Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751J.00/10–854: Telegram

The Chargé in Laos (Rives) to the Department of State

secret

Vientiane, October 8, 1954—10 p.m.

55. Repeated information Saigon 92, Phnom Penh 5, Bangkok 14, Paris 31. From Yost.¹ Department’s telegram 55.² Lao leaders face three primary tasks: (1) set up strong united government unafraid of present dangers, (2) establish government’s authority throughout country and take vigorous action against subversion, (3) to meet immediate economic needs of people and commence at once gradual improvement their condition.

First task complicated by dearth of political personalities but simplified by absence basic differences of doctrine among them. As far as I can judge; present Prime Minister is ablest, strongest and most knowledgeable among Lao leaders. On other hand, he is handicapped by relationship and fraternal feeling toward two dangerous brothers, by blame for Lao acceptance of unfavorable Geneva settlement, and by over optimistic belief in reconcilation with Pathet Laos. He will probably have to go, at least temporarily. Unfortunately three alternative candidates are far from ideal, though all appear thoroughly sound on Communist question. Phoui Sannanikone is badly shaken by recent assassination,³ though convincing reassurance from Thai side might restore his nerve. Prince Boun Oum, while upright and firm is not bright, has little political following and is regarded as French instrument. (Of course French desire to substitute Boun Oum for present Prime Minister, who resents their pressure at Geneva, is not entirely disinterested.) Katay Sasorith is ablest after Souvanna Phouma but has reputation of dabbling in corruption and might be difficult keep in line. Yet any new government will have to be based on these three. Reassuring fact is that Crown Prince will in any case play major role and that he is able, vigorous and sincere. On the whole I feel that, while too much should not be expected of new Lao Government, acceptable constellation will be worked out during next month which, with considerable prodding from French and ourselves, will take necessary action.

In order for new government to expel Viet Minh and reestablish its authority in northern province, (1) its anxiety re Thailand supported acts of terrorism must be relieved and (2) it must have more energetic and effective backing from international commission. We are pleased by attitude new Canadian Ambassador and believe he can bring his Indian colleague along in protesting gross and clearly established violations Geneva agreement. If Western powers take up and publicize such protests, I believe gross violations can be checked. It is too early to say whether Pathet Lao can be expelled from or driven underground in two northern provinces but I consider prospects fair if objective pursued vigorously. Public opinion in remainder of country should not, after withdrawal Viet Minh, prove too serious in immediate future, assuming US continues its budgetary and logistic support Lao armed forces.

Possibility of meeting third task successfully depends very largely on material and technical help US, France and others will supply. Amounts are relatively small and economic improvement required keep people contented and immune from subversion is slight.

Most immediate measures US could take to reinforce Lao security are following: (1) persuade Thai Government cease at once all subversion in Laos and support of Lao exiles; (2) supply promptly helicopters to assist international commission in establishing Communist violation truce agreement; (3) exert strong pressure on Lao Government and commission to carry out agreement and reestablish royal authority northern provinces; (4) prepare to implement; commencing close of rainy season at end this month, modest but fast moving program of economic aid, emphasizing food, health and transport.

Rives

1. Minister Yost did not present his credentials until Nov. 1.
2. Telegram 55 to Vientiane, Oct. 5, requesting Yost’s estimate of the situation in Laos, is not printed. (751J.00/10–254)
3. The Legation had reported in telegram 35 of Sept. 19 that Laotian Defense Minister Kou Oravong had been assassinated by unknown terrorists. (751J.00/9–1954) It was further reported in telegram 49 of Oct. 3 that according to French and Laotian authorities, agents of Prince Petsarath, brother of Souvanna Phouma and a former Laotian Prime Minister in exile in Thailand, were apparently responsible for the assassination. (751J.00/10–354)