751G.00/8–1054: Telegram

The Chargé at Vientiane (Rives) to the Department of State

secret

9. Sent Saigon 20, Department 9, Paris 8, Bangkok 3, Phnom Penh unnumbered. As result conversations various Franco-Lao military [Page 1929] including Colonel De Crevecoeur, I submit present military picture Laos with anxieties expressed regarding future and with few immediate plans.

1.
Cease-fire effective August 6 and quiet reigns Laos. Joint Franco-Lao-Viet Minh commission due meet August 7 Khangkhay village on Plaine des Jarres met only yesterday as result delay arrival Viet Minh from Hanoi via military plane. Latter group includes officers which will contact Viet Minh units Laos.
2.
Colonel De Crevecoeur stated Viet Minh began breaking off contact and moving toward frontiers as much as week before ceasefire date. He believes this due fact certain units hard hit and tired and their desire leave without controls specified Geneva agreement. Latter desire thought based enemy plans leave weapons behind with Lao dissidents or hidden in secret depots. Further purpose early movement enemy obviously based plans carry out maximum propaganda campaign during withdrawal. This especially evident south Laos where three regular Viet Minh battalions have broken contact Pakso-Saravane region and are moving toward Annam in company groups via different routes, thereby passing through large number villages. Since Franco-Lao forces no longer allowed move and mixed commission has designated no assembly areas or routes evacuation yet, Viet Minh still free do as they please.
3.

First difficulties joint commission (from Franco-Lao point of view) three-fold according De Crevecoeur. Primary one is certainty Viet Minh will again try separate Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces from Laos by direct or indirect means.

Also sees trouble re future of Vietnamese from Laos who fought with so-called Pathet Lao but not citizens Laos. Feel Viet Minh will try have them recognized as Laotians and regroupable with Pathet Lao (according De Crevecoeur this would immediately increase estimated 2,000 Pathet Lao strength to at least 6,000).

Third worry of French is fact joint commission in five mobile groups touring country. Unless closely controlled this to present excellent propaganda opportunity Viet Minh elements these parties.

4.

One of principal tasks not only of commission members but for future is regain and retain control Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces. Franco-Lao forces not permitted move forces in during 120 days, but in each area some 2,000 Franco-Lao guerrillas and parachute commandos led by about ten French officers each province. These men now ordered group openly scattered points both provinces as regular Lao forces led by members French training mission. These groups then to attempt pro-Lao Government propaganda work while at same time trying keep Pathet Lao forces scattered, leaderless (Vietnamese [Page 1930] have been leaders in past) and unable receive aid from North Vietnam or China.

Neither French nor Laotians believe number of Pathet Lao desirous move regrouping zones in north will be large. Well-known dislike Laotians leave village areas expected result in most requesting remain home districts (danger, however, exists that some may simply go underground and organize for “banditry”). Therefore number Pathet Lao hoped be small if Vietnamese can be weeded out. Franco-Lao side will urge on International Commission that Vietnamese claiming Lao nationality (no Vietnamese able hold it legally) be grouped special area in north and be forced produce proof nationality or be expelled with other Viet Minh.

With regard corridor for Pathet Lao movement between Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces, Franco-Lao authorities determined allow no loitering or establishment camps and hope this too may keep Pathet Lao from organizing effectively.

5.
All French forces Laos including training mission total approximately 9,000 of which some 4,000 will depart by end 120 days (November 19). This will leave 1,500 in training mission and 3,500 at two French bases located Seno and either Paksane or Vientiane. I had announced Paksane as definite for second base but De Crevecoeur states he trying for Vientiane because of airfield which French must ban and because town on direct route from Bangkok to north in event war reopens and other troops move up. Objection is political undesirability have French troops located Lao capital.
6.
For defense Laos De Crevecoeur (future status unknown but will probably lead training mission) plans on light defenses in north, slightly stronger on line Luang Prabang–Plaine des Jarres, with main forces near areas Vientiane and Seno from which rapid movement by plane possible.
7.

Lao National Army already equipped mainly with US material but with few spare parts or replacements. Only ammunition appears be in large supply.

Though French troops which leave are to take their equipment, I believe most heavy equipment to be left Laos.

Lao forces waiting see how much equipment destined for them now in Saigon. Meanwhile, figures re defense matériel needed by Laos being prepared for presentation International Commission with permission import requested.

8.
Matter of extreme importance is spread all possible propaganda counter past and present Viet Minh efforts. To this end orders gone out all guerrilla as well as regular Franco-Lao units that stress be placed immediately fact that Viet Minh are withdrawing and therefore [Page 1931] Laos victorious in struggle. I feel this vital in order combat enemy words they will be back, and shall urge Lao Government have civil officials circulate about country since ban on movement only affects military.

Thus far, French military appear be supplying main ideas and drive effort save Laos. I trust, however, Lao Government aware need for action and will move shortly. Unfortunate delays and confusion caused by late return officials from Geneva, mounting of commissions, and need plan and despatch group for Paris economic talks which of more immediate anxiety Lao Government even than Viet Minh.

Rives