120.251G/11–1054: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
1788. Repeated information Paris 592. I accompanied Collins1 on his initial calls on Diem, Foreign Minister Do, and Ambassador Daridan.
Collins outlined his terms of reference and explained to Diem that prior to arriving at any conclusions he was interested in learning the facts influencing the situation in Vietnam.
Diem discussed at some length refugee problems, problems caused by Sects, and then at very considerable length insubordinate attitude of General Hinh which had completely deadlocked, he claimed, progress of his government. He said, as he has frequently said before, that Hinh was utterly untrustworthy and not efficient, and that only solution was his departure on some military mission away from Vietnam for at least six months. He alleged, as he often has before, that French could easily order Hinh back to service in French Army from which he is only absent on congé. I observed, as I had before, that it was uncertain whether French would order Hinh back to service in French Army or that he would go if he were ordered, and mentioned that any departure of Hinh would have to be arranged with due regard to saving face for himself and the Army.
During call on Tran Van Do latter drifted into explanation of beginning of Hinh Diem conflict. He recalled meeting of officers of General Staff of Vietnamese Army which had voted deposition of Bao Dai and dismissal of Diem Government. Hinh had opened meeting, but had not taken part in discussions. When news of this action of staff officers reached Diem, he immediately ordered arrest of Colonels Lam and Giai, heads of G-5 and 6 in army. Hinh had immediately gone to see Diem and said that punishment of these officers was his responsibility. Hinh had offered once matter was arranged to go on leave in France saying that he was extremely fatigued. Following day Chan, State Secretary for Defense, had appeared suddenly in Hinh’s office, gave him order to undertake military mission in France, handed him airplane tickets, and said he must leave 36 hours later. Hinh had protested he could not leave so precipitately and said he would name his own date. Chan returned next day with tickets for plane leaving three days later. Hinh had then refused to go except at time of his own choosing and conflict was on. Tran Van Do very plainly indicated that if Chan had handled matter in less arbitrary fashion, dispute might have been settled.
[Page 2230]In our talk with Daridan, latter took same line he had in previous conversation in regard to nationwide elections in Vietnam.
He said unsettled point in Washington conversations with Ely and Guy LaChambre was question of whether nationwide elections were to be held in July 1956 as prescribed by Geneva agreements. French took line that nationwide elections could therefore not be held. Daridan said he personally was quite prepared to accept thesis that nationwide elections should not be held, but there should be clear understanding between US and France to that effect and agreement as to what defensive action should be undertaken if Viet Minh on pretext that non-holding of elections was violation of armistice, should renew hostilities. Daridan took line that if we agreed that nationwide elections would not in fact be held Diem might be acceptable Chief of Government of Free Vietnam, although US and France should join their influence to force him to undertake much needed governmental reforms and action. If nationwide elections were to be held in accordance with Geneva agreements, then stronger and more effective Chief of Government than Diem must be found.
- Gen. J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Special Representative in Vietnam, arrived at Saigon on Nov. 8.↩