751G.00/6–2954: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
5093. Repeated information Saigon 633. Re Embtel 5074 not repeated to Saigon.1Ely came to see me this afternoon for an unofficial talk before returning to Indochina, which he plans to do at the end of the week. I took up with him the question of safeguarding end item equipment as indicated in reftel and he gave me absolute assurances that no such equipment would pass into the hands of the Viet Minh, except in cases where the French forces might be defeated in battle.
Ely said he was pleased to hear of the additional U.S. officers being assigned to O’Daniel. He said that he wished to make his over all position on training clear. It is that he considers the war in Indochina to be a civil war which must be fought on the political as well as the military front. In the long run the only people who can fight it effectively are the Vietnamese themselves. He feels that nothing would give the people of Vietnam more of a feeling of independence than an army of their own which was substantially trained by the U.S. For that reason he was strongly in favor of the U.S. undertaking the training of native troops in Vietnam. He felt the problem was as much one of morale as of military efficiency.
[Page 1762]I pointed out to him that although the additional officers could be used for training, they did not constitute a new training mission and that he would have to discuss this subject with O’Daniel in Saigon. He said that he realized this and that while he would prefer the U.S. to undertake the complete training of Vietnam forces, including the sending of U.S. officers into combat with Vietnam troops as advisers, he had never attempted to hide the fact from O’Daniel that this would naturally draw the U.S. a good deal further into the war than they were at present. He said he could well understand it if the U.S. was not prepared to undertake this form of training. However, he hoped that they could work out the next best compromise.
He said that he felt that the Western Powers had lost tremendously in prestige in the last two or three months as against world communism and that the negotiations with the Viet Minh had become much more difficult because of the Viet Minh belief that the menace of U.S. intervention no longer existed. He said that the only way to stand up to the Communists was to have complete unity and that the obvious lack of unity among the three great Western Powers in the last few months had had a terribly damaging effect in the world generally.
He said his own position was particularly difficult because he had to regroup his forces so as to protect them from possible annihilation. This meant giving up territory in the middle of negotiations which, naturally, did not facilitate the negotiations. In answer to a question he said he expected the regrouping to be completed in the next 10 or 15 days.
As he left he said he wished he were back in Washington with the standing group instead of having to handle the present situation in Indochina, which seemed to him very nearly impossible on both the military and the political fronts.
- In telegram 4825 to Paris, June 25, the Department of State instructed Ambassador Dillon to raise with Premier Mendés-France the question of the safeguarding of U.S. MDAP equipment. (751G.00/6–2554) Dillon reported in telegram 5074 from Paris, June 29, not printed, that the Premier had that day expressed sympathy with the concern of the United States. He asked the Ambassador to discuss the matter further with General Ely, with whom Dillon was to meet that afternoon. (751G.00/6–2954)↩