751G.00/4–854
Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State
We have been going under the assumption that the French have, in their own minds, no real alternative to fall back on at Geneva should negotiations fail to produce a settlement which would not in effect mean the turn over of Indochina to the Communists. I believe the above assumption is erroneous in so far as the way Frenchmen like Bidault and Laniel (who do not wish to sell out) see matters. From our talk with Bonnet last Saturday1 immediately following his return from Paris and your conversation with him this morning2 as well as [Page 1295] reports from our Embassy in Paris, I believe the French have reached the conclusion from your March 29 speech and other utterances which have been made by the President and others on Indochina that the U.S. has definitely made up its mind to intervene in Indochina militarily to prevent it from falling into Communists hands, whether or not others join us in united action. This assumption on the part of the French, which I honestly believe they hold, may well be in large part responsible for their unwillingness to even consider seriously the possibility of united action in Indochina until after the negotiations at Geneva have run their full course. The French undoubtedly feel that any agreement regarding united action prior to Geneva would boomerang with French public and parliamentary opinion along the lines that the French Government has prejudged the Geneva talks by taking steps which will continue the war and since they also believe that the U.S. will come to their aid, whether or not there is united action, there is no need for them to risk French opinion reacting as set forth above.
In other words, the French believe that we have made up our own mind irrevocably to intervene militarily to prevent Indochina from falling and since we have reached this decision, they can always fall back on us if negotiations at Geneva fail and the French Government does not feel that it could afford to sell out to the Communists.
My conclusion is that to get the French to think seriously about united action, you must face them next week with the true picture, namely, that we can assist in bailing them out only on the basis of united action and that in fact they have no alternative or fall-back position.3
- For the memorandum of the Dulles–Bonnet conversation of Saturday, Apr. 3, see p. 1225.↩
- For the memorandum of the Dulles–Bonnet conversation of the morning of Apr, 8, see p. 1290.↩
- In despatch 2563 from Paris, Apr. 8, the Embassy transmitted an eight-page memorandum on the subject of “What Happens in France if an Indochina Solution Is Not Found at Geneva.” The Embassy’s tentative conclusions included an estimate which is relevant to the views expressed here by MacArthur: if no settlement was obtained at Geneva, it appeared likely that a French governmental and parliamentary majority would favor “internationalization” of the war, and would seek allied and particularly United States intervention as an alternative to direct negotiations with the Viet Minh. The Embassy warned that France might then confront the United States, directly or indirectly, with the alternative of intervening with its own forces or accepting a “political settlement” between France and the Viet Minh. (396.1 GE/4–854)↩