611.51G/8–1354
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs (Hensel) to the Under
Secretary of State (Smith)
secret
Washington, August 13, 1954.
Dear Mr. Secretary: In accordance with the informal
request of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested
to consider the draft message to Prime Minister Mendes-France regarding United States policy toward
Indochina. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been received and a
copy is attached. These views
[Page 1943]
are consistent with their views regarding United States assumption of
training responsibilities in Indochina which were forwarded to you with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense on 11 [12]
August.1
This Department fully concurs in the attached views and recommendations of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except that it will not be necessary for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the proposed message after it has been
amended to reflect the recommendations in paragraph 5 of their comments.
Sincerely yours,
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
secret
[Washington,] 12 August 1954.
Subject:
- Message to the French Prime Minister
- 1.
- This memorandum is in response to the memorandum from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 11 August 1954, which requested the comments
and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to a
Department of State draft of a proposed message to the Prime
Minister of France regarding United States policy toward
Indochina.2
- 2.
- In their memorandum to you dated 4 August 1954, subject: “U.S.
Assumption of Training Responsibilities In Indochina”,3 the Joint
Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions which they considered
should be met before the United States assumes responsibility for
training the forces of the Associated States. Particularly pertinent
to the consideration of the proposed message are two preconditions
which, in substance, prescribed:
- a.
- The existence of a reasonably strong, stable government
capable of performing those functions essential to the
successful raising and maintenance of its armed forces;
and
- b.
- The granting by France of full independence to the
Associated States and arrangements for the eventual phased
withdrawal of French forces, officials and advisers from
Indochina, in order to provide motivation and a sound basis
for the establishment of national armed forces.
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of the above
conditions can be said to exist now. The tenure of the present
government in Vietnam appears to be in doubt and subject to final
determination by the French as to the eventual composition of that
government. Until this matter has been definitely resolved, the
strength and stability of the Vietnam Government will hardly be such
as to hold promise of providing the firm direction required for the
raising and maintenance of armed forces. Unless a reasonably stable
government is established, the United States training mission would
lack authority and governmental support essential to the successful
accomplishment of its mission.
- 4.
- While the French Government has announced its intention to grant
independence to the Associated States, it has not announced a plan
for the scheduled relinquishment of French authority or for the
withdrawal of French officials from Indochina affairs. The residual
responsibility and authority, if any, to be retained by the French
Government, particularly with respect to the control to be exercised
over the armed forces of the Associated States, has not yet been
made clear. If, in fact, the French were to retain a degree of
authority and direction in the organization and training of the
indigenous forces, the United States training mission would be
prevented from discharging its responsibilities completely
independent of French participation and control.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the proposed message is
not an unqualified commitment to furnish military aid or to provide
training assistance to the Associated States. They are in accord
with the stated purpose of the message, to reassure both the French
and Associated States Governments of the United States intention to
assist in preventing an eventual Communist take-over in Indochina.
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the
proposed message should state in clearer terms that the final United
States decision as to the extent of military aid and the assumption
of responsibility for training will be contingent upon the
establishment of the prerequisite conditions discussed in paragraphs
2, 3, and 4 above. As presently worded, the proposed message might
convey to the French that U.S. decisions with respect to these
matters have already been taken, without definite French commitments
as to their intentions. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that
the message should be more specific with regard to the United States
desire that its representatives deal directly with the Governments
of the Associated States and that all United States military
material aid should eventually be given directly to the Associated
States rather than through the French Government.
- 6.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the substance of the
foregoing views be transmitted to the Department of State with the
request that they be adequately reflected in any message to the
Government of France, at this time, regarding the furnishing of
military aid to the Associated States or to the assumption of
training responsibilities by the United States in Indochina, and
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be given an opportunity to review the
amended message.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
M. B.
Ridgway
General, United
States Army Chief of Staff
