751G.13/9–1354: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
992. Repeated information Paris 333. Limit distribution. It is perhaps premature to make any definite prediction at this moment but tension in Diem–Hinh conflict appears to be relaxing and result may well be that Diem, with some outside help and advice, may have won this round. During week-end there was always possibility of clash between Hinh’s guards and Vietnamese soldiers guarding military radio broadcasting office, but fortunately no incident occurred.
As reported in mytel 971 September 11, Hinh, taking for pretext story by correspondent Bodard to Paris press that Diem was dismissing him, called up Prime Minister’s office and said if such publicity being issued he would not only not consider leaving but would “take action.” Shortly after that news reached Prime Minister’s office that army radio was broadcasting attacks on Diem Government. I had PAO Hellyer send someone to radio station where he found situation described in Tousi 80 September 13.1 We encouraged Diem to see former Defense Minister Quat, which he did last night, and Quat reports he told Diem his order in relieving Hinh of his duties and attempting unsuccessfully to replace him by other officers and finally by Secretary of State for Defense Chan were imprudent, since Diem did not have necessary authority and power in his own hands to bring about these changes in such summary fashion. Quat generally calmed him down while at same time supporting him in his decision to remove Hinh from scene.
We also conveyed to Diem through his advisers that we thought Defense State Secretary Chan was too rash in his advice regarding removal of Hinh. We are informed that one of latter’s actions was attempt to countermand invitation to Hinh for Diem’s dinner in honor of General Ely tonight. Fortunately Chan was reached before invitation had actually been countermanded.
I went to see Ely this morning at latter’s request. To latter’s inquiry as to what I thought should be done to solve this situation, I said that Hinh should go to France although perhaps his departure might not be as abrupt as Diem insisted, and that once in France organization of [Page 2024] Vietnamese staff could be changed and Hinh could be “elevated” to position similar to that of our Chairman of Joint Chiefs and act as military adviser to Prime Minister, but without direct command of troops. I told Ely I had just heard that Diem had calmed down and had informed me through one of his advisers that, if Hinh would leave, he was prepared to go to see him off at airport and, if Hinh would issue press statement asserting his loyalty to Diem’s Government, Diem would issue similar statement declaring his confidence in Hinh and his intention to retain him in service. Ely said that was also his idea of solution but he thought that as further sop to Hinh latter might be given title of Inspector General of Army. Ely was going shortly to see Diem and urge this solution on him. Hinh, however, should not be informed of any change in his status until he was safely out of country. Ely told me he had sent for Hinh that morning and had had difficult interview although Hinh had shown himself surprisingly calm. Ely had told him that there must not be any disorder in streets of Saigon and that if his officers attempted coup d’etat against Diem Government new regime would not be recognized by France and other countries.
I told Ely that whatever his qualities Hinh could not in my opinion form type of Vietnamese army which France and US sought. Ely said emphatically that was his opinion and that of French General Staff, which held Hinh largely responsible for poor development of Vietnamese National Army to date. He remarked also that Diem had said that when he was summoned by Bao Dai to head new government, Bao Dai had privately advised him that, if he wanted to succeed, he should get rid of Hinh as chief of staff.
After his talk with Diem at noon, Ely informed me that Diem had said he would go to airport to see Hinh off but made no mention of seeing Hinh personally before then or issuing press statement to save Hinh’s face. Moreover, he was insistent that Hinh must leave tomorrow morning, although Madame Hinh had arrived only today from Paris and did not [plan] return immediately to France.
I saw Diem this afternoon. He told me he planned to go to airport to see Hinh off tomorrow but he did not plan to see him before then unless Hinh attended State dinner which Diem was giving tonight. Up to that time Hinh had not given his acceptance. I urged Diem to see Hinh personally and when he saw him to urge him to attend dinner and also recommended that in order to spare feelings and prestige of army, he arrange for press statements by himself and Hinh on occasion of latter’s departure. At that moment Diem’s secretary brought in a telegram from Bao Dai saying that in view of Diem’s explanation [Page 2025] and Hinh’s request for conge he had ordered that Hinh be sent on special mission to France. Diem was jubilant and said that now he would see Hinh. He also remarked that he was pleased that Bao Dai had not let him down.
There the matter stands at present.
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