Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751H.5 MSP/12–2254: Telegram

The Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the Department of State

top secret
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Phnom Penh, December 22, 1954—7 p.m.

398. Sent niact Saigon 411. Deptel 223¹ was handed me at airport as I was saying good-bye to Admiral Radford and he and I had opportunity to give only most cursory consideration to it. However, I believe I am correct in stating Admiral Radford shares my view that JCS insistence on written Cambodian engagement to get rid of French instructors as condition precedent to any kind of MAAG at all is unduly restrictive and will much hamper our negotiations here. Request that Admiral Radford report separately from Saigon his views to JCS with repeat of his message to Department.²

I am confident (see Embtel 389)³ that Cambodians can be brought to give us solid engagements for phased withdrawal of French, but do not feel this need be negotiated abruptly or, in fact, that such an engagement would be necessary until we are in position ourselves to assume responsibility for training Cambodian Army. Admiral Radford and I, however, are in complete agreement that if we undertake training responsibilities here, US should have sole say in such training, and French eventually should be phased out.

My position on this negotiation has been stated so frequently and I trust so consistently that it is difficult to add further argument. Basically my views are as set forth in Embtel 319.⁴ I likewise strongly feel we should not pay for Cambodian Army which does not measure up to our standards of what such an army should be. This is clearly set forth in final two paragraphs Embtel 352.⁵ However, these matters must be negotiated and not dictated.

I am willing if authorized by Department to undertake negotiation with Cambodian Prime Minister of written engagement for “ultimate” withdrawal of French instructors but at same time I request authorization to initiate negotiations of a MAAG bilateral to provide me with that expert military advice for expenditure of US public funds come January 1 which I consider indispensable.

McClintock

1. In telegram 223 to Phnom Penh, Dec. 21, not printed, the Department of State asked Ambassador McClintock to attempt to convince Admiral Radford that the United States should not insist upon an agreement with Cambodia requiring the ultimate withdrawal of all French advisers before establishing a MAAG mission. (751H.5 MSP/12–2154) Admiral Radford visited Cambodia and Vietnam as part of a tour of the Far East.
2. See footnote 1, p. 2433.
3. In telegram 389 from Phnom Penh, Dec. 19, not printed, McClintock reported that he had been informed by an official in the Cambodian Ministry of Defense that France and Cambodia had negotiated a training agreement whereby 720 French instructors would remain in the country. The official stated, however, that the King, the Prime Minister, and the other ministers unanimously agreed that United States military guidance should gradually replace that of the French. McClintock told the Department the following: “I consider French action in negotiating training agreement without prior consultation with US a direct violation of Mendès-France’s ‘instructions’ to confer in field before taking decisions re aid to IC”. (751H.5 MSP/12–1954)
4. See footnote 2, p. 2329.
5. See footnote 7, p. 2373.