120.251G/11–654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
1750. Repeated information Paris 581. I saw Daridan yesterday at his request. He said he regretted Ely and La Chambre had taken position against President’s letter to Diem and that Ely had also voiced objections (my telegram 1686)1 to General Collins’ mission. It seemed to him that both these steps were not only in accord with Washington understandings but logical steps in connection therewith. It occurred to him there had been full agreement in Washington on text of understanding but unfortunately words therein meant different things to two sides. It seemed imperative that between Generals Collins and Ely and between Mendes-France and President and Secretary there should be new understanding reached which would mean same thing to both parties. For example, in Washington talks question of Vietnamese elections was not agreed upon, in Daridan’s view. Guy La Chambre [Page 2219] believes thoroughly that nation-wide elections must be held in accordance with terms of Geneva agreements. That was evidently not our view. I said it was definitely not our view and we had made specific reservation against nation-wide elections not held under United Nations auspices. On other hand, it would be necessary for Diem or other government to have elections in free Vietnam to establish legitimacy and popularity of government. I added I thought this was Ely’s view. Daridan said he thought that was reasonable position but if France were to espouse this view there would have to be some understanding about possible military consequences of free Vietnam’s refusal to participate in or be bound by results of elections held under Geneva agreements. He would not say that Viet Minh might on such refusal renew hostilities but it was possibility. If hostilities were renewed it might mean Chinese jet planes over Saigon and it would be necessary to have American jet planes in neighborhood to defend it and indeed it would be necessary to establish airfields here that could support jets.
2. Daridan went on to say that in spite of their misgivings about Diem as leader and administrator he thought United States and France could agree fully to support Diem as permanent solution but it would have to be subject to certain conditions imposed on Diem. Conditions would be: (1) That Diem do something immediately about agrarian reform; (2) That he put in capable Minister Interior; and (3) That President make his peace and establish himself with army. It was not question of army being reconciled to Diem. Army was only important force in this country. I said I would personally agree with all these conditions but I would have to add a fourth which would have to be imposed on Hinh. Fourth was that Hinh leave Vietnam, preferably for good or as a compromise, absent himself from this scene temporarily. He might return as chief of staff, inspector general, or possibly even commander in chief, although I thought last would be going too far. Hinh had acted very badly and was continuing to act badly. Latest episode of Hinh signing memorandum to Nehru in company with Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen Generals was political act which would not be tolerated in stable countries.2 Hinh talked freely, to say the least, against Diem to every foreign journalist that visited Hinh’s headquarters. If Diem’s mishandling Hinh’s insubordination had made latter champion of the army, Vietnamese civil opinion considered Hinh a Frenchman trying to reestablish French [Page 2220] colonial influence over Vietnam, an action which Diem was honored for resisting.
- Dated Nov. 3, p. 2203.↩
- Indian Prime Minister Nehru visited Saigon on Oct. 31 on his return to India, having visited Hanoi on Oct. 16–18, and the People’s Republic of China thereafter. Joint Weeka No. 45 from Saigon, Nov. 6, reported that Hinh and leaders of the sects had presented a memorandum to Nehru expressing sympathy for him but objecting to his support for compromise with the Communists. (751G.00(W)/11–754)↩