751G.13/9–1154: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
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971. Repeated information priority Paris 323. Embtel 954.1 Following are latest developments in struggle between Diem and General Hinh:
Faced with refusal General Vy assume duties as Chief of Staff replacing General Hinh, Diem relieved Vy of duty and placed him on inactive service.
After study of list of Vietnamese officers which lasted well into night, Diem decided to order Colonel Minh of Vietnamese General Staff to take over Hinh’s duties. Minh is only 31 years old but appeared to be only candidate available in Saigon area in whom President felt he could have some confidence. State Secretary for Defense Chan was sent in middle of the night to wake Minh and order him take over duties as Chief of Staff. Minh temporized and early this morning sent in his definite refusal.
Diem reacted by appointing Chan, the civilian Secretary of State for Defense, as Chief of Staff in addition his other duties and directed [Page 2019] him take over from Hinh. Meanwhile Colonel LeRoy who has returned from France, was sounded out and claimed he could obtain support “several battalions” in Saigon area. It was reported, although unconfirmed, that LeRoy would second Chan in his new duties.
Chan wished to serve orders upon Hinh relieving him as Chief of Staff and directing him depart Saigon Sunday September 12 for study mission in France. Hinh invited Chan to lunch with him for this purpose. Chan, perhaps wisely, refused but it was agreed that the two would lunch together in public at 1 o’clock today at Majestic Hotel.
At lunch Chan presented General Hinh with Diem’s orders. Hinh stated categorically he could not leave so soon and said he could not depart before Monday or Tuesday. Chan is reported to have said he would see what could be done and to have set about changing reservations to Monday, September 13.
Meanwhile news story was filed by French journalist Lucien Bodard stating Hinh had been dismissed by Diem in “coup d’etat” being staged by President and representing General Hinh as innocent and injured party. Diem’s government was pictured as very weak and about to fall and Diem’s move was one of desperation. Telegraph office held up message and notified Interior Ministry and Interior Ministry in turn informed President requesting permission censor story. Diem at this point had attack of misty metaphysics, refusing to censor story in view his recent promise end all censorship political articles. During afternoon he ordered Interior Ministry to pass article.
Shortly thereafter Hinh telephoned Chan reportedly “in a rage” over the article concerning which he appeared well informed. Hinh told Chan he could stand no more and will “take action”. President has sent his private secretary Kiem2 to appeal to Daridan, informing him of Hinh’s announced intention and requesting assistance prevent use of force. Daridan is in charge temporarily by reason of Ely’s absence in north and General Salan’s absence over the week end in Nha Trang.
At this writing, Hinh has two armored cars at his house in addition to guards to “protect him from the President”. President in addition to Palace guard of 200 men is in process bringing in 100 trusted soldiers in disguise and they are reported to be moving into Palace grounds in guise of refugees carrying weapons hidden in bundles.
General Hinh is reported to have approached Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao to gain their support in appeal to Bao Dai prevent Diem from removing Hinh as Chief of Staff. We are uninformed at present whether this support is designed to go beyond appeal to Bao Dai but hostility of sects toward Diem is well known.
[Page 2020]Diem’s government, weak and hesitant, is very near point where it may be overthrown by force. Attitude of French and whether or not they take action at this time will probably be deciding factor. When I accompanied Senator Mansfield to call on Daridan yesterday evening, Daridan said that French were keeping entirely neutral in the circumstances and would only intervene if they received information that Hinh would try forcibly overthrow Diem. He said French would not tolerate use of force and would summon Hinh and tell him so in case of necessity. We have now reached point where such action on part of French authorities is urgently required.3
- See footnote 2, p. 2016.↩
- Pham Duy Khiem.↩
- Telegram 984 to Saigon, Sept. 11, read as follows: “Your 971 rptd info Paris 323. Department closely following situation and greatly concerned over disunity confronting Diem. In your discretion express to Diem and others US hopes present crisis can be rapidly overcome and strength new government consolidated under Diem who appears working sincerely and conscientiously that end for good of Free Viet-Nam in face Communist danger.” (751G.00/9–1154)↩