Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158
United States Minutes of the Third Tripartite Meeting, Washington, July 13, 1953, 10:30 a.m.1
ST MIN 3 (Draft)
Participants
- United States:
- French:
- United Kingdom:
[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]
Indochina
M. Bidault warned that “peace in Korea might mean war in Indochina”. He referred to Indochina as the wound in the side of Southeast Asia and suggested that the three Ministers should probe all possible means of improving the situation in the essential area of Southeast Asia. He said that he had nothing specific to propose at the moment but simply wished the other Ministers to reflect on this problem. He added that he might have more to say on this subject later.
M. Bidault pointed out that his concern with Indochina did not grow out of a French desire to pull out, but because the French desired to liquidate the war with honor. He urged that the Ministers not neglect the possibility of preventing in Indochina the loss of “the good that might come elsewhere”.
The Secretary said that he had listened attentively to M. Bidault’s remarks, especially his inference that Indochina might be discussed in any political conference following a Korean armistice. He pointed out that the UN had never taken any part in Indochina nor had it been invited to do so. He agreed that no opportunity should be thrown away to explore ways to extend the areas of peace in the world. He said that to attempt to agree that Indochina should be on the agenda of the post-armistice political conference would raise many difficulties.
Lord Salisbury said that the point raised by M. Bidault was most important, but very complicated. He said that Indochina had never been before the UN and that it was his understanding that the French had not wanted this. He said that since the political conference was a matter of UN concern and would be called on an ad hoc basis to deal with Korea, it would not be appropriate to put Indochina on the agenda. However, if Korea was dealt with satisfactorily in the conference and if it were found that a favorable atmosphere existed, then we should keep an open mind about other matters to be explored. The policies of the Soviet Government and its satellites are unclear at the moment, but it might be that they will wish to liquidate all of their wars.
M. Bidault agreed with the U.S. and the U.K. that procedural difficulties existed, but pointed out that procedure was not always a factor uppermost in the public mind. He added that he had not stated that the conference should deal with Indochina but only that the Indochina situation should be dealt with. He was not very optimistic about the atmosphere in the political conference. Since Indochina is of great interest, not only to France, but also to the U.S. and the U.K., [Page 671] he might have some specific proposals to make to the two governments through normal diplomatic channels, provided a Korean armistice is achieved.
The Secretary asked M. Bidault if he wished to report further on Indochina, particularly with respect to the recent French notes to the Associated States.
M. Bidault said that the steps taken by the French had been welcomed by the Associated States, especially Laos and Viet Nam. He said there had been a less favorable reaction from Cambodia.
“What did we say? We said that independence, not something else, would be granted”. He said that the Associated States would determine the nature of the negotiations, which would be conducted immediately and rapidly with all States. The negotiations will deal with political, economic and military matters as well as symbols which, M. Bidault said, are more important than at first glance. He referred to the problem of the rights of the Chinese population under existing Treaty arrangements. He said that military commands would be transferred under existing agreements. As for state officials, the French would keep only those requested by the Associated States, but he predicted that the Associated States may ask for more French officials rather than less. He referred to the new French Ambassador as a man well known to the U.S. and U.K. representatives, a man of great prestige and merit. He said that no one could believe that he would have a “pro-consular state of mind”.
He said that many people wondered why the situation in Indochina had appeared to deteriorate, particularly by comparison with de Lattre’s statements. He said that “the front is nowhere and the enemy is everywhere”. While the enemy has no large quantities of heavy weapons, it was extremely difficult to conduct a war against people who appeared to be peasants by day and were soldiers by night. In Indochina, he said, there was always the “burglar-policemen” relationship, that is, the policemen must always wait for the burglar to make the move. He said that it was impossible to find large concentrations of the enemy against which military maneuvers could be conducted. The foe was extremely mobile and operated principally in small groups by night.
He referred to the new plan devised by the French Government which involved: (1) an acceleration of the U.S. of Associated States troops and (2) expansion of “means”. He said that an expansion of means would involve increased expenditures and that, while France had received considerable aid from the U.S., the increased expenditures could not be carried out on the basis of the present level of aid. [Page 672] He said that a new French plan envisaged gaining superiority over the Vietminh in quality and means, if not numerical superiority. He said that he had discussed the details of this program previously with both the Secretary and Lord Salisbury.
He asked that the action taken by the French with respect to the Associated States be recognized by the conference and referred to the final communiqué. He said that this would encourage his Government and the Associated States and call the attention of the world to this recent action. He added that the French delegation would table a suggested statement on this for inclusion in the communiqué.
Lord Salisbury said that his government was most interested in the steps being taken by the French toward the Associated States. He said that M. Bidault had referred to them as independent and sovereign states and he wondered if they would be analogous to members of the British Commonwealth. With respect to the military situation, he said that the British experience in Malaya made it easy for them to understand and appreciate the French difficulties in Indochina. He referred to the new French military program and asked if it were true that the French Government was prepared to initiate new measures at considerable sacrifice in Indochina. He asked this not from idle curiosity or because of the British interest in Southeast Asia, but with reference to M. Bidault’s earlier remarks regarding negotiations. He stressed that if the French Government were considering negotiation, they should negotiate from strength. If the French negotiated from weakness, it would do far more harm than good.
M. Bidault said that the situation in Indochina was not deteriorating in any deep or inevitable way. He stressed that the French were holding the vital points and areas. He pointed out that there was the question of whether it was advisable to decrease strength in Europe in order to increase strength in Asia, and he touched briefly on the problem of sending conscripts to fight 12,000 kilometers from home.
In answer to Lord Salisbury’s question, he said that the relation of each member of the French Union is determined by “statutes” agreed between states concerned. He referred to the chapter on the French Union in the text of the French Constitution.
Lord Salisbury hoped that it would be possible to return to Far Eastern questions later in the conference.
The Secretary suggested that each delegation nominate a member to work on the Far Eastern section of the communiqué. He designated Mr. Johnson for the U.S.; Lord Salisbury named Mr. Tomlinson; and the French named M. Roux.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
- The source text indicates that these minutes were prepared by Walter N. Trulock of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. The minutes were circulated to U.S. officials on July 15 as document ST MIN 3 (Draft) without having been cleared or approved. For an additional portion of the minutes describing discussion of European questions, see volume v. The meeting was summarized in telegram 158 to Paris, July 14 (also sent to London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Taipei, Pusan, and New York), not printed. (396.1 WA/7–1453)↩
- Joseph B. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.↩
- Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State.↩
- Robert E. Matteson, Assistant Director for Research, Statistics, and Reports, Mutual Security Agency.↩
- Chief of the European section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.↩
- Gontran Begoügne de Juniac, Minister, French Embassy.↩
- Jacques Vimont, Co-Director of the Cabinet of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.↩
- Jacques Martin, First Secretary, French Embassy.↩
- W. D. Allen, Head of the Central Department, British Foreign Office.↩
- P. H. Gore-Booth, Public Relations Counselor, British Embassy.↩
- J. H. A. Watson, First Secretary, British Embassy.↩
- F. J. Leishman, Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- I. F. Porter, First Secretary, British Embassy.↩