Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/8–954: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Paris, August 9, 1954—7 p.m.

558. Eyes only Secretary. New information which has just come to my attention makes me feel that it is imperative to obtain concurrence or acquiescence of Schumann and Bidault prior to publication of statement on Indochina. When Joyce showed proposed statement¹ to Margerie, Margerie commented that the record seemed to be accurate as far as it went but that it omitted all mention of your offer of atomic bombs to Bidault. He said you had made this offer to Bidault during a private conversation which took place during an intermission of one of the formal talks at the Quai d’Orsay, which were held during your visit here en route to Geneva.

Joyce asked Margerie if this “offer” was not perhaps merely a speculation as to whether atomic bombs could be useful at Dien Bien Phu. Margerie said “No”. He further said that Bidault told him and La Tournelle about your offer immediately after he finished talking with you and that Bidault had the distinct impression that you were suggesting the use of atomic bombs which were to be given by the US to the French. According to Margerie Bidault was much upset about this offer and felt that the use of atomic bombs would have done no good tactically and would have lost all support for the west throughout Asia. Our judgment is that Margerie fears that if Bidault should feel that publication of the statement as drafted placed him in unfavorable light and indicated that he favored continuation of the fighting and was not doing his best to obtain a settlement, he might respond by publicizing his version of the conversation regarding atom bombs and might attempt to take credit for having prevented their use after it had been suggested by US.² I would hope to avoid any such eventuality by prior clearance of statement with Schumann and Bidault.

I do not believe that Bidault would resort to any such irresponsible tactic which would damage interests of free world and prestige of US but we must nevertheless bear in mind that he is ill, nervous, hypersensitive and bitter.

Dillon

1. For text, see telegram 689 to London, Aug. 3, p. 1915.
2. For Bidault’s subsequent recollection of an offer by Dulles of two atomic bombs, purportedly made at Paris in April 1954, see Georges Bidault, Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 196.