State-JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417
Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, Friday, October 1, 1954, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follow a list of those present (32) and discussion of a subject other than Indochina.]
[Page 2107]Indochina
Mr. Murphy introduced this subject by remarking that he understood the JCS were currently informed on these conversations through their own representatives. To clarify, however, he called on Mr. Robertson to give a review on the agreement reached with the French representatives (Faure, Ely and La Chambre) on Indochina.
In giving a general review, Mr. Robertson emphasized that the State Department representatives had made no definite commitments with reference to financial assistance either for the French Expeditionary Corps, or for the Indochinese Nationalist forces.
In discussing the Diem–Hinh controversy, Mr. Robertson stated that it was the view of the U.S. Government that Diem was the best man, though he had many serious defects. Hinh, he said, had put up impossible conditions for his participation in the Diem government. The French were definitely pessimistic regarding Diem. Ambassador Heath, Mr. Robertson continued, was to arrive in Paris that day in connection with a direct approach to Bao Dai looking toward a resolution of the crisis in Vietnam.
In the Ely–La Chambre talks, Mr Robertson said, it was agreed that the U.S. would give direct aid to the Associated States and would not work through the French.
Admiral Davis interjected to say that the discussion of training missions for Cambodia and Vietnam was somewhat confused and did not indicate definitely the respective parts to be played in such programs by the U.S. and France.
Admiral Radford said that as he understood it, General Smith had told the French representatives that we planned to keep French advisers in Cambodia. The Admiral said that it was the opinion of the JCS that if the U.S. undertook an aid and training program for Cambodia, this country should be in a position to make its own decision as to what extent the French participate.
Elaborating, Mr. MacArthur said that it was understood that the U.S. was to lead the training program for Cambodia, but that this did not mean the exclusion of France. Obviously, for example, it would be necessary to supplement purely U.S. cadres with people who spoke French, possibly Frenchmen.
Admiral Radford said that the JCS believe that we should not permit the French to believe that they have a right in the program in Cambodia.
On the other hand, Mr. MacArthur remarked, if Cambodia wants the French to participate, it would be unfortunate if we were forced to take the position with the Cambodians that it had been agreed that France should be excluded.
[Page 2108]Admiral Radford continued that as he saw it, we would make the usual bilateral arrangements with Cambodia, and that we could take up the relation of France to the bilateral agreement from there. Bringing the French in now, the Admiral stressed, would create difficulties if it turned out that Cambodia did not want France to participate.
(It was brought out at this juncture, following a query of Admiral Radford, that Ambassador McClintock was that same day presenting the letter from the President to the King of Cambodia together with his letters of credence.)2
At the conclusion of this phase of the discussion with respect to Indochina. Mr. MacArthur and Mr. Robertson agreed that we had not committed ourselves to a joint French-U.S. mission to Cambodia.
Admiral Radford then turned his attention to Vietnam. As he understood it, he said, there was no substantive agreement about a training mission in Vietnam. Mr. Robertson said that under the Geneva agreement, this subject was left vague.
Continuing, Admiral Radford recalled that when he had seen General Ely in Washington last April, General Ely had turned down our suggestion that we participate in a training program; that when General Ely had returned to Saigon in May, he had decided, and had informed us, that we should participate in the training program; and that General Ely now expresses surprise that we did not take over the training program at that juncture. Admiral Radford indicated that he had told General Ely that at that particular juncture we were not certain in our own minds exactly where the French were going.
Admiral Radford reverted to the Diem–Hinh controversy. He called on Mr. Kidder for comment. Mr. Kidder3 said that the key to the situation was Emperor Bao Dai: all depends on His Majesty. Compromise, Mr. Kidder noted, would leave Hinh with the free hand, which would be unfortunate.
Admiral Radford remarked that in his opinion our instructions to Ambassador Heath, in which we permitted him latitude as to whether or not to give all-out support to Diem, was like “throwing the football into the grandstand”. In the Admiral’s opinion, the Ambassador should be given no alternatives: he should be told to support Diem.
Mr. Murphy inquired as to how things would be effected if Hinh were in some way eliminated. Mr. Kidder gave it as his opinion that this would be a healthy development.
Referring to leadership among the local population, Admiral Radford noted that the Vietminh apparently did not lack for leaders whereas the Vietnamese had developed none, and that the Government was rendered powerless by the machinations of a Captain in the Air [Page 2109] Force. In the Admiral’s opinion, we could do just as much with the Vietnamese as the Vietminh had been able to do with their own people. He saw calculated French policy in the present lack of leadership in the southern part of the country. In the Admiral’s opinion, the French army had rendered aid and comfort to Hinh.
Concluding this portion of the discussion, Admiral Radford stated that in his opinion, the net result of our conversations with the French regarding Vietnam was: not good.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]