120.251G/11–1254: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State1
1807. Repeated information Paris 598. From Collins. Diem told us 10th that Bao Dai had sent Hinh orders to report to him in France by first available plane. Understand Hinh received duplicate messages containing orders, one through Defense Ministry and other through imperial cabinet office here. Hinh informed Diem that he could not obey orders for seven or eight days.
I told Diem that I had had no conversation with Hinh and would receive him for first time 11th. I added however that it seemed to me means should be found to save Hinh’s face in departing since although he is an obstructive element at present he may prove useful at some future time.
Thereafter I discussed problem with Ely who was present at same social function. We agreed that we would both advise Hinh to obey Bao Dai’s summons promptly. On taking leave of Diem I told him of this agreement. He expressed gratification and said he had already talked over matter with Ely.
Reference Paris 1984 to Department, repeated Saigon 276.2 Diem did not mention any orders Bao Dai may have sent to Xuan or Bay Vien.
At my invitation Hinh called 11th. He spoke forthrightly concerning impasse between him and Diem. He recounted in detail background of difficulty with Diem and declared latter incapable of providing proper leadership.
He stated that primary current problem is to establish some effective system for resisting the infiltration of communism. He felt that during war governmental propaganda and indoctrination program had been inadequate with result that Viet Minh still have many adherents in free Vietnam, particularly outside large towns and cities. He believes that army is only vehicle with discipline, organization and means to reorient people toward national government.
Despite lack of government support, he has marshalled army forces in certain provinces to help people and to win their support. He believes [Page 2239] that such utilization of army in a peacetime role will assist government materially. Hinh reported that where he has implemented system results have been most encouraging (and I have reports from my observers which tend to confirm this).
He referred to civilian companies of unpaid volunteers. He said that in these groups called companies of psychological action 100,000 civilians (pedicab drivers and manual laborers) are organized under general supervision of psychological warfare section of his staff. Hinh declares that it is the activity of this group which government views with concern and fears might lead to revolution.
Hinh declared that if he had wanted to start a revolution, he would have done so before now and that he could start one today if he wished. He stated that he would take no action except for benefit of Vietnam despite government’s opposition to him and army.
Hinh stated that situation which had existed past few months must end shortly otherwise south Vietnam will be lost within one or two months. He said he has taken advantage of opportunity created by dispute between him and Diem to demonstrate to world latter’s incompetence and inability to lead. However, he said it was not up to him to determine if Diem should remain as Prime Minister.
He added however that there are two ways to get rid of Diem: (1) Bao Dai could dismiss Diem or (2) Hinh could execute a coup d’état. However, external considerations had prevented Chief of State and Hinh from getting rid of Diem. Hence latter remains, but if he continues in office he must cooperate with all elements of society, especially with army.
Hinh further stated that decision must be made shortly, either by Diem, army, Chief of State or US to resolve current political crisis. He said that those who intervened to keep Diem in power are responsible for future of Vietnam. He said he realized Vietnam needs American aid but if that aid, employed under incompetent leadership, leads to certain defeat, Vietnam would do better without it.
I thanked Hinh for his frankness.
I told him that I had heard that he had instructions from Bao Dai to report to latter in France and urged him to comply promptly. I assured him that in his absence any steps that I took would be in support of freedom of Vietnam. I also assured him I would do nothing while he was absent which would in any way lower his or army’s prestige. I said however that I had just arrived and was not yet in position to make firm recommendations to my government as to action it should take and I agreed with him that system which he urged (utilization of army described above) made a lot of sense to me. I told him flatly however that if he was to defy Bao Dai he would have to stand alone.
[Page 2240]Hinh admitted that he had instructions to report to Bao Dai but stated that he had not yet made up his mind whether to obey. If he decided not to go to France he would execute a coup d’état. He said that question was whether Vietnam was better off with Diem and US aid or without Diem and our help. He said he realized that if he executed a coup he would have to forego US aid. I assured him that if he revolted US aid would definitely be withdrawn.
I asked Hinh if Cabinet changes suggested by General Alessandri (Embtel 1796 repeated Paris 596)3 appeared sound to him and he replied that he was completely indifferent to proposals. I suggested that when he returned from France he do so as Inspector General or in capacity other than Chief of Staff. I asked then if he would support nomination of General Vy as his successor. He said he would.
Hinh then asked whether I would ask Diem to effect changes if I should determine that his government was incompetent. I replied frankly that I was not committed to support any particular Cabinet but was committed to support Diem.
I then asked him when he expected to leave to report to Bao Dai. Hinh replied he had not decided whether he would leave Vietnam or start a revolution. He said if he decided to go, he would probably leave fifteenth. He said that he was not motivated by any desire to protect his position and, in fact, he would very much like rest of several months; but that he had a responsibility toward country and though he held no hatred for Diem he was convinced that Prime Minister was leading Vietnam to destruction. I again urgently advised him not to attempt a revolution but to obey Bao Dai promptly. Hinh replied he would consult with his friends and determine whether Chief of State was above country or the country above Chief of State.
At the conclusion of our discussion I outlined to Hinh some of my thinking for support of Vietnamese forces. I told him of my conversation with Ely and latter’s agreement that US take over training of Vietnamese armed forces. I pointed out that it was planned gradually to replace French officers on Vietnamese staff by Vietnamese officers. I told him of my conversation with President Magsaysay and latter’s enthusiastic response to my suggestion that Philippines assist free Vietnam in training and providing guidance in various fields of endeavor.
[Page 2241]I assured Hinh that I would urge Diem at every opportunity to broaden framework of government and repeated that in his absence I personally would make no recommendations which would derogate from the prestige of the army or his position. Hinh’s parting words were that he would decide within 48 hours whether to go to France or start a revolution and he said that if he did not leave there would be trouble.
Despite a certain amount of bravado in Hinh’s statements I was quite impressed with his personality and ability. He spoke forcefully and with great clarity and gave me at least the first impression of a sincere desire to save his country in the face of what he regards as an utterly inadequate government. He is still somewhat immature and, despite his protestations to the contrary, is personally ambitious. However, he has qualities of drive and imagination which should be preserved and if possible used to the maximum in a constructive way.
I do not take seriously his threat of a coup d’état but as I do not know the man and know little of his actual hold on the army I cannot guarantee this judgment.
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩
- According to telegram 1984 from Paris, Nov. 9, not printed, Bao Dai had reportedly cabled Generals Hinh and Xuan, ordering them to return to France, and had instructed Gen. Le Van Vien to cooperate with Diem. (751G.00/11–954)↩
- General Alessandri, military adviser to Bao Dai, visited Ambassador Heath on Nov. 10. Alessandri, having returned to Saigon to assess the political situation for the Chief of State, presented a proposal for a durable government under Diem and a list of specific candidates for the various cabinet posts. Among his suggestions were that Phan Huy Quat and Buu Loc serve as Vice Presidents, that the Interior Ministry go to Le Kieu of the Binh Xuyen or to Nguyen Van Tam, and that Ho Thong Minh be named Minister of Defense. Heath reported this conversation in telegram 1796 from Saigon, Nov. 11, not printed. (751G.00/11–1154)↩