751G.5 MSP/11–554: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
1692. Limited distribution. Department considering what position US should reach regarding US financial support for French forces Indochina remainder 1954 and calendar 1955. Would like your views before determining Departmental position for discussion with other agencies. Believe we should move forward rapidly on this since Mendes likely raise subject when he visits Washington and in view French 1955 budget presentation Parliament which has already begun in committee.
US policy is to support indigenous forces in Indochina for purpose internal security and resistance against internal Communist subversion, and President has agreed such forces as well as US funds in support thereof should be minimized. We will not seek indigenous force levels for purpose resisting external aggression since Manila Pact intended serve as such deterrent and would come into play should aggression take place. Although French state purpose French forces Indochina for initial defense against external aggression, believe reasonable assume if hostilities resumed French would probably seek quick settlement allowing evacuation foreign forces in absence large-scale Allied intervention involving ground troops which seems unlikely. Essential motivation maintenance French forces Indochina appears be retention French influence on internal security and political situation (although not to extent of direct clash with Vietnamese National Army) partially to help free Vietnam but also to maintain French presence Indochina and French role in Far Eastern affairs.
We recognize utility continued French military presence Indochina as stabilizing factor during coming year but believe such presence would probably be as effective if say at level 30,000 men as 100,000-150,000. It is possible French are retaining larger forces than necessary in belief US would subsidize these forces in being which if stationed elsewhere would be entirely charged to French financial resources. Note French plan reduce their forces largely by transferring Vietnamese from French payroll to their own and by not replacing other elements as their tours of duty are ended. Note from press reports [Page 2216] Faure now proposes asking US for some $300 million support for remaining French forces Indochina next year.
With above background (which is for your private guidance and not for dissemination) we now considering following position to present to Mendes-France:
- 1.
- US will fulfill prior commitments to reimburse eligible expenditures made on behalf French Expeditionary Corps prior to truce (July 21).
- 2.
We do not believe we obliged reimburse French for expenditures made after truce. However we would agree to lump sum settlement on expenditures made on behalf FEC between July 21 and December 31, 1954.
US reimbursements under both 1 and 2 would come from remaining FY 1954 funds which have been carried over by Congress.
- 3.
- We believe French should take steps repatriate their forces from Indochina more rapidly than by normal rotation and their forces should be thereby reduced to levels within French financial capabilities. We no longer consider necessary for US to share cost these forces and we will not plan provide any further direct financial support to French forces Indochina after calendar 1954. We would agree some 6000 French forces serving as cadre for indigenous forces Indochina could be financed through Associated States as part their own military budgets to which we plan give direct financial support.
Would like your comments soonest on foregoing as well as your best estimate of (a) how much more we would have to pay out under paragraph 1 and (b) what total might be of post-truce expenditures on FEC eligible for reimbursement and what reasonable lump sum settlement you consider we might make against this amount, as well as (c) your estimate whether French in their own interests would be likely continue maintain Expeditionary Corps on some reduced basis even if US financial support discontinued and (d) effect on degree French cooperation with US in Indochina programs.
If we can reach tentative US position on this ahead of Mendes’ departure from Paris we may want you to make some preliminary approach to him. Would also like Collins and Embassy’s comments from Saigon on aspects this cable dealing with future action.
- Drafted by Beigel of WE. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 1875.↩