751G.5/7–2752: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State1
220. Rptd info Paris 54. I have had long talk with General Salan who leaves next week for fortnight in Paris. Principal purpose—and hope—of his Paris trip is to persuade French Air Force to send him, if only temporarily, sufficient transport planes, pilots, maintenance crews so that he can assure air drop and parachute operations in support of offensive operations within limit of French capabilities during next fall and winter.
[Page 226]At present he can airlift and parachute only about one battalion at a time although he has a total of eleven parachute troop battalions including a Cambodian and a Laotian unit. If he is to engage in any offensive beyond Tonkin delta with any possibility of success he needs enough planes to be able to drop three battalions simultaneously. Ideally he said he should have enough transport for a six battalion drop but he realized under present circumstances he could not obtain planes or crews for operations on such scale.
Not only does he need sufficient planes to transport three parachute battalions but he said he should have them available before end of September or early in October before certain Viet Minh divisions which should be appropriate targets at that time have had time to rebuild their cadres, troop strength and morale.
Salan admitted he was not very optimistic that he would get planes, pilots or crews from French Air Force in required numbers or on time. He would need full backing of Letourneau who he said was not yet entirely persuaded as to prudence of Salan‘s proposed offensive operation. He hoped, however, to persuade Letourneau.
Salan said if he were unable obtain sufficient transport planes and crews to stage successful operation by parachuting troops to rear of Viet Minh division attacked the Viet Minh would have time to recover strength and morale and undoubtedly would launch attack toward end of year. While Salan says he is certain his troops can repel any Viet Minh offensive they would suffer losses which could be avoided if he were able to undertake offensive operations early this fall. In all other respects save air transport he had sufficient troops and equipment for his proposed fall operations but increased air lift was prerequisite to their being undertaken.
Comment and recommendations:
I believe it imperative that initiative be wrested from VM and I fear that unless Fr Govt supports offensive plans like Salans no effort will be made to do so.
Letourneau has not rejected plan but Fr Cab seems increasingly inclined to mere “holding operation” or harassing defensive in IC.
This seemed evident in Paris talks prior to Wash mtg then at Wash and most recently at Spore where Fr lack of “victory psychology” disquieted Brit (mytel 131 July 7 [17]). Moreover Fr expeditionary force in IC is now actually to be reduced by 2 battalions as initial tardy installment on De Lattre‘s commitment to return troops to Fr 1952 and as concession to Fr polit pressures. Altho this loss is theoretically compensated by multiplication of Viet battalions and by increase in mobility and fire-power brought by US aid it is compounded with shortfall in replacement and rotation sched, and slow pace in build-up of Viet army by direct recruitment (rather than unit [Page 227] transfers from FTEO) which will result, on Fr own showing, of net increase of men under arms of only 7,000 in 1952.
Reasons for Fr caution probably incl fingers burnt at Hoa Binh, war weariness at home, collapse of earlier over optimistic estimates, example of static phrase in Korea war, hope that “something will turn up” in way of gen FE settlement and “theory” that successful offensive will only precipitate Chi Commie descent on IC.
Regardless of these rationalizations fact is that stalemate in IC will foster listlessness in Vietnam Govt and army, allow VM to build its strength and choose its time, soften up SEA for Commie infection, delay day when there can be real return of Fr cadres to def of Eur, continue burden on US and Fr indefinitely, and set stage for ignominious and fateful negotiation with VM.
To avoid sinking into this morass, I strongly recommend that we explore capabilities of Franco–Viet offensive operations with top Fr levels in IC and at Paris.
Our top mil auths (and Gen Trapnell2 when he arrives here) shld get more detail on Salan‘s plan of campaign, but I believe it is urgently desirous for him to have additional airlift and maintenance he needs for a 3 battalion lift.
As he described it to me his fall offensive will not in itself be decisive but effect of knocking out one of VM reg dins may be unpredictable. At very least it shld spoil VM offensive plans.
Since any planes borrowed from France and NoAfr affect NATO sitn I believe it wld be desirable for SAC Eur to interview Salan during his current visit.