Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/9–853: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, September 8, 1953—4 p.m.

950. Repeated information Saigon priority 88. Prime Minister Tam returned unexpectedly to Paris from Cannes yesterday. Embassy officer called on him last evening.

Tam stated he had advanced his return to Saigon by two days (he is leaving today) as a result of the pressing need to get the Nationalist Congress which will choose the Vietnamese delegation to the forthcoming Franco-Vietnamese negotiations under way. He had had a most satisfactory two days with Bao Dai in Cannes and was proceeding on instructions from the Chief of State, with which he entirely agreed.

Tam explained that the Congress would have an entirely free hand in choosing the members of the Vietnamese delegation. He hoped that all sections of Vietnamese opinion (excepting the Viet Minh) would be represented. The delegation need not include members of the government but Tam obviously intends that it shall. Although given ample [garble] Tam made no reference to Buu Loc’s claim that he would serve as liaison officer between the Congress and Bao Dai.

We questioned him as to the significance of the declaration issued by the five anti-Communist nationalist leaders including Monsignor Ngo Toc-Dinh, Pham Cong-Tac and Nguyen Zuan-Chu, which was fully covered in yesterday’s Paris press. Tam belittled the importance of the declaration. He claims to have known before his departure from Saigon that it was to be made. The signers had waited for his absence to release it. He described them as chronic dissenters whose main objective was to get in the public eye to assure a place for themselves in the delegation. Bao Dai’s position had not been harmed by the declaration. It was possible, even likely, that the signatories would be members of the delegation.

As to the timing of forthcoming events Tam would make no prediction regarding the length of time required to establish the Nationalist Congress much less the time required by the Congress to choose the Vietnamese delegation. He believes “it may take weeks or months”.

Tam approached the subject of postponement of his scheduled trip to the US reluctantly although it was obviously for him the prime purpose of the interview. He expressed his concern at offending the US Government by requesting a further postponement of his visit but admitted that his schedule was now such that he did not see how he would be able to get to the US by September 21, although he still intended to try. We gave him strong assurances that we understood perfectly the urgency of the tasks facing him and were confident that the US Government would consider any request for postponement of his trip sympathetically. We urged him to make a decision as soon as possible, reminding him of the busy schedule of the officials he would expect to see in Washington. He replied that he would make a final decision soon after his arrival in Saigon where he would be able to judge the difficulties facing him in the formation of the Congress.

Tam took pains throughout to impress us with the solidarity of his position and the extent of his understanding with Bao Dai. If he had received his walking papers in Cannes he concealed the fact admirably. He appeared to be returning to Saigon not as a man who had just lost a battle but as one who had just overcome a difficult obstacle and was impatient to get back into the fight with renewed vigor and confidence.

We believe that he has already decided to request postponement of his trip to the US but wishes we do so from Saigon rather than Paris, both as a courtesy to Ambassador Heath and as a means of avoiding any implication that Bao Dai had been responsible for influencing his decision (as he undoubtedly has).¹

Tam’s claims regarding the importance of the Nationalist declaration of September 6 appear to be borne out by today’s Paris press account of the attempts of the signers to annul the declaration before its release and the subsequent withdrawal of that portion of it which criticizes Bao Dai.

Dillon

1. In telegram 433 from Saigon, Sept. 11, Ambassador Heath reported that President Tam had informed him that he preferred to postpone his visit to the United States in view of his responsibilities in connection with the formation of the national congress. Ambassador Heath had indicated that his government would understand perfectly. (751G.00/9–1153) The Department of State announced the postponement of the Tam visit at the daily news briefing of Sept. 14. No new date was specified. (ON files, lot 60 D 641)