Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, September 4, 1953, 11 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, September 4, 1953, 11 a.m.

Present

• Admiral Radford²
• General Twining
• General Ridgway³
• General Carns [Admiral Carney]⁴
• General Everest
• Admiral Gardner
• General Lemnitzer
• General Gerhart
• General Ruffner
• Mr. H. Freeman Matthews
• Mr. Robert R. Bowie
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II
• Mr. Livingston Merchant
• Mr. Ridgway Knight
• Mr. Philip Bonsal
• Mr. Frederick Nolting
• Mr. U. A. Johnson
• Mr. Charles C. Stelle
• CIA
• General Cabell
• Defense
• Admiral Smith⁵
• NSC
• Mr. S. Everett Gleason

Mr. Matthews: This is our first meeting since you gentlemen came in as the new Chiefs of Staff. I would like to say that from the State Department’s point of view we have found this series of friendly and informal meetings extremely valuable. For our part we have learned a lot in these conversations about the military implications of what we do in the political field and conversely we have had opportunities to discuss with you the political impact of what you do in the military field. We think that these State–JCS Meetings have contributed greatly to our understanding and effectiveness.

Admiral Radford: I am sure I can speak for the new Chiefs of Staff in saying that we look forward to the closest continued association with you in the State Department.

Mr. Matthews: We would like to talk this morning about Indochina. There have been in the past several discouraging factors. On the military side the French have failed to show an offensive spirit or to demonstrate confidence. On the political side the French have up till now given the natives in Indochina no incentive which would make them really feel that they were fighting for their own country. We think that right now the recent developments may be hopeful. General Navarre has shown signs of possessing a really aggressive spirit and his plans call for offensive action. On the political side the recent French declarations that they are willing to go ahead with negotiations to complete the independence of the Associated States may have very valuable political effects. There is particular urgency now in that the rainy season will stop in September and the fighting season will open. The French have now agreed, subject to receiving from us additional assistance they have requested, to send some nine battalions of reinforcements to Indochina. This is a decision that frankly we would not have thought possible some months ago. It is therefore really urgent that we get ahead with an NSC decision on whether or not we will make available to the French the financial assistance for which they are asking.

Mr. MacArthur: It is important to realize that the French decision to send nine battalions of reinforcement to Indochina is one bound to be particularly unpopular. If we don’t get an agreement with them sewed up immediately and if the troops are not actually moving in the very near future, we have some apprehension that this favorable decision might become a political football and be reversed. In that case this promising opportunity would go down the drain. Laniel has told our Secretary of his determination really to go through with this decision. We don’t think that it is likely, in fact it is highly improbable, that Laniel would be succeeded by any French leader who would be willing or able to take as forthright and positive a position on Indochina as Laniel has now adopted. We feel that if we don’t move rapidly to get an agreement with the French sewed up now we might run the risk of encountering a successor French Government, which would look primarily toward withdrawal from Indochina. If we can’t act to take advantage of this immediate opportunity we may be faced with a most difficult situation with regard to Indochina next year. Premier Laniel is well aware of the difficulties of the situation in Indochina, He is particularly aware of the importance of the political developments there. He has said that he wants to remove the remaining old-line colonial administrators and to undertake genuine negotiations for the independence of the Associated States. We have been concerned on the timing of the actual movement of reinforcements. Up until yesterday the French had talked of trying to get their forces out there by the middle of December. For the reasons I have already outlined, we have thought it was imperative to get the reinforcements actually moving. Yesterday we received an encouraging message which said that the French are now working out schedules which would get forces to Indochina by the first of November.⁶ The immediate problems that we face in this government center around the NSC consideration of this question next Wednesday.⁷ The President will have to decide whether or not we can notify the French of our willingness to provide them with additional financial assistance and the terms on which we provide them with such assistance. The President will also have to consider what method to use in securing legislative approval for making available any additional financial assistance. For our own part we feel that there is no real alternative to giving the French the help which they are asking for unless it is that of accepting gradual French withdrawal from Indochina. We feel that on the basis of the information which the French have given us we do have grounds for moving ahead in an effort to assist the French to make progress in Indochina.

Mr. Merchant: I think there are three factors which bear emphasizing in this situation. In the first place this French Government is the only one in recent years that has been willing to contemplate an increased effort in Indochina. In my opinion it may be the last French Government which is willing to take on such an effort. The second point that I think we should keep in mind is what the French really need and want at this stage is budgetary assistance rather than end items, and the third point is that if the French can start on a course which leads to success in Indochina and which promises the possibility of eventual withdrawal of some French expeditionary forces, this might be the greatest single factor contributing to French ratification to EDC and the achievement of a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe.

Mr. MacArthur: I think the last point that Merchant made is a very important one. From our talks with Laniel it is clear that the Indochina situation has a very direct bearing on the French attitude toward EDC.

Admiral Radford: As you know, I have had some opportunities to become familiar with the situation in Indochina. I, personally, have felt that the basic difficulty was political rather than military and the political difficulties centered in Paris. Since Delattre died there has been a deterioration in the situation. Delattre had sufficient prestige and authority so that he wasn’t hamstrung by orders from Paris. With his death the civil and military authority in French Indochina was split up and the effects of political indecision in Paris were intensified. I personally think that the French, if they really put their heart into it, could win a military victory in Indochina in two years and with true aggressive leadership they might do it in one year. I thought Salan had a chance last year to almost wrap up the war. He gave me an outline of what he was going to do and it looked very sensible, but the trouble was he simply didn’t do it. The French will have another chance this fall.

I have always to some degree discounted the possibility that the French might decide to pull out of Indochina because that would so clearly mean the end of the French as a great power. But for this very reason it is clearly in our interest to prevent a French withdrawal just because we would lose the French as a powerful ally. I feel we should comply with the request which the French have made just as rapidly as we possibly can act on it. Mr. Dulles’ statement in St. Louis⁸ is of real importance in this situation. The French have always given as an excuse for not undertaking offensive action the possibility that offensive action might result in Chinese Communist intervention. The Secretary of State’s indication that we would take a very serious view with any Chinese Communist intervention should go far towards eliminating this French excuse. I also think that Laniel’s statement that he is going to remove the old colonial civil servants in Indochina is very important. All in all I think that there is now a chance of putting the Indochina war on the right track. If we give the French the backing that they are asking for and if the French go through with what they say they are going to do, I think we might look forward to the possibility of the French withdrawing part of their forces within two years. One question I have is whether or not we actually have the money.

Mr. Matthews: I have the impression that there is money earmarked which could be used.

Mr. Nolting: There are funds reserved which could be used. We have some problems in finding ways to use the funds in the precise way in which the French would like, but I think we can overcome those problems.

Mr. MacArthur: I would like to underline what Admiral Radford has said about the importance of moving rapidly. If we move fast we really help the French in creating the means and the spirit for them to move rapidly.

Admiral Radford: I think you are quite right. Last May you may remember that I recommended giving them some C–119’s and we managed to move on it with real speed. I really recommended this not because I was absolutely sure they needed the planes, but because I knew if we didn’t give them the planes they would have an excuse to blame us for not cooperating and that moving fast on the planes helped spur their own efforts. There is one thing I would like to bring up. I think it would be useful if we had an American officer out there to sort of ride herd on what the French do this campaigning season. If in the meantime we have agreed to give the French the money they are asking for, I would like to recommend that we send O’Daniel out to buck up Navarre in going through with his plans.

Mr. MacArthur: If O’Daniel goes back after we give the French this additional assistance, it will strengthen his hand in encouraging Navarre to deliver on his plans.

General Ruffner: On the question of money, I think it is evident that we will need clearance with congressional leaders.

Mr. MacArthur: Our thought was that we first might get the legal advice as to use of reserved funds for this purpose and then move into the problem of congressional relations.

Mr. Nolting: Since I last talked with General Ruffner I have indications from our legal people that the problem will not be primarily a legal problem, but essentially that of getting an OK from congressional leaders.

General Cabell: Might I mention that from the point of view of CIA, we think that the French have set their sights too low on what might be done in guerrilla warfare. We don’t think that the French will get anywhere in guerrilla warfare unless Navarre takes a real interest in it and pushes it. If he does, however, we think that something might really be accomplished.

Admiral Radford: I agree the French haven’t exploited their possibilities in that field and up to now they have been afraid to trust the native people.

Mr. Matthews: What is the actual situation with regard to an NSC decision.

Mr. Bowie: On August 5 [6] the French request was discussed in general terms in the NSC.⁹ At that time the President said that if State, FOA, and the JCS were agreed that the French program had possibilities of success, the U.S. should be prepared to exceed [accede] to the French request. I assume that it is now up to us to come forward with a formal expression of opinion as to whether the French progress fulfills the various requirements that the NSC stipulated.

Admiral Radford: We have sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense which gives our views on the possibility of success of the Navarre Plan.¹⁰ In general it says that we believe necessary support should be given to the French conditional on evidence of French willingness to go through with the program. I understand the Secretary of Defense has sent our memorandum over to your Secretary with his concurrence.

General Ridgway: I have a question on this. Do we just give the French $385 million and then sit back and hope that they meet our conditions? I have read the French documents and frankly I don’t get any particular impression of offensive spirit from what they are talking about.

Mr. MacArthur: They don’t say they will take an all-out offensive this fall—they do say that they will undertake offensive actions which they hope to step up in spring and direct themselves to making their main effort in the next dry season.

Admiral Radford: I personally don’t believe there is any reason why they have to wait a year. I think the French have enough out there now, and particularly if they reinforce this fall, to win the war if they would only change their military concept. They are all tied up in a static position and are afraid to move out of their bases and hit the organized Viet Minh divisions. A change of concept on the part of the French could do a lot. I think if we can send O’Daniel out to ride the herd on them, he might be able to talk Navarre into really pushing forward.

Admiral Carnes [Carney]: My feeling is that if the French pull out of Indochina then the problem is going to be right in our laps. It seems to me that this is the time for us to help the French in taking forceful action. I think we should go along with their request on the condition that we have a chance to needle them into taking aggressive action. I think we want to be in a position to give the high command direct advice and to expand the possibilities of the MAAG influencing French action.

Mr. Merchant: With regard to General Ridgway’s question, we could make an agreement which would result in our paying out the money over a stated period of time and in installments. But in the light of the political problems of the Laniel Government, we think it would be better for us to say that we will give them all the assistance which they are requesting provided they do their part and not to make an agreement which would clearly indicate that we were doling out the money over a period of time.

Admiral Radford: I agree. Then if the French do back down on their part, there is nothing to keep us from backing down on our part.

1. This State Department draft was not cleared with the participants.
2. Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since Aug. 15, 1953.
3. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, since Aug. 15, 1953.
4. Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations since Aug. 17, 1953.
5. Rear Adm. H. P. Smith, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.
6. Reference is to telegram 902 from Paris, Sept. 3, p. 748.
7. Sept. 9.
8. See editorial note, p. 747.
9. For the record of the action taken by the National Security Council at its meeting of Aug. 6, see p. 718.
10. See memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Aug. 28, p. 744.