751G.5 MSP/11–854: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
1761. Repeated information Paris 586. I am not in agreement with position taken in Deptel sent Paris 1692, repeated Saigon 1875.1 Aside from French objectives in maintaining forces here, withdrawal of French forces in 1955 would create military vacuum which very likely, in my opinion, would be filled by Viet Minh activity based on irregular forces which Vietnamese Army in its present stage of training and discipline could not withstand. From all our reports there has been no substantial diminution in Viet Minh military strength. I do not believe Viet Minh would be deterred by Manila Pact which has neither been ratified nor implemented by appropriate military conversations and arrangements. Argument that French in case of open military invasion would seek quick settlement allowing evacuation of foreign forces is not valid in my opinion because Viet Minh operation would not be open mass invasion. It would be para-military operation of infiltration, subversion, and local use of force. Withdrawal of French expeditionary force might present appearance matter already shaken Vietnamese will to resist. Popular as idea may be of causing withdrawal of major portion of FEC, such move would entail such grave risks as to threaten continued existence of free Vietnam. I think as practical measure we should make some contribution to maintenance of FEC during at least first half 1955 although not to extent of $300 [Page 2225] million annually contemplated by French. I suggest that toward midyear we might look at this problem again.
Period which we must consider is that which lies between the present and May 1956, before which time elections presumably must be scheduled. Continued presence of substantial French force over considerable period of this time is essential for maintenance of security and will not in our opinion prevent forming of effective Nationalist Government or detract from national support of such government. Our objective, however, must be to see to it that effective Vietnamese national army is created, capable of taking over from and displacing, on a phased basis, French Expeditionary Corps during this period.
Although essential initially and until Vietnamese national army is capable taking over responsibilities, presence sizeable French forces in Vietnam at time of elections, we agree, would be highly damaging psychologically and prejudicial to favorable outcome of elections in Free Vietnam.
French cooperation which is essential to the successful carrying out of any project in Indochina at this time would be gravely endangered by a complete discontinuance of US support for an adequate expeditionary corps.
Specific comments on points raised in reftel follow.