appropriate. It would be bad tactics. The Secretary was sympathetic to the Chinese position. He knew the importance of “face” and wanted as much reciprocity as possible in the treaty.
Dr. Yeh said that the word “approval” in the U.S. draft was undesirable. It was merely a matter of semantics, but it was important.
Mr. Robertson said he could agree to the substitution of “mutual agreement” for “approval”.
Dr. Yeh asked why not take out the sentence entirely. He said that he still pled for deletion.
Mr. Robertson said the Secretary must be able to make a sound defense of this kind of treaty. All aspects of the treaty and understandings pursuant thereto must be defensible.
Dr. Yeh said that there was no assurance that the KMT could fully control the Legislative Yuan when the ratification of the treaty came up.
Mr. Robertson said that the U.S. Government may have some problems too when ratification came up before the Senate. There would undoubtedly be some severe criticism. The treaty needed to define clearly the U.S. commitment. But we wanted to avoid any revelation to the Communists of U.S. intentions. The Secretary had been careful not to define the U.S. position as to the off-shore islands. He had taken pains to avoid any position which would encourage the Chinese Communists to think that they could seize the islands without risk. The Secretary had developed the phrase “directed against” in Article V in order to broaden the definition of an armed attack with a view to keeping the Communists guessing as to what action by them might lead to invocation of the treaty.
Dr. Yeh said that he would like some such phrase in Article V as “hostile intent”.
Mr. Robertson said it was hard to define intent. We had been talking about a treaty for more than a year. It would be a mistake to stall and drag out the negotiations too long. If it seemed that we had a difficult time in agreeing, questions would be raised in the public mind. It would be bad psychologically. If two closely allied countries cannot get together after a month of negotiations, people begin to wonder. The Korean treaty was negotiated in two days.
[Page 907]Dr. Yeh said that a formal assurance of full U.S. logistic support would be the most effective means of keeping the Communists guessing as to the off-shore islands.
Mr. Robertson said the U.S. Commander in Chief should not have his hands tied in advance on logistic support, the same as to deployment of his forces. He doubted that the President would agree to different language.
Ambassador Koo said that the main Chinese consideration was to offset any impression that the U.S. does not care about the offshore islands.
Mr. Robertson said it is evident that we do care about the offshore islands, as well as the rest of the territory held by the GRC.
Ambassador Koo felt that the wording of the treaty and the draft exchange of notes does not show this. It would sound very weak if we could only say we had an oral understanding about logistic support for the defense of the off-shore islands. The Chinese Government needed something in writing which could be exhibited.
Mr. Robertson said he would be lacking in frankness if he did not state that we could not get a treaty ratified which obligated the U.S. to a defense of the off-shore islands.
Dr. Yeh said that he was not asking for U.S. defense of the islands. U.S. personnel would not be involved.
Mr. Robertson said the suggested logistic support commitment was vague. He felt that the suggested language was bad—worse than the language of the earlier Chinese draft. The matter of logistic support came under implementation and did not need to be embodied in a formal exchange of notes identified with the treaty. The phrase “armed attack directed against the territories” was sufficiently broad to meet the requirements. Some of the off-shore islands were not much more than a dot in the ocean.
Dr. Yeh said that “we are realists” and would not quibble over insignificant small islands.
Mr. Robertson said he was aware that the Chinese were realists but it seemed that not much progress was being made on the negotiations. The Secretary had asked several times when the negotiations would be concluded. If there was a common basis, the two sides ought to find it soon, or else give up.
Dr. Yeh said that he had a last point to raise. He said “Give us something to offset the provisions about removal of military elements from the Treaty area”. The Chinese Government would have to submit the notes to the Legislative Yuan if the American Government submitted them to the Senate.
Dr. Yeh said that the troops on the off-shore islands were fighting with weapons provided by the U.S. American assistance was already committed up to a point.
[Page 908]Mr. Robertson said that it was doubtful whether the Senate would understand the importance of the off-shore islands. The treaty might be subject to reservations if we got involved in formal commitments for “full logistic support”.
Dr. Yeh said that the Chinese Government must “put up a good show” if the off-shore islands are attacked.
Mr. Robertson said that the U.S. Government naturally would not restrict the defense of the off-shore islands. He felt that Dr. Yeh, in objecting to the U.S. language, was raising an unreal issue. The essential part of the note showed great drafting resourcefulness. The language gave a real impression of reciprocity.
Dr. Yeh reiterated that the treaty did not cover the off-shore islands. If the despatch of urgently required Chinese troop reinforcements to the off-shore islands could only be effected by mutual agreement, serious delays might be created.
Mr. Robertson said it was unthinkable that we would picayunishly interfere with the defense of islands important to the protection of Formosa. He added that Military support questions should not be incorporated in the exchange of notes.
Dr. Yeh felt that consultation on the use of force could be taken for granted, without having a restrictive provision in the notes.
Mr. Robertson said it was not unusual to have joint agreement on a matter of such consequence.
Dr. Yeh then said that he would accept the principle of joint agreement being required for the use of force from Formosa. But the U.S. had no responsibility for the off-shore islands.
Mr. Robertson said that if we pinpointed all the areas where we have no formal obligation, it would amount to a green light for the opposition. Hence the area outside of Formosa and the Pescadores under the control of the Chinese Government was referred to only in a general way. Some islands were more important than others. The Chinese Government did not wish to give up any of the islands. The U.S. Government understood this attitude. But Formosa is the vital rallying point for the free Chinese. We must not jeopardize that base by getting involved over subsidiary matters.
Dr. Yeh said that he had hoped that the U.S. representatives would try some new language.
Mr. Robertson said that was not his understanding. The Chinese side had volunteered to come up with new language. He had asked the Foreign Minister to convey the U.S. position to the Generalissimo.
Dr. Yeh said the Generalissimo had recalled that in the conversation of October 13 with Mr. Robertson, he (the Generalissimo) had voluntarily repeated the commitment he had given earlier, that “there would be no action against the mainland without U.S. [Page 909] concurrence”. At the same time he had asked the U.S. to give assurance of logistic support.
Mr. Robertson then proposed new language which he thought would go far to meet the Chinese wishes. He said he would be willing to amend the final sentence of the note by the addition of the phrase “to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories”.
Ambassador Koo said he presumed that any removal of forces to a lesser degree than that specified would not call for mutual agreement.
Mr. Robertson said that was what he had in mind.
Ambassador Koo said that on the face of it this proposal was more reciprocal and gave the Chinese Government more freedom of action. He felt that the Chinese Government could face the Legislative Yuan much more confidently with this language.
Dr. Yeh said that this was an ingenious solution. It was very good, in fact excellent. He believed he could accept it.
Mr. Robertson said the Secretary could not accept the sentence about “full logistic support”.
Dr. Yeh asked if assurances of logistic support could be expressed later in some form. The Generalissimo wanted the opinion of the Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Robertson said he felt it was a military question which could be better handled by the Department of Defense. He was not prepared to go into the subject at this time.
Dr. Yeh said that he supposed the Chinese Government could communicate later on this subject through diplomatic channels.
Mr. Robertson assented.
Dr. Yeh then said that he wanted to make it very clear that the GRC did not interpret the restrictive provision as to use of force only by joint agreement to apply to his Government’s “port closure policy”. He said his Government felt it must retain its right to intercept enemy shipping. He said the interceptions have been carried out without actually using force. Furthermore, his Government construed shipping interceptions as a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense. The interceptions took place only in areas near the territories held by the Chinese Government. No ships were intercepted unless they were carrying cargo which could be directly used to attack the Chinese Government forces and territories. Hence the interceptions were acts of self-defense. He reaffirmed that the exchange of notes would be construed to mean that the Chinese Government could not attack the mainland without joint agreement.
Mr. Robertson said that the ship interception matter had not been brought up before, so far as he was aware.
[Page 910]Dr. Yeh requested Assistant Secretary Robertson to inform Secretary Dulles of the Chinese Government understanding as he had just stated it. He said that the Chinese Government would endeavor to enforce its closure policy so as not to bring “too many blows” on Chinese forces, and so as not to involve the U.S. Dr. Yeh said he had been a forceful moderating influence in the Chinese Government. He had been in the middle of a number of debates as to whether various ships should be intercepted. Frequently he had been awakened in the middle of the night to examine manifests of ships, approaching the Formosa Strait, with questionable cargo. The Chinese Government had consistently exercised restraint but it did not want to lose the right to intercept ships when it considered such action necessary.
Mr. Robertson said he would discuss this matter with the Secretary.
Dr. Yeh said he would agree then and there to the latest revised text of the exchange of notes, with the understanding which he had just stated. He felt that the exchange of notes could not be interpreted to interfere with the Chinese Government port closure policy. The Chinese Government must retain the right to attack Communist shipping when in its judgment such attacks were required. Communist shipping companies sometimes misused British flag vessels, but the Chinese Government used great moderation where British shipping was involved. He said the U.S. Government did not need to worry over the interception policy of the Chinese Government. The tacit understanding between our two governments has worked well up to now and he hoped it would not be changed.
Ambassador Koo said that Dr. Yeh meant to imply that the Chinese would not stop every unfriendly ship near Formosa waters headed for a Chinese Communist port. The Chinese Government would make its own appraisal in each case.
Mr. Robertson said the question gave him some concern. The interceptions might lead to Communist retaliation.
Dr. Yeh said the policy which the Chinese Government intended to apply would not entail any serious risk of retaliation.
Mr. Robertson did not agree. He thought the Chinese Communists would not stand supinely by if the Chinese Government made war on their shipping.
Dr. Yeh said the Communists are sending thousands of tons of strategic supplies by water to Communist China. As a result of the Chinese Government efforts, a large percentage of Communist traffic has been rerouted so as to keep out of range of Chinese Nationalist destroyers. The Chinese Navy is unable to touch those ships which do not come close to the Formosa area. But what goes into [Page 911] the Amoy area is used almost immediately against the Chinese forces, and it must be stopped.
Ambassador Koo said it was a matter of self-defense.