Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

120.251G/11–1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Saigon, November 10, 1954—7 p.m.

1794. Repeated information Paris 595. Department pass Defense. From Collins. I had two-hour conversation with Ely yesterday at Dalat. In cordial atmosphere and with what I believe to have been considerable frankness we reviewed major problems facing us here, discussed in general terms provisions of President’s directive to me, and reached preliminary agreement with respect to fairly wide range of issues.

Ely did not conceal that his first reaction to my assignment had been adverse. He said that he had feared Viet Minh would seize upon it as pretext for agitation which might build up dangerously. However, there had been no such development, nor had he noted any untoward reaction among population of Free Vietnam. During conversation I took occasion to impress upon him that my mission here is diplomatic and in no sense narrowly military. Summary of principal points I made and Ely’s responses follow.

1. I said my directive called for development and adoption of measures to foster friendly, non-Communist government in Vietnam, and in particular to support Diem. Ely replied that he had backed Diem and would continue to do so, but that he feared this was a losing game. At present time there is no government in Vietnam. Basic problem to be resolved is Hinh–Diem feud. Ely thinks that at this stage Diem is more to blame than Hinh for persistence of quarrel. Until some modus vivendi is worked out between the two, government will remain paralyzed.

When I asked what alternatives Ely might envisage, he answered that one possibility was to attempt to build up around strong Interior Minister an internal structure capable of buttressing the weakened state. He hesitated to mention the name he had in mind because the man was so ill-considered by Americans: Nguyen Van Tam. Without entering into any commitment so far as Tam was concerned, I said that the American policy is to support Diem, we are not bound to any particular Cabinet list and would certainly wish urge Diem to gather about him as competent a group of Ministers as possible. Ely expressed gratification at this statement and indicated that he could support Diem with more confidence and enthusiasm if we were prepared to bring pressure to bear in this direction.

I suggested both respect to Hinh–Diem dispute and to improvement of Diem’s Cabinet that I take initiative in suggesting remedial measures to parties concerned. Prime Minister, for example, must of necessity be anti-French to a degree and must resist French pressures, therefore he might be more responsive to suggestions of a newlyarrived American. I would of course keep Ely informed. Ely agreed.

Ely brought up Bao Dai’s name later in conversation, saying that Bao Dai had asked him some time ago whether he should return to Vietnam. Ely advised against Bao Dai returning, saying that Chief of State was most unpopular figure in Vietnam. However, Vietnam is now independent, and what would we do if Bao Dai suddenly appeared unannounced? I suggested that this might be one alternative to the Diem government which would be legally admissible if Bao Dai were able to take over active direction of government. I asked whether Bao Dai would now be more acceptable to the people than at time Ely advised against his return. Ely said that state of lassitude among population now is such that Bao Dai might find acceptance. In reply to my question whether Bao Dai had courage enough to return and ability take over government, Ely answered that Bao Dai had enough physical courage to confront danger, but probably not enough courage to undertake tasks incident to heading government.

Under this heading, Ely expressed regret that my directive called so explicitly for support of Diem. He had hoped that we might consider problem together and have greater liberty consider different course of action. I answered that we felt still more could be done to support Diem and that he must be given every possible chance to succeed. If every resource is exhausted and Diem still is unsuccessful, we can take further counsel at that point.

2. I told Ely that we were thinking in terms of support for a national army capable of assuring internal security, but not of meeting large-scale external aggression. We believe protection against such aggression should be afforded by the Manila Pact. In this connection, I said, we felt that an FEC of 100,000 on January 1, 1956, appeared too large and that Congress would probably be unwilling to furnish substantial support to a force of such size.

Ely stated that French policy, adopted in consultation and accord with the US, was to maintain FEC here until national army can protect Free Vietnam against Viet Minh. He said we know that Viet Minh in north are building up military strength and believe that they would be prepared use this force against the south. If Franco-US policy to protect Free Vietnam against this danger is altered, French stand ready to withdraw FEC tomorrow. Plans to build up stable and viable non-Communist state, however, are meaningless unless Viet Minh are prevented by presence of effective military force from taking action against Free Vietnam before it is prepared to defend self. Viet Minh will not be intimidated by threat to invoke terms of Manila Pact. To be effective, any protection afforded Vietnam in this manner would have to be subject of detailed specific treaty arrangement within framework of Manila Pact. I stated it would be difficult to secure any such arrangement. Moreover, Ely added, from French viewpoint, maintenance of sizeable FEC is necessary for protection of 60,000 French nationals. Ely insisted that this question of maintaining adequate defenses in free Vietnam is the pivotal point in formulating long-range policy for the area and must be subject of further consultation between us.

With reference to Vietnamese National Army, Ely said that he strongly opposed its being weakened by existence of independent and often rival armed forces. He agreed that army must be subordinate and loyal to the legal government but not threatened by other forces within its own territory.

3. I told Ely that our policy was, as he knew, to provide aid directly to the three Associated States. While we are anxious to coordinate our efforts with French, we must have full authority and responsibility for distribution of American aid; tripartite bodies could serve for full exchange of information but could not have executive power. As part of this direct aid, we wish to have training responsibility for National Army.

Ely replied that he had long ago invited General O’Daniel to bring in as many as 500 or even 800 training personnel “to operate under the Commander in Chief”. Our problem now, he said, is to develop an American training program which will not provoke Viet Minh reaction or charges that it is in violation of the armistice agreement. Such a program, however, must be effective within imposed limitations and “take account of my authority”. I reiterated that while we would be willing to direct training in accord with broad agreed policies, we should have to have full authority to execute program.

I mentioned to Ely that I had been informed many staff sections in Vietnamese National Army were headed by French officers. I suggested he give consideration to replacing progressively such French officers by Vietnamese, the French withdrawing to positions as advisors to their Vietnamese counterparts.

Ely agreed to do this; details to be worked out later.

4. I told Ely that the fourth major point of my directive was to foster relations between Vietnam and its neighbors in Southeast Asia. I told him briefly of my conversation with President Magsaysay in Manila and said that the Philippines stand ready to help in training Vietnamese to meet problems which in many respects are similar to those confronted and overcome by the Filipinos. In resettlement, for example, the Filipinos have had an experience which might usefully be shared with Vietnamese authorities responsible for relocating refugees from Communist rule in the north. Ely appeared receptive to this idea but made no particular comment.

Concluding conversations, I said that I had been delegated broad powers and hoped that Ely might have similar authority so that we might make joint decisions promptly and without having to refer every detail to our respective governments. Ely replied that within the limits of French policy in Indochina, which he helped formulate, he had great latitude and felt that he needed no further delegation of authority.

As an initial exchange of views I believe conversation with Ely was satisfactory. Of course much remains to be done if we are to work out mutually acceptable formulas for support of Diem Government and for military defense of free Vietnam’s territory.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.